

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1325741-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 8
Page 50 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 51 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 53 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 143 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 144 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 145 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 146 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 190 ~ Duplicate - Page 186;

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
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FOI/PA# 1204182-0

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Page 190 ~ Duplicate - Page 186;

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CC: N
B
BELMONT
DONOHUE

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

April 1, 1955

DIRECTOR, FBI

59169

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

Security Informants - General

I thought you would be interested in the attached Photostat of an article entitled: "F.B.I. Fighting to Protect Identity of Spies on Reds," which was published in the "Louisville Times," Louisville, Kentucky, on March 22, 1955.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY SP2 PML/mjc

Enclosure

cc: Mr. William F. Rogers (Enclosure)
Deputy Attorney General

cc: Assistant Attorney General (Enclosure)
Warren E. Burger

RECORDED-48

INDEXED-48

EX-107

APR 14 1955

JDD:DE (9)

Tolson _____
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Belmont _____
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Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

69 APR 15 1955

RECEIVED READING ROOM
FBI
APR 1 9 49 AM '55

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo

F.B.I. Fighting to Protect Identity of Spies on Reds

Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Value of Trained Undercover Agents Would Be Destroyed If Unmasked

By PAUL R. LEACH

Special to The Chicago Daily News and The Louisville Times

Washington, March 22. — Despite pressure in Congress hearings for full rights of an employee to confront an accuser in a loyalty case, the Justice Department is in a fight to the finish to protect identity of its most valued informants.

Back of this is a belief that Communist agents have never let up in efforts to get jobs in "sensitive" offices, and are constantly trying to put the finger on undercover counterspies.

The F.B.I. does not admit it, but in the past it has had trained agents work their way into inner Communist Party posts and undoubtedly has them now. To unmask them in employee cases would destroy their value in the much more important job of rooting out subversive activity removed from the Federal payroll.

It is not the backfence gossip, neighborhood screwballs, or office sorehead the Justice Department

wants to protect. A recent revision of rules says that when an employee has been subjected to adverse charges he shall have the right of facing and cross-examining his accuser in loyalty-board hearings.

Program Examined

This applies in all cases except those in which "national security would be jeopardized." That is not spelled out, but it means the sort of case in which an employee or person seeking a job

might have crossed the screen of a larger picture.

The whole employee-loyalty problem is being examined and action taken on several different fronts.

In addition to the rule revisions recently drawn up by Attorney General Herbert Brownell and approved by President Eisenhower, the Defense Department has been overhauling its industry-security program.

The aim is to simplify procedures in screening workmen and contractors on secret-work or work but not to change the basic insistence upon protection against espionage.

Meanwhile two Senate committees are getting into the act.

A subcommittee of the Government Operations Committee is holding hearings on a bill by

Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D. Minn.). It would set up a joint Congressional commission to write a whole new set of rules for employee-loyalty cases.

The employee-security program has been characterized by its critics before this group as a "chamber of horrors" and "political demagogery."

About to Open Hearings

The Post Office and Civil Service Committee, with former Senator Guy M. Gillette (D. Iowa) as chief counsel, is about to open hearings on what critics of the Administration have called "the numbers game."

That concerns the large number of persons who have been fired or who have resigned from Government jobs because of charges of shabby security. That

means not merely loyalty alone, but a number of personal shortcomings, such as housing, sex deviation, or even talking too much. This hearing promises to be heated.

Then, too, there is the Supreme Court case brought by Dr. John P. Peters of the Yale University Medical School. Peters was dismissed as a security risk in 1953 from a part-time job of consultant with the Public Health Service.

This involves dismissal without an accused being permitted to face his accuser.

120-Page Brief Filed

Dr. Peters' attorneys in their brief say, "The issue is solely the use of star-chamber methods to impose on nonconsenting employees the stigma of a

honorable discharge and a stigmatization from Government service."

Attorney General Brown filed a 120-page brief upholding the government's right to hold certain witnesses in security cases.

The Justice department is by no means happy over the recanting of paid testimony by Harvey Matusow, who has been sentenced to jail for contempt of court for refusing to save his life in a labor case involving anti-communist membership.

But Justice Department officials draw a broad distinction between information from former Communists and from trained undercover agents.

Because of the Matusow revelations, the Department will be extremely cautious in accepting backsliding Communists.

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DATE 7/28/81 BY 2844pm

The Louisville Times
Louisville, Ky.
Date 3-22-54
b2. File

RECEIVED
RECORDED
EX-1066

ENCLOSURE
66-2542-3-934

24 APR 14 1955

Send copies to C.G. Rogers & Bunge

MAR 24 1955

Bureau

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION

Date March 18, 1955

To: Director, FBI

From: ROBERT E. KEHRES, SA

Field Office or Division Cleveland

SUGGESTION: Security Informants - general

See attached.

~~X~~ Destruction of information memoranda

Its advantages are:

Saving of space.

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DATE 7/28/81 BY SP5 JMC

It should save at least \$ annually.

The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States.

Robert E. Kehres
(Signature of Suggestor)

Comments and recommendation of Supervisor, SAC, or Assistant Director:

The suggestion submitted by this employee appears to be an excellent one. It appears that by adopting this suggestion considerable filing space will be saved. It is, therefore, recommended that favorable consideration be given this suggestion.

ack 4/1/55 - hce
referred to
FBI PH, Div. 4, 5, 6.
3/31/55 - hce
EC memo 3/20/55
JMC
DSB

H. O. Hawkins
(Signature)

Special Agent in Charge
(Title)

2-PPH

EXP. PROC.
MAR 30 1955

66-3286
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

As the Bureau knows, information in security informant reports is disseminated to appropriate files as indicated in the attached sample memo. Copies of this memo go to all pertinent files. The original, along with the informant's report, goes into informant's file, being Serial [redacted] in sample case.

b7D

When an agent writes a report on a subject, all pertinent information in the serials in subject's file is incorporated into that report. Hence all pertinent information in 100-14899-460 (sample memo) would be in this report. It is seldom that the need ever arises to again review this serial (100-14899-460), but should such occasion arise, the documentation page of subject's report will show that the original of this memo can be located in [redacted]. Consequently no justification appears to exist for retaining this serial (100-14899-460) in subject's file.

b7D

It is recommended that when a report is written, the dictating agent submit a memo for the subject's file, listing in numerical order the serial numbers of the memoranda reviewed and incorporated into the report. This applies only to those memoranda where the documentation page shows the original to be in a file other than subject's file. This memo, to be directed to the Chief Clerk, would authorize the destruction of the serials listed. This memo will serve as an explanation for the missing serials.

Memoranda, such as the sample copy, are disseminated on an average to fifteen to eighteen files. They constitute in excess of 60% of the bulk of a security file. Their destruction would save approximately 60% of the filing space hereafter required for security files. To retain them actually amounts to maintaining duplicate records which serve no useful purpose.

Cleveland, Ohio
December 14, 1954

MEMO, SAC

100-18776
100-20948
100-15197
100-20742
100-20087
100-18923
100-17033
100-11826

100-20116
100-20534
100-15575
100-20817
100-18406
100-18185
100-16538
100-11899

b6
b7C

Following is the verbatim report of [redacted] dated November 27, 1954, received by SA ROBERT E. KEHRES on December 3, 1954. The original memo will be found in Serial [redacted]

b7D

(Informant's report is copied here, followed by any explanation or comments on this report.)

ROBERT E. KEHRES
SA

SA 100-14899-460

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
MAR 13 1965	
FBI - CLEVELAND	

61 12 - 934 X

ENC SURE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

FROM : R. T. Harbo *RT*

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NUMBER 151-55
MADE BY SA JOHN H. CONNORS
NEWARK OFFICE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842-DMC
me

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

RM. 5254

Security Enforcement - Genl.

Elimination
SUGGESTION: Eliminate use of T-symbols for reporting physical surveillances in security cases. Use a statement that "Subject on (date) was observed by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to be in attendance at ..." or "... to be meeting with ..." or "... to be entering premises at ..." The actual names of the Special Agents would not be shown in the details of the report.

This suggestion is within the purview of a Special Agent's duties. Special Agent Connors's supervisor is SAC Foster.

PRESENT PROCEDURE: Physical surveillances made in security cases by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation are reported by T-symbols in the main body of the report. Explanation desired is placed in the administrative pages, which are not disseminated.

ADVANTAGES STATED: Would eliminate some T-symbols, in harmony with SAC Letters 55-7 and 55-2 which instructed that T-symbols should not be used more often than absolutely necessary. Would enable other agencies receiving copies of the report to more accurately gauge the reliability of the source of information.

DISADVANTAGES STATED: None.

SAVINGS: None.

OBSERVATIONS: SAC Foster, Newark, is against adoption, stating that if the suggestion were adopted, there is no question but that the Bureau would be requested to make available for hearing those Agents who participated in the physical surveillances. SAC Abbaticchio, Charlotte, and SAC Milnes, St. Louis, recommend against adoption, giving the same reasons as those given by SAC Foster. Mr. Cleveland, Domestic Intelligence Division, recommends against adoption, also giving the same reasons as those given by SAC Foster.

DJD:hoc

RECORDED - 87 66-9542-3 935

INDEXED - 82 12 APR 20 1955

EX-116

Attachment
66 APR 26 1955

2-51

4/11/55

RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. That the suggestion not be adopted.

RB

✓

2. That if the suggestion is adopted, no award be given. The suggestion is within the purview of the suggester's duties. No financial savings being apparent, any award made would be based on intangible values for a suggestion of "minor" benefit and "limited" application in which case the minimum award is and the maximum

b7E

M

abu

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION

Date: 3/21/55

To: Director, FBI

Security Informants - Genl.

From: SA JOHN H. CONNORS

Division of assignment: NEWARK

SUGGESTION: Eliminate use of T-symbols for physical surveillances in security investigations. Substitute a statement that "Subject on (date) was observed by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to be in attendance at ..." or "... to be meeting with ..." or "... to be entering premises at"

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY 2802pmjme

Current practice or rule (include manual citation as well as facts):

Manual of Instructions, Vol. III, 87, page 25F requires that such surveillances be protected with temporary symbols.

Advantages of suggestion: Eliminates use of a T-symbol in accordance with instructions in SAC Letters 55-7 (N) and 55-22 (I).

Would enable outside agencies to more accurately gauge the reliability of the source of the information.

Actual names of surveilling agents need not appear in details of report.

Disadvantages of suggestion: None known. Writer feels that lack of actual names of surveilling agents would make subpoenas unlikely even if unauthorized individuals obtained access to the report.

EX-116

20 MAR 24 1955

The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States.

ack 3/29/55 - hcc referred to division 3/28/55 - hcc
Memo Harbo to Tolson 4/11/55 - hcc
FCC UNFAV 4

Recommendations and comments of Division Head:

This suggestion appears good for the reasons set forth above. However, there is no question but that the Bureau's permission would be requested to use in any hearing all those agents who participated in a fisur. For this reason, it is better to keep the whole operation confidential.

(Signature & Title)

6 APR 26 1955

55-7 (N) states that in order to give hearing boards and others the best opportunity to evaluate our reports we should not use T symbols any more than absolutely necessary.

55-22 (I) restates and emphasizes above instructions.

DATE OF MAIL 4-12-55~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR MR. LAMHERE TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS
OFFICE, ROOM 1736~~HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 pmv/mcRSUBJECT JUNE MAILREMOVED BY 59 APR 29 1955FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-937

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

JH

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
Att'n: Training & Inspection Division

DATE: March 30, 1955

FROM : SAC, Philadelphia

SUBJECT: SUGGESTIONS

Reference is made to Suggestion No. 148-55, copy of which is attached, concerning the setting forth in the investigative reports the identity of CIs and PCIs contacted.

There is no question but what the suggestion would greatly streamline the reporting of cases where we have to contact numerous informants and PCIs. Under the plan offered in the suggestion it would be possible to determine whether a certain informant had been contacted by going to the informant file. However, if it became desirable to ascertain what informants were contacted in a particular case it would be necessary to review all of the informant files.

It is believed that the present procedure of listing on the administrative page the identity of the informants contacted should be continued since this provides the supervisor approving the report an opportunity of observing the identity of the informants that were contacted in a particular case, and will enable the Bureau to check back later on if it becomes necessary to determine what informants were contacted in a case.

NHM:AVM
 (2-Bu, 1-Ph) 2
 Enclosure - 2

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DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842pm/mec

NOT RECORDED

APR 18 1955

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

APR 22 1955

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: March 30, 1955

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NUMBER 148-55
(STREAMLINING OF REPORTS)

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

The St. Louis Office has suggested that the Bureau adopt a specific rule in investigative reports and letters in criminal cases permitting a statement to the effect that logical criminal informants and potential criminal informants were contacted but provided no information concerning the subject of the inquiry and that there be no requirement that either the details or administrative page of the report set forth the identities of the criminal informants and potential criminal informants. (This would only apply in cases of negative contacts.)

Since the same suggestion may logically apply in the case of security investigations, the Internal Security Section has reviewed this suggestion. In order that the Bureau may exercise complete supervision over security cases and since it is frequently desirable to know at the Bureau the identities of security informants contacted with negative results, the Internal Security Section recommends against adoption of the above suggestion.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum be referred to the Training and Inspection Division to indicate that the Internal Security Section recommends against adoption of the above suggestion.

**ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED**

DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 dm/rnc J

NOT RECORDED
128 APR 18 1955

71 APR 22 1955

cc - Mr. Belmont
Mr. Baumgardner
Mr. Rushing

~~INITIALS ON ORIGINAL~~
2 APR 15 1955

पृष्ठ: १५७

March 16, 1955

DIRECTOR, FBI

FX-125

With reference to our conversation yesterday, I am transmitting herewith a copy of the statement which I presented to the subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on March 27, 1954, pertaining to the confidential nature of our files. On page three, I referred to our files as being comparable to the notes of a newspaper reporter.

I am also transmitting herewith the series of questions and answers which appeared in "The New York Times Magazine" on April 16, 1950, wherein in answering question ten, in the last paragraph of the middle column and the beginning of the last column, I referred to the similarity between an investigative report of the FBI and a newspaper reporter's notebook.

Enclosures (2)

cc: Mr. Jones

LBN:arm

(5) *asum*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 pmd

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Boardman _____
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Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

Per Nollens 3/14/11

MAY 8, 1955

~~71 APR 29 1955~~ 0442

MAILED 2

MAR 17 1955

CCM-FBI

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MAR 16 3 44 PM '54

94-8-51-V

66-2541
1-1-70
66-7225

FIELD IN

64-2-3-1000

Autostat

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

Mr. Tolson

FROM :

L. B. Nichols

SUBJECT:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 2/28/81 BY 2502 PM

Security Intfs GEN

Tolson _____
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 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

With reference to the Director's conversation with the Attorney General yesterday wherein the informant system of the Bureau was likened unto the practice of the press in using confidential source of information, I wish to advise that we made an exhaustive search last night seeking to find some former statement on this point with negative results. This search included reviewing all statements, speeches, articles and testimony which went back prior to the Coplon Case.

We did liken the files of the Bureau to a newspaper reporter's notes. Likewise, we likened information coming into the Bureau to the information coming into the press which has to be checked; however, we did not go into the matter of informants at that time. I recall very vividly conversations which the Director had with Rex Collier in the Summer of 1949, which resulted in two articles in the Star on June 27 and June 28, 1949. In the article on June 27, 1949, a copy of which is attached, on page three a reference is made to the fact that FBI Agents operate like a newspaper reporter. I also recall very vividly using this illustration in discussions with Marquis Childs. The Childs column, however, took a different slant in June 18, 1949, a copy of which is attached, wherein Childs contended that the press has something to answer in connection with the Coplon reports. The raw material of FBI reports were translated into sensational headlines with little indication that these were not conclusions of the FBI, but merely the stuff to be ground through the security mill. A good illustration of the argument we were using then is set forth in a letter which the Director personally wrote to Henry Suydam of the Newark, New Jersey, News, a copy of which is attached, wherein the third paragraph on page 1 the Director draws a similarity between newspapers and investigative agencies in the information gathering process. In a statement which the Director made before the Tidings Committee on March 27, 1950, opposing the production of FBI files on page 3 the Director pointed out for want of a more apt comparison our files can be compared to the notes of a newspaper reporter before he has culled printable material from unprintable material. In a series of questions and

cc - Mr. Jones

LBN:ptm

(4)

memo to Attorney General
 3/16/53 LBN

EX-125 APR 25 1955

CRIME RECORD

Autos Lat

66-2542-1-1

66-2542-1-1

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66-2542-1-1

Memorandum for Mr. Tolson from L. B. Nichols.

answers published by the New York Times on April 16, 1950, a further illustration was used that investigative reports of the FBI are like a newspaper reporter's notebook. In a memorandum sent to the Attorney General-designate on December 11, 1952, dealing with the confidential character of files, the same illustrative material comparing investigative reports to the notes of a newspaper reporter was made. Tom Clark in his statement of July 1, 1949, after the first Coplon Case in Washington also borrowed our line in linking the procedures of the investigative or news gathering medium; however, he related this to reports and not to informants.

Wm

I suggest memo
to att. sending
the Hydring. Com.
statement
and the ny Times
questions and
answers

3/16

yes.
H.

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

SYNDICATED COLUMN, "TODAY IN WASHINGTON"
BY DAVID LAWRENCE

Attached is David Lawrence's column from today's issue of the "New York Herald Tribune" which I believe you will find of interest as it regards leaks of information and protection of informants.

Enclosure

CC - Mr. William P. Rogers (with duplicate of attachment)
Deputy Attorney General

GEM:djg
(6)

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DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 pmw
mcjc

1 ENCL
for 4/22/55

166-3542-1
NOT RECORDED
170 APR 22 1955

APR 25 1955

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: BUREAU'S SECURITY PROGRAMS

DATE: April 29, 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 2/28/61 BY 2072 pml

In accordance with instructions, I spoke to Special Agents assigned to security work in the Chicago, Seattle, San Francisco and Los Angeles Offices on April 12, 13, 14 and 15, 1955, respectively. At each office, I also consulted with the Special Agent in Charge and supervisory officials as to problems in the security field. The discussion with the Agents lasted about one and a half hours, followed by a half-hour or of answering questions, and the remainder of the day available was taken up with Supervisors and the SAC.

I followed the same outline as the talk before the Washington Field and New York Agents, as reflected in the attached memorandum to you dated March 25, 1955, at the same time using additional current examples to illustrate our problems. Basically, my talk was to insure that the Agents know there is a very definite problem facing us in the security field today; that we are carefully examining our procedures in the light of this problem; and thereafter we are enthusiastically and aggressively going ahead with our various security programs in order to meet the terrific responsibilities we have in the field of security. I made it very clear that while we are using a careful approach, we are in no way retreating nor being intimidated by the current controversy on security.

During these visits, I found a need to let the Agents know the pitch, as they were uncertain as to what the Bureau was retreating. I made it clear that this was not so and painted a picture of the problem and the need to take cognizance of it and not to go plunging blindly ahead, but to weigh and evaluate what is happening and to adjust.

Enclosure

NOT RECORDED

ALB:LL

145 MAY 18 1955

(9)

cc Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Keay
Mr. Baumgardner
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Rodch
Mr. W. C. Sullivan

66-3542-3-
Handwritten notes and signatures, including "Belmont" and "Keay".

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 1-40-151 N

55 MAY 31

ourselves accordingly. I stated there can be no retreat, as we must meet our responsibilities; at the same time we must be sure we are not providing ammunition to cripple our security programs.

I found enthusiasm and drive among the Agents, but some uncertainty, which I resolved promptly. I laid stress on the responsibility of each Agent to constantly think before acting; that it just makes pure common sense when the attack is on to think in order that we will not provide ammunition to the enemy. I told the Agents that the basic formula which has been applied by the Bureau in its security work still holds true; namely, that we can't stand still--we must forge ahead through careful planning and careful execution of our plans. We weigh each problem in the light of value to be obtained as against the risk involved and, where the value outweighs the risk, we go ahead aggressively, after reducing the risk to the absolute minimum through careful planning and organization.

I encouraged questions on a frank basis and the Agents responded, as a result of which I was able to make the Bureau's position clear as to why we insisted on certain rules and courses of action. The response was good because the Agents could understand the logic and reasons behind the Bureau instructions. The field is not looking for soft answers or excuses, but wants the facts so it can adjust itself accordingly and be positive in its approach.

Inasmuch as the Attorney General had approved our revised standards for the Security Index before I left, I covered this and explained that it would result in a drastic cut in our Security Index.

PROBLEMS

I am noting certain problems which came up in each office.

1. Time in the Office

SAC Letter 55-10 dated February 8, 1955, requires the field to submit specific facts as to steps taken to reduce time in the office wherever it exceeds 15%. Each of the four

offices stated that it is simply impossible to bring time in the office by security Agents down to 15%, inasmuch as a great deal of the work requires channelizing information from informants, sources, etc., searching the files, and preparation of reports. I told the offices that the Bureau's instructions are based on the fundamental concept that investigation is necessarily conducted outside the office and that they should be sure the Agents are not seizing on the excuse that they are on security work to stay unnecessarily in the office.

2. Discontinued Informants

Several offices referred to informants recently discontinued by the Bureau as a result of review of all security informants. The offices felt that in probably 90% of the cases the informant could be discontinued immediately without resultant problems. However, in some cases, immediate discontinuance of the informant will present a definite control problem because of the temperament of the informant, the informant's reliance on funds paid by the Bureau, etc. The offices were in agreement with the Bureau's reasons for discontinuing informants who may be unstable, but in a very limited number of cases felt that we were asking for trouble and creating an unnecessary problem by immediately cutting off an informant. They suggested that in these few cases the informant be tapered off to permit control and adjustment.

There is some merit to this. H.

They were told that we want to discontinue these informants immediately if possible; that if there is a definite problem, the field should present such cases individually to the Bureau, clearly pointing out the alternatives, and the Bureau will consider each case on its merits.

right -

3. Security Index Review

Los Angeles and San Francisco particularly questioned whether they could complete the review of Security Index cases within 90 days. (Los Angeles has over 4,000 and San Francisco over 2,300 on the Index.)

They were advised that the Bureau desires the deadline be met, for obvious reasons; that if they cannot complete it by the deadline, the Bureau will consider their problems in view of the large number on their Index. They were told they should approach this problem with the idea they will meet the deadline.

4. Errors in the Field

There were considerable questions by both Agents and Supervisors in the field on the pressure being applied by the Bureau to cut out errors in reports. I told them very frankly that the Bureau cannot be disseminating inaccurate reports and thereafter be constantly correcting our reports in possession of other agencies.

The larger offices particularly felt that the Supervisors handle such a large volume of reports they are unable to read the reports word for word and thus cannot catch all errors in the reports. San Francisco suggested that the field be allowed to use competent clerical proofreaders, inasmuch as many Agents are unable to read their reports before they are sent to the Bureau. Chicago felt that there is a need to train Agents in the field to get at the root of what is causing the errors and that the field Supervisors should have time to train the Agents and concentrate on policy and leadership and getting across to the Agents the necessary enthusiasm and training to develop them; that the Supervisors are so tied up on proofreading, chiefly a clerical function, they are unable to devote the proper training time to the Agents. For example, Chicago felt that the size of reports can be reduced through proper training; that the Agents have a tendency to be far too verbose. Chicago, San Francisco and Los Angeles felt that production is being definitely

This is certainly true -

H. - 4 - 5

*See letter typed 4/22/45
Shaw*

slowed up in the field. Several of the offices felt that if the field catches its own errors, the Bureau should give cognizance to this; otherwise, there is no incentive for the field to call attention to errors in reports which have already gone to the Bureau.

All of this boils down to the fact that the field is definitely feeling the pressure being applied by the Bureau for accuracy in reports. The basic premise is unchanged; namely, that we must have accuracy in our reports. If the field needs additional assistance in the way of Supervisors, proofreaders, etc., the offices will have to present their problems on an individual basis for consideration. I do think we should consider in some way giving the field credit if it catches its own error; otherwise, an Agent or Supervisor in the field may fail to report an error. In each of the offices there was a definite attempt to set up a systematic improvement in the matter of errors in reports. Frankly, I have no suggestion to offer in this matter other than that if a field office needs assistance in order to meet this problem, it should present its findings to the Bureau for consideration on an individual basis.

This is being handled by SAC letter
5. SAC Letters

It is apparent that the field will operate more as a team with the Bureau, and with a better understanding and a lack of uncertainty, if in Bureau instructions we endeavor, where possible, to explain why the instructions are given. In recent SAC Letters, there has been a tendency to shorten the letters to the point that the field does not understand why the instructions are being given. Each of the offices expressed this opinion. Therefore, I think we should be careful to premise our SAC Letters, where possible, on a brief explanation as to why the instructions are being given.

Agree -
Memo to all SACs
Supervisor
DWG/M
11/24/56

TO : Director, FBI
Att'n: Training and Inspection Div'n
FROM : SAC, Philadelphia
SUBJECT: SUGGESTIONS

Date: April 11, 1955

Rebulet 4-4-55 and Suggestion No. 102-55 which was submitted by the Dallas Office concerning the Informant Program.

The proposed form submitted by the Dallas Office has been reviewed by the supervisors handling criminal and security informants and it is not recommended that this form be adopted.

The supervisor of criminal informants is of the opinion that this form includes numerous items that are not usually obtainable when a file is opened on a PCI and are not available until after several contacts with a PCI. He feels that the forms which are presently available are adequate for the handling of this program.

The security supervisors do not feel that this form is suitable for use in connection with security informant matters and believe that the methods presently being followed in the handling of such cases are adequate.

I am returning herewith to the Bureau the copies of the Suggestion furnished by the Dallas Office.

NHM:AVM
(2-Bu, 1-Ph)

Enclosures - 2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/84 BY 2542pm Jme/SC

NOT RECORDED
161 MAY 12 1955

EXP. PROC.

ORIGINAL FILED IN

81 MAY 10 1955

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
SECURITY MEASURES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

DATE: April 1, 1955

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 2897-Drav.DIC-2
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7-28-81

Boardman
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Ladd
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

My memorandum of April 5, 1955, furnished you with information concerning the problem which had arisen in Chicago relative to efforts of the Communist Party to uncover a person suspected as an informant. Specifically, the Party had arranged to check income tax records of this individual for the purpose of seeing whether he had received unexplained income. You were advised that we were making a study of the methods whereby our informants report income from the Bureau inasmuch as if the Party pursues this technique elsewhere in the country, informants may be uncovered.

The problem of reporting income by informants has received considerable study in the past. Informants who receive compensation for their services to the Bureau are advised that such compensation must be reported as income when filing an income tax return. Since these persons are not employees of the Bureau, we do not withhold taxes from them and for security reasons they cannot show the FBI as the source of the money they receive from the Bureau.

Generally speaking, the instructions as to how informants are to report their Bureau income are that they should report such income as received from other sources (apart from their regular employment) for personal services rendered through private enterprise or other similar general term applicable to the informant's position and station in life. For instance, an informant who is employed as a day laborer or truck driver might report his Bureau income as being from handy man-type jobs or other similar extra odd jobs obtained during the informant's spare time. An informant whose occupation lies in the professional field, on the other hand, might report his Bureau income as being from writing or other similar occupation consistent with his background. Such income would be explained on page two of the

Attachment
cc: Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

NOT RECORDED
MAY 11 1955

CONFIDENTIAL

50 MAY 12 1955

CLASSIFIED DECISION FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 6-29-94

83213437

ORIGINAL FILED IN

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-17-2014
C32WGB391

7-10-91 12-28-91
Classified by 66502/bja
Declassify on: OADR

1- ENCL

ENCL

DECLASS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~██████~~ Federal Income Tax Return, Form 1040, under Schedule G.
(A copy of this form is attached.) (u)

You will note that in reporting income from other sources, according to the form, the taxpayer must state the nature of the source. Therefore, all such income must be explained, and it is felt that there would be little likelihood of the Communist Party's determining the identity of our informants through mere examination of income tax returns. (u)

In rare instances, moreover, in the case of an informant who is receiving a substantial income from the Bureau and who would have particular difficulty in concealing on his income tax return the source of such an income, arrangements have been made to have the informant submit his return under an alias, using an address other than his own (usually an address of an Agent in the Washington area is used). Such a return, of course, could definitely not be traced to the informant and affords maximum security in those isolated instances where it is next to impossible for an informant to report his Bureau income under his own name and on his own tax return. This procedure has the approval of Departmental officials. (u)

A widespread system such as this would, however, be unworkable due to the large number of paid informants which the Bureau has and due to the many different livelihoods and occupations in which they engage. It is, therefore, reserved for use in rare instances only. (u)

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Although it is felt that our instructions to the field as to how informants are to report income are adequate, it is felt that we should alert the field to the (u)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

interest of the Communist Party in income tax returns as a method of uncovering FBI informants. Proposed SAC Letter attached.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OK.
H.

(U) (2) It is not recommended that we institute an investigation at this time of this alleged bribery of an employee of the Internal Revenue Service. This information was obtained by (CG 5824-S) one of our most valuable informants, in a meeting with Claude Lightfoot, organizer for District 8, Communist Party, USA. It is noted that our informant does not know the identity of the employee involved and allegedly the employee does not know that the income tax information is for the use of the Communist Party. Our informant has been alerted to obtain any additional information and if, as a result of any additional information, there is a definite indication of a violation of the Bribery Statute, the facts will be considered by the Investigative Division in order that an investigation may be instituted. At that time we will also consider whether it is necessary to advise the Internal Revenue Service, keeping in mind that we would probably have to identify another informant, [redacted] the person under suspicion by the Communist Party.

b7D

(49)

OK. but we should keep
after it & try to establish
identity of RR employee

H.

Jo Jim H

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

200371
10/2

The Attorney General

59471

April 25, 1955

Director, FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - SECURITY INFORMATION
General

I have just had the pleasure of reviewing your interview in the current issue of U. S. News & World Report. I think that this is one of the most constructive contributions that has been made with reference to the perplexing problem of the informant system in the handling of security cases and other related matters. You did a particularly effective job in putting the facts on the record where all who are interested can see and read them. I do hope that the Department can take steps to get reprints of this interview as I feel that it is something that should be widely circulated.

While on the subject, I want to call to your attention the very effective work which Mr. Warren Burger has been doing and the contributions he has made. This has been a real source of encouragement to me.

cc - Mr. William P. Rogers
Deputy Attorney General

cc - Assistant Attorney General
Warren E. Burger

cc - Mr. Boardman
cc - Mr. Jones

BN:ptm

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 JMD
mc J

EX-112

RECORDED - 97

66-5542
MAY 2 1955

RECEIVED
FBI
MAY 11 1955
ROOM

MAY 4 1955

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

DATE OF MAIL 5-3-55

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR MR. LATTERS TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS
OFFICE ROOM 1736~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

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DATE 7/28/81 BY 2802 p/home
JC

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL

REMOVED BY

F21f
59 MAY 13 1955

FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-940

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION

Date April 19, 1955

To: DIRECTOR, F.B.I.

From: SA CLARK F. BROWN

Field Office or Division Detroit

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 JPM/PC

SECURITY INFORMANTS - 9144

SUGGESTION: It is suggested that the Bureau direct each division to prepare a circular letter to the Bureau and all other offices in which is set out all informants, whether current or discontinued, as well as each confidential source and source of information. After each one his reliability, and whether his identity must be concealed is to be set out. Thereafter, it will be the responsibility of each division to notify all offices as well as the Bureau, each time a new informant is established or an old informant's status changes. Each office will maintain these circular letters in a central file with each informant indexed to the proper serial or serials, thereby being readily available to any Agent having need for this information.

Its advantages are: Reference SAC Letter 55-22, Section I which emphasizes the fact that use of T-symbols must be held to an absolute minimum in our reports. The above procedure would eliminate the corresponding on each informant on an individual basis to determine whether his identity can be revealed. It will eliminate an office from answering as high as 51 inquiries (or more over a period of time) on each informant. The above procedure would eliminate delays in report writing while waiting to see if an informant's identity may be disclosed.

b7E

It should save at least \$ annually.

66-2542-3-1
NOT RECORDED
APR 25 1955

The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States.

Comments and recommendation of Supervisor, SAC, or Assistant Director:

Mr. BROWN's suggestion appears to have considerable merit. The initial project would require a considerable amount of work, more part of every office. I believe, however, that this would be more than compensated for by the saving in time and correspondence in the future to determine whether or not an informant's identity could be revealed and information concerning his reliability. It is recommended that the observations of other SACs be obtained and that the adoption of this suggestion be given serious consideration.

EXP. PROC.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-2542-3-1

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI ATTN: TRAINING & INSPECTION

DATE 4/5/55

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE 66-6

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NUMBER 168-55
MADE BY ROBERT E. KEHRES
CLEVELAND OFFICE

ReBulet to NY 4/1/55.

Security Informants - general

This suggestion appears to have merit from standpoint of saving space. However, this is outweighed by amount of extra time consumed in referring to original source. Having informant's memo always available in subj's file saves considerable agent time when need arises for future file review in such cases as preparing prosecutive reports, SI reviews, contemplated interview with subj, review for possible violations arising out of subj's appearance at Congressional hearings, possible changes in SI standards, etc.

Should this suggestion be adopted, demands made for informant's original rept would be such as to greatly impede the submission of subsequent reports as numerous SAs would have occasion to refer to it at same time.

Further, constant handling of informant's original report by a large number of employees would eventually so deface the original report that its future value as evidence might be destroyed.

In addition, it would appear that the considerable amount of clerical time involved in destroying memoranda in the substantive case files would more than offset any financial saving in space.

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DATE 2/28/81 BY SP-12 PJC

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(3)

EX-124

EC memo to Hurlston
F2/P rec info
4/20/55
4/20/55
77 MAY 16 1955

66-2542-3-941

5-6
APR 6 1955

HARILL

EX-124

66-2542-1-
66-3286-
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

APR 6 1955

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: April 5, 1955

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NUMBER 168-55
MADE BY SA ROBERT E. KEHRES
CLEVELAND OFFICEALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 PJC

Security Information - General

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

Information obtained from a security informant is incorporated into a memorandum, copies of which are designated for all pertinent files. SA Kehres has suggested that copies of all such memoranda in an individual's case file be destroyed at the time the next report is written, which report would contain information secured from the copies of these memoranda. He suggests that the Agent dictating the report also prepare a memorandum listing the various memoranda by serial numbers which are used in the preparation of the report. This memorandum would be the basis for the destruction of copies of memoranda reflecting information from the informants and would also serve to explain the missing serials.

OBSERVATIONS:

1. The copies of the memoranda reflecting information secured from an informant if maintained in individual case files would eliminate the necessity of file reviews to locate this information. The information in these memoranda is normally paraphrased when including the data in a report and should be retained in order that an individual file will be complete in itself.

2. It should be noted that notations of an administrative nature are frequently made on such serials. The destruction of such serials may later result in extreme difficulty in fixing responsibility in the event a question arises as to the handling of a particular case.

3. It is also possible that the memoranda may contain information concerning a subject which is not presently pertinent to the investigation and, therefore, not included in the report. Such information pertaining to the subject of a case file should, of course, be retained in the individual case file.

cc - Boardman
cc - Belmont
cc - Baumgardner
cc - Simpson

RECORDED - 83

24 MAY 6 1955

F21 RDS:amc
(5)

71 MAY 16 1955

EX-124
E. J. Connelley
J. E. Sullivan 4/24/55
J. E. Sullivan 4/24/5566-2542-1-1
66-3286-1
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2-PR

RECOMMENDATION:

The Domestic Intelligence Division recommends
that Suggestion 168-55 not be adopted.

JB
JLW
SLO
7813
LW

Suggestion Number #168-55.

That memoranda containing information from informants be removed from substantive case file at such time as the information is incorporated in an investigative report.

Investigative Division does not believe this suggestion has adaptability to criminal cases in view of fact that positive information does not come from numerous informant sources in individual substantive cases as in security cases. Present regulations as to criminal informants provide that negative contact memoranda be routed to the agent to whom the substantive case is assigned. He handles them the same as he does investigative notes, disposing of them after proper treatment in investigative report. Therefore, criminal case files are not "cluttered" with numerous memoranda on informant contacts.

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DATE 7/28/81 BY 2542 pmd

me J C pmd

C 57
JMP
JOK
pmd

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 4-5-55

FROM : SAC, PHILADELPHIA.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY 12542 DOW J.C. [signature]

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NUMBER 168-55
MADE BY ROBERT E. KEHRES
CLEVELAND OFFICE

Attention Training and Inspection Division

ReBulet 4-1-55 enclosing a memorandum of 3-18-55 incorporating the suggestion of SA KEHRES (168-55). The memorandum and its attachment are returned herewith. The suggestion has been reviewed by and discussed with the security supervisors of this office, and based on their views, it is recommended it not be adopted.

The Bureau requests an estimate of the percentage of file space saved if the suggestion were adopted. Philadelphia estimates 50%. In Philadelphia it is estimated this would total about 41 four drawer file cabinets or 33 five drawer file cabinets.

The recommendation against the suggestion is based on the fact that the suggestion is believed to incorporate a false premise. A report written on a security subject, particularly one who is quite active, will normally incorporate a summary of the CP activity rather than all conceivably pertinent details. For intelligence purposes or for an evaluation of the dangerousness of the subject, the information contained in the report is adequate. If points should be reached when the subject must be prosecuted, the U. S. Attorney will require the maximum possible detail regarding each meeting attended so that he can (1) prepare his case; (2) interview and prepare witnesses; and (3) be prepared for cross examination. For this purpose the U. S. Attorney is normally furnished with the original informant reports or the disseminating memoranda. Most of our security reports to which the suggestion would apply involve persons on security index, formerly on security index, or being considered for security index. Should the Detcom Program go into effect Government attorneys would require detailed information regarding many persons simultaneously. To the extent that the original information or copies thereof is available in the master file, the task of preparing and presenting the cases will be facilitated. If the Bureau places itself in a position where information needed for the preparation of many cases must be sought simultaneously from the file of a single informant, it is feared that great confusion will result.

NSH:emc

FBI (2 Bu 1 Ph)
Enclosures 3

RECORDED

EX-126

APR 6 1955

EX-126

APR 6 1955

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DIRECTOR, FBI
SUGGESTION NO. 168-55
BY SA ROBERT E. KEHRES
CLEVELAND OFFICE

4-5-55

It is felt that the principal purpose in these investigations is a determination of dangerousness and preparation of cases that can be presented to a Court or Hearing Board with the greatest facility under conditions that might prevail should the Detcom Program go into effect. Accordingly, the possible saving in space must become a secondary consideration.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

Director, FBI

DATE: 4-12-55

FROM :

Att: Training and Inspection Division
SAC, New York (66-7111)

SUBJECT:

SUGGESTION #168-55 MADE BY
ROBERT E. KEHRRES, CLEVELAND
OFFICEALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY 2802 pmu

Rebureau 4-1-55 requesting recommendation for or
against adoption of captioned suggestion.

This office does not recommend adoption for the following reasons:

A. Investigative Reasons

1. On most occasions, all information in the dissemination memo may not be included in the investigative report. Nevertheless, the remaining information might still be valuable for future use and if the memo were destroyed, such information would not be available for review without going to the informant's file. For example, if the informant had given some information concerning subject's place of employment and we had the actual employment record from another source, we would not be reporting information concerning employment from both sources.

2. Cases involving organizations, particularly those which may be brought before the SACB or similar hearing body, require constant review looking towards the establishment of competent witnesses and development of evidence. In such cases, it is important that the dissemination memo be available for scrutiny by the Agent to whom the case is assigned, at a particular time, and it would be time consuming to expect him to be reviewing informant's reports not contained in the investigative file.

3. The informant's file would, of necessity, have to be made available to many more employees than is required under the present system. This would possibly jeopardize the security of the informant, and there would be a tremendous amount of handling of the informant's file.

4. The possibility of detecting an error committed in the investigative report would be lessened if the dissemination memoranda filed in the case files were destroyed.

B. Administrative Reasons

It is estimated that 15% of filing space in security cases would be saved if the suggestion were adopted. Nevertheless, it is felt that the grounds for objection outweigh the advantage of the saving of space. From an administrative standpoint, these grounds

EWW:MRK

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168-55
PR 13-1955
EX-126
66-3549-1-1
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-3286-1

Letter to the Director
NY 66-7111

1. It would increase the work in the serializing section approximately 20%, in that on receipt of the dictating agent's memo listing serial numbers of memoranda incorporated into the report, it would be necessary for the serializer to prepare individual charge-out slips indicating the serial destroyed, remove the serial in question, and insert charge-out in its place.

2. The addition of another step naturally increases the possibility of error along the line. For example, a typist could make a typographical error resulting in the destruction of the wrong serial or serializer could inadvertently destroy the wrong serial. The frequent disassembling of the files will increase the possibility of misfiling serials.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 pms
me/c

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN *Security Informants* DATE: April 8, 1955
FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT
SUBJECT: JUSTIFICATION FOR UTILIZATION OF
INFORMANTS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK
IN BOTH CRIMINAL AND INTELLIGENCE FIELDS
ADMINISTRATIVE

Reference is made to the attached memorandum, dated March 26, 1955. In accordance with your request of March 29, 1955, set forth as an Addendum to the memorandum on page 17, and received by me on March 31, 1955, there has been appended "Documentation" extending from pages 18 to 42.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This is for your information.

Enclosure

WCS:mh/sar/dja

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. J. D. Donohue
1 - Mr. C. L. Green
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Section tickler

NOT RECORDED
FEB 26 1958

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

FEB 25 1958

W.E.S.

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-2542-1

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN *1/25 2/1/55*

DATE: March 28, 1955

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: JUSTIFICATION FOR UTILIZATION OF INFORMANTS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK IN BOTH CRIMINAL AND INTELLIGENCE FIELDS ADMINISTRATIVE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY *SP-5 JMS*

pmc Sullivan
me
JC

BACKGROUND

Pursuant to the request in your memorandum to me dated March 24, 1955, and my reply to you of the same date, both of which are attached, you will find set forth herein some thoughts and facts pertaining to the subject under consideration.

SYNOPSIS

FBI informants are persons who submit information of value concerning criminal and security investigations being conducted for the welfare of the nation and its people. The end is justice. The means and end are moral. The use of FBI informants may be justified (1) on a rational basis and (2) on a productive basis. The rational justification of the use of FBI informants relates to (1) access to information; (2) service as witnesses; (3) time saving; (4) economy; (5) accuracy; (6) investigative aids; (7) understanding; (8) clearing the innocent; (9) prevention; (10) clandestine group penetration; (11) learning of violators; (12) shortening investigation; (13) safeguarding property; (14) widespread use; (15) independent evidence; (16) identification difficulties; (17) development of information; (18) mobility; (19) admissible evidence; (20) forbidden areas; (21) one source cases; (22) citizen informants or officer informants; (23) saving lives; and (24) Communist reaction. The productive justification relates to the excellent specific results produced through the use of informants by (1) the General Investigative and (2) Domestic Intelligence Divisions. CONCLUSION: Any investigative procedure which is rational, moral and productive is justifiable. The FBI use of informants is a rational, moral and productive investigative procedure. Therefore, the FBI use of informants is justifiable.

Attach-

66-2542-1
See attached page 17
1 - C. L. Green
1 - W. C. Sullivan
1 - Section Tickler

Documentation attached, commencing page 18.

Tolson
Nichols
Belmont
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

100-442321-13
187
COMM. DIVISION

W.C.S.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: 4/20/55

FROM : The Executives Conference

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #168-55 made by
SA ROBERT E. KEHRES
CLEVELAND OFFICEALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 2/28/81 BY 60321

RECAPENTER
5254Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

SUGGESTION: That informative memoranda in subject files be taken from those files and destroyed after the pertinent information in each memorandum has been incorporated into a report written on that subject. When the Agent has dictated his report he would also dictate written notification to the Chief Clerk of the memoranda in the subject files which had been incorporated into this report and the Chief Clerk would then destroy those memoranda. Should the originals ever be needed they could be found in the files of the informants who gave the information.

This suggestion comes within the purview of Special Agent's duties. The suggestor's supervisor is SAC Hawkins.

PRESENT PROCEDURE: The informative memoranda appearing in the subject's file remain there as integral parts of the file even after a report has been written to incorporate the data shown in those memoranda in official report form.

ADVANTAGES STATED: Would save over half of the filing space for security files inasmuch as these memoranda constitute in excess of 60% of the bulk of a security file.

DISADVANTAGES STATED: The memoranda are not available in the subject file should it be desired to review them after the report has been written. The originals of those memoranda, however, can be found in the files of the informants who provided the information.

SAVINGS: None estimated in terms of dollars.

OBSERVATIONS: SAC Hawkins, Cleveland, recommends adoption of the suggestion, stating that considerable filing space will be saved. Mr. Eames, Records Section, recommends adoption, stating that there would be a substantial savings

cc - Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Harbo

RECORDED - 73

MAY 6 1955

EX-115

MAY 16 1955

ROAD

66-2542-1-1
66-3286-1

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Copy filed in 66-25554

in file cabinets and floor space. Mr. Eames adds that since these memoranda are copies of the originals from the informant files they could be considered as work papers and destroyed without specific authority from Archives. SAC Kelly, New York City, recommends against adoption, giving the following reasons:

(1) Possibility of tracing an error committed in the investigative report would be jeopardized if the memoranda had been destroyed.

(2) The only remaining source of the original information would be the informant files and these would be needed by so many Agents in so many cases that those files would be in tremendous demand and the extra handling might even jeopardize the informant.

(3) The original information would not be available for review in each subject file and some of these cases, particularly those going before hearing bodies, require a great deal of review and analysis.

(4) There would be a 20% increase in the Serializing Section of the Chief Clerk's Office in handling the memoranda marking other memoranda for destruction.

(5) Additional handling of the files involved in destroying memoranda would increase the possibility of all types of misfiles and errors.

SAC McCabe, Philadelphia, recommends against adoption, stating that destruction of these memoranda might deprive the office of important information when needed. Reports often incorporate only certain pertinent items from a memorandum and do not include other data in that memorandum which will become highly important later on should the subject be prosecuted. In case of prosecution, Government attorneys would require the most detailed information and great confusion would result if one single informant file were the only place where such information could be found on a number of cases. In security cases, the primary consideration is whatever will facilitate the Bureau's completeness and effectiveness; file space must be secondary. SAC Brown, Baltimore, recommends

against adoption citing the same conclusions as those shown immediately above. Mr. Cleveland, Domestic Intelligence Division, recommends against adoption, stating that each subject file should be complete in itself (it would not be if the memoranda were partially paraphrased in a report and then destroyed) and that if the memoranda were destroyed, the Bureau would lose the notations of an administrative nature which are frequently made on the subject memorandum. It would then be more difficult to fix responsibility. Also, memoranda often contain information which does not appear important now but becomes highly important later. This information should be in the subject's file.

RECOMMENDATIONS: (1) That the suggestion not be adopted.

(2) That if the suggestion is adopted no financial award be given because this suggestion comes within the purview of the suggestor's duties.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION: EDM:DMG 4/20/55

The Executives Conference on 4/20/55, with Messrs. Tolson, Mohr, Tamm, Parsons, Sizoo, Belmont, Boardman, Rosen, Mason and McGuire present, ^{and} unanimously opposed to this suggestion. The Conference felt that adoption of the suggestion would make it impossible to trace errors or fix responsibility and that original source information should continue to appear in FBI files. No further action necessary. RRM

J. Edgar Hoover

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) *4635*
DATE *10/19/81* *AND*

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Tolson

March 16, 1955

66-2542-3-947
CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY *NO. 1111*
REASON FOR EXTENSION *2*
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION *9-7-91*
9/17/81

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE *7/28/81* BY *2842 p/w mc*
TC

In response to the Director's request, there is set forth the principal arguments I have been using on the use of informants, necessity, etc. *Security* *Encl.*

The so-called informant is as old as man. History is replete with accounts of their use. In fact, Moses employed this technique when he sent, by virtue of a Divine directive, men to spy on the land of Canaan for forty days, sizing up the people, their cities and mode of life. (Numbers 13 and 14). As a result of information gained, and the question of confrontation was not raised, the chosen people were lead to greater accomplishment that started the glorious tradition of a race proud of its culture and which has never abandoned its quest for freedom.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

The use of the informant coincided with the rise and fall of civilization. Hannibal, after a long siege of a city in Sicily, sent a trusted war veteran into the city - there he developed his informants and reported back to Hannibal on the weaknesses of what were supposed to be impregnable fortifications.

DECLASSIFIED BY *SP-6 JJA/BJP*
ON *4-21-80* *13-1343*

Herodotus in Book V of his Persian wars, 500 B.C., proved that through the use of informants the best information comes from the inner citadel of the enemy. Such information down through the years protected truth and justice and was the indispensable weapon on the side of freedom.

Wilhelm Steiber made possible the rise of Bismark by developing a network of informants that lasted until World War I.

Nathan Hale was a Revolutionary hero because of his

ability to develop informants.

One cannot be too careful and must be careful. When one is in a position to develop informants, one must be careful of the way to do it.

1 MAY 27 1955

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Director's office
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In fact, the wild clamor today against informants is an assault on tradition and custom. The Communist tactic of divide and conquer, as the Fascist tactic, first seeks to sow seeds of doubt and debunk tradition.

The informant system was well established in the old English Common Law and later Parliament, by enactments, provided for forfeitures and penalties with a portion going to the King, the poor and the informer.

As early as 1789, Congress gave sanction to the role of the informer to stimulate enforcement of custom laws. Today the informer gets 25 per cent of amounts recovered, not to exceed \$50,000, in forfeitures under the customs laws. (Title 19, USC, 1619)

Informers are authorized by Congress to bring suits in the name of the U. S. Government in frauds against the Government with a potential reward of one-fourth of the proceeds of the suit. (T 31, USC, 232)

One-half of the penalty goes to informers in Indian Affairs cases. (T 25, USC 201). Informers also can secure one-half of benefits in seizures of liquor on Indian reservations. (T 18, USC 313).

Evasion of Internal Revenue laws can secure up to one-half of the penalty recovered. (T 26, USC, 3617). Narcotic laws, Title 21, USC, 183; Navigation laws, Title 46, USC, 497 and 710; Postal laws, Title 39, USC, 9; and numerous other Acts of Congress recognize the informer as an institution and give him protection.

In criminal law enforcement, the informer is a well-established institution. The same applies to the one American institution that is our most potent protection against tyranny - the American press. There is little difference in the use of the informer by the press and particularly some columnists who use the investigative process.

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Few Pulitzer Prizes have been won without first the tip and then development of the sources of information. Some of the most glorious days of journalism are found in the tradition of the press in protecting its sources of information. Even reporters have gone to jail and to fame by standing firm - i.e., Martin Mooney in New York exposures.

The FBI has always protected its sources and it has been able to secure information because of its tradition of maintaining a confidence. In the few cases where informants have been disclosed, it has been by their own acts: the "Woman in Red" who fingered Dillinger; through policy determination and the judicial process - the Coplon case; and through inadvertence of the informer himself.

Times - events - situations - all dictate procedures. So far as the FBI is concerned, the informant became of paramount importance with the rise of clandestine movements whereby the only proof of the conspiracy came as a result of penetrating the lair of the conspirator.

This Nation forever owes a debt of gratitude to Harry Sawyer, the FBI informer who went to the Nazi spy school in Germany and around whom the German Espionage Service was built prior to World War II. Defense policies were influenced by him, but had confrontation been forced prematurely, the people of the United States, not the FBI, would have suffered because responsibility has a way of finding its final resting place. The informant contributed to the unparalleled record of no enemy sabotage in World War II. Because of the informant the dangerous alien enemies were promptly arrested after Pearl Harbor.

The only way the Ku Klux Klan, as well as the Communist Party, has been thwarted, is through the informant.

This Nation would become defenseless and open prey if arms and ammunition were taken from our Armed Services. By the same token, it would be helpless against the subversive if the FBI were deprived of its informants and confidential investigative techniques.

The proof of this is found in the intensity with which the Communist Party has sought to expose, discredit and destroy informants and former Communists who have testified.

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From the earliest days, Communists have reserved their vilest epithets for the informant whom they labelled as "stool pigeons." The Daily Worker and Communist publications are constantly shrieking at the informant. Pamphlets are sent out broadside and propaganda attacks leveled at informants; smear brigades write letters to editors and public officials.

All America hates a "double crosser" and those who "snitch" - thus, the Communists have directed an attractive appeal that has influenced good Americans. To pervert justice is an American horror - thus, the Communists find a ready-made instrument in the double-dealing Harvey Matusow.

By applying syllogistic reasoning, they start out with the premise that the FBI uses informants - Matusow was an informant - Matusow recanted - therefore all informants are potential recanters and should be banned.

FBI safeguards against double crossers must work, otherwise, Matusow would not be the first case of its type and the record is clear that Matusow was dropped as an informant in December of 1950 after being carried in this role for six months. Even so, Matusow has not been proven to be wrong - he just says he is after he placed himself back in the Communist clutches.

Eighty-two Smith Act convictions, each brought about through the use of informants, have been subjected to the strictest judicial scrutiny. To date the convictions stand.

In loyalty cases the FBI is a service agency. In the early days of the loyalty program the Director laid the facts on the line before the Civil Service Loyalty Review Board which fixed the policy and the Board faced the realistic fact that the protection of the government demanded that all information bearing on loyalty be secured, even if it meant concealing identities. It is unfortunate, but true, that in many instances more energy has been diverted in ascertaining the identity of informants than in ascertaining the truth furnished by informants.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

The FBI checks upon informants by checking other informants, by ascertaining whether they were at certain points and by following out all leads if informants turn sour or become unreliable. They are dropped faster than chained lightning. Of course, one turns out bad on occasions, so did one of the Twelve Disciples; but are the others to be condemned who have been proven? And where do the loudest shouts emanate?

Unfortunately, the true record has not been placed before the public. By Executive Order loyalty data cannot be disclosed. There is no way whereby the FBI can make public the record when the charge is made that a Government employee does not know his accusers. The facts are to the contrary. The FBI endeavors to secure signed statements. In some instances this is not possible because the informant is not a live person but an event - a Communist Party dues book or document produced by another informant which has on many occasions been found to be in the handwriting of the accused. *EW*

The informant is an institution - in criminal proceedings there is the constitutional safeguard of confrontation - but employment in the Government is a privilege and not a right and the employer has the right to employ whom he chooses. When the employer is the Government and a public trust, the employer has the duty to resolve doubt in the interest of security.

Sure, a lot of people are against security and loyalty programs, but for what reason. Joseph Petersen, Jr., wrote letters denouncing security to the editor for 4 years before his arrest for a security breach. Naturally he was against security and the same applies to others.

CONFIDENTIAL

MR. TOLSON

5-10-55

B. T. HARGO

**PROPOSED REVISIONS OF FBI HANDBOOK
AND MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS RELATIVE
TO CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES**

Part I, page 20c, paragraph 5 of the FBI Handbook, Section 107T (6) of the Manual of Instructions states the Agent handling a confidential source must dictate a memorandum every three months for the file regarding the indications of unreliability presented by the confidential source.

This three-month provision applies only to Security Confidential Sources, and not to Criminal Confidential Sources. Thus, to avoid any possibility of confusion on the part of the field, the word "Security" should be inserted before the words "confidential source."

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached FBI Handbook and Manual of Instructions' revisions be approved.

HTS:mag:mag.

(4)

Enclosures -2

NOTE:

Above revisions concurred in by C. L. Green,
Criminal Informant Desk, Investigative Division.

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67 MAY 24 1955

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DATE 2/28/81 BY 2842 pme/oc

ORIGINAL FILED IN

PROPOSED REVISIONS IN MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

SECTION 107 T (6)

Insert word "Security" before words "Confidential Source" appearing throughout this paragraph.

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BASED ON MEMO DATED 5-10-55
FROM R.T. HARBO TO MR. TOLSON
ENTITLED "Proposed Revisions of FBI HANDBOOK
AND MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS RELATING TO
CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES"

ENCLOSURE

PROPOSED REVISION IN FBI HANDBOOK

Part I, page ²⁰⁶~~23~~, paragraph 5 - insert the word "Security"
before words "Confidential Source" throughout the paragraph.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842pmjmc

Based on MEMO DATED 5-10-55 from R.T. HARBO To
MR. TOLSON ENTITLED "Proposed Revisions of FBI
HANDBOOK AND MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS RELATING
TO 'CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES'"

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ENCLOSURE

RH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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May 3, 1955

DATE 4/28/55 BY MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

28/12 pm dmh TC

With reference to my memorandum of April 29, and our conversation at the White House this morning concerning the same, I wanted to advise you that Assistant Attorney General Tompkins did call to see me yesterday and informed me he had ascertained the identity of the attorney in his Division who had talked to Arthur Sylvester of the "Newark Evening News," resulting in the very critical article on the FBI and my administration of it in the handling of informants. As I advised you, Assistant Attorney General Tompkins declined to advise me of the name of the individual who is responsible for this vicious attack upon the FBI.

As I stated to you this morning, I consider this incident to be one of the most vicious attacks made upon this Bureau since I have been connected with the Department of Justice and whether it is to be attributed to stupidity or maliciousness, the result is the same. If individuals in the Department, through either stupidity or maliciousness, can plant stories with hostile newspaper correspondents with complete impunity, then there no doubt will be "open season" for attacks upon the FBI.

I have never contended that the operations of this Bureau are perfect nor that our policies and procedures are above improvement, but I, at the same time, have strongly adhered to the view that any one who has any question about any of these matters should take them up within the "family" and not air their grievances through the writings of a hostile newspaper correspondent. As I advised you in my first memorandum about this matter, we had never been informed by Mr. Tompkins' Division that there was any question or criticism of our procedures in handling informants but, to the contrary, had had the assurances of the attorney in that Division that they were in accord with our procedures and recognized the need of them because of security factors involved.

It is, of course, not within my province to recommend any action even after my suggestion as to what action should be taken in the final disposition of this matter as that is entirely one within your jurisdiction but

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MAY 10 1955 MAY D 1955

SENT TO Mr. D. O.
TIME 9:45 AM
DATE 5/1/55
BY 7203

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-101077-2

Memorandum for the Attorney General

May 2, 1955

I did request Mr. Tompkins and I do very strongly urge through you that, whoever this individual may be in Mr. Tompkins' Division who is responsible for this vicious attack upon this Bureau, that he not be assigned to any cases which would require personal conference or contact with representatives of the FBI. The feeling within this Bureau about this matter is quite strong and I do not think that any representatives of this Bureau should be required to confer or deal with any such character who resorted to the tactics as have been evidenced in this matter. It was solely for this reason that I was desirous of ascertaining the identity of this individual because so far as this Bureau knows it could be any one of quite a number of attorneys in the Internal Security Division and I do not believe that the best teamwork can be obtained when there is suspicion such as must necessarily exist in the minds of the personnel of this Bureau about who was responsible for the completely unwarranted and malicious criticism of this Bureau as furnished to Arthur Sylvester.

Respectfully,

151 J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

cc - Mr. William P. Rogers
Deputy Attorney General
$$J_{\text{EH}} \text{ eff (7)}$$

May 5, 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 pndmc

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BOARDMAN
MR. BELMONT
MR. NICHOLS

Yesterday afternoon Assistant Attorney General Tompkins called to see me and stated that he was calling because of his great concern over the article which appeared in the "Newark Evening News," written by Arthur Sylvester, and in which Sylvester quoted an attorney in the Department of Justice, obviously in the Internal Security Division, who was particularly critical of this Bureau's policies in handling informants.

Mr. Tompkins stated that he had, upon his return to the city when he learned of this matter, at first called Sylvester, ostensibly on some other matter but hoping that Sylvester might mention the article, and that he, Tompkins, might then find out with whom Sylvester had talked. Mr. Tompkins stated that he had not been successful in this as Sylvester never made any reference to the article. Mr. Tompkins stated that he had subsequently ascertained the identity of the attorney in his Division who had talked with Sylvester. Mr. Tompkins stated that he was quite certain that this attorney had not been malicious in his statements which he had made; that, in fact, the attorney had no criticism of the Bureau's procedures, but that Sylvester had twisted the statements so as to indicate criticism of this Bureau.

I told Mr. Tompkins that I certainly could not go along with his line of reasoning; that anyone reading the article could not see that the attorney interviewed by Sylvester was void of all maliciousness and criticism against this Bureau. I stated in the first place it was quite obvious that Sylvester had obtained his information from an attorney in the Internal Security Division because in substance what Sylvester printed, as having been given to him by the attorney, were facts but that the viciousness of the situation was that the attorney in directing criticism to the Bureau's procedures had failed to make or give any reasons for the same. Mr. Tompkins stated that he knew the attorneys in the Internal Security Division were in full accord with the procedures we follow in handling confidential informants and that he had never heard any criticism of the same.

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MAY 13 1955

SENT FROM D.O. MAY 11 1955
TIME 6:25 PM
DATE 5-5-55
BY

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-10017

May 3, 1955

I then asked Mr. Tompkins to give me the name of the attorney in his Division who had been in touch with Sylvester. Mr. Tompkins stated that he would prefer not to do this. I told Mr. Tompkins that, very frankly, I was nonplussed at his own attitude in that he seemed to be palliating the situation, which I thought was one of the most vicious incidents that had ever occurred within the Department of Justice and that his refusal to furnish me the name of the attorney was again not understandable to me unless he, Tompkins, was trying to justify and protect the "rat" who had endeavored to embarrass the Bureau by talking as he did to Sylvester. Mr. Tompkins stated that he was quite sure that, as he previously indicated, there was no viciousness or malicious intent upon the part of the attorney. I told him again that I certainly couldn't share his viewpoint.

I observed to Mr. Tompkins that I hoped he would see that the attorney who had been responsible for this vicious attack upon the Bureau would not be handling any cases emanating from the FBI which would require personal contact by FBI personnel with the attorney. I got no assurance one way or the other as to whether Mr. Tompkins would do this.

This morning, prior to the National Security Council meeting, I spoke to the Attorney General at the White House about this matter and the Attorney General informed me that Mr. Tompkins had been to see him yesterday and that the last he heard Tompkins was coming to see me about the matter. I advised the Attorney General of the conversation which I had with Tompkins and that I was at a loss to understand Tompkins' attitude in the matter in that he, Tompkins, was trying to excuse and justify the actions of his subordinate when I was frankly at a loss to understand how such actions could be justified. I observed to the Attorney General that even if the most charitable attitude were taken toward the attorney involved that the attorney was certainly guilty of the grossest stupidity and that stupidity can do as much harm as maliciousness, as was evidenced in this matter if the action of the attorney is to be attributed to stupidity. The Attorney General inquired of me as to whether I thought he should look further into the matter and I told him I was certainly of the opinion that he should. I observed to the Attorney General that if anyone in this Bureau had engaged in any such actions as this attorney had engaged in, that I would immediately dismiss such an employee from the service of this Bureau and I wouldn't wait until the Attorney General suggested that I do it. I commented to the Attorney General that I considered this incident one of the most vicious attacks made upon this Bureau

Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Boardman,
Belmont, Nichols

May 5, 1955

from within the Department during my entire career in the Department of Justice. I stated that if this attorney was allowed to get by with this sort of conduct that it would no doubt be open season for any other malcontent in the Department to stick a stilette in the back of the FBI. The Attorney General indicated that he intended to talk with Assistant Attorney General Tompkins further about the situation.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

JEH:ell (7)

CONFIDENTIAL

cc - Mr. Belmont
Mr. McInturff

CONFIDENTIAL

Assistant Attorney General
William F. Tompkins

May 12, 1955

Director, FBI

DECLASSIFIED BY 2542 m/mc
ON 12-28-86
CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2542 m/mc
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 9-17-81

SIGNING A NON-COMMUNIST AFFIDAVIT AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 101 OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, BY INFORMANT

Reference is made to my letter of February 2, 1953, to Assistant Attorney General Warren Olney III under the above caption and to Mr. Olney's letter to me of July 24, 1953, captioned "Confidential Informants in Security Matters." Both of the above letters dealt with the problem of informants signing loyalty oaths or statements required by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, as well as other loyalty oaths and statements required by Federal, state and local employment.

My letter of February 2, 1953, confirmed conversation between Mr. William N. Foley of the Department and representatives of this Bureau as to whether or not a current informant would be violating the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, in signing a non-Communist affidavit required in compliance with that Act. Mr. Foley advised that he could see no moral or ethical wrong in such action and moreover this would not be a prosecutable violation of the Labor Management Relations Act inasmuch as the informant's membership in the Communist Party is solely for the purpose of assisting his Government and the informant, therefore, has no intent to violate the law.

In Mr. Olney's memorandum of July 24, 1953, it was stated that it was the view of the Criminal Division that an active current informant of the Bureau may legally and morally answer in the negative questions pertaining to his current subversive activities.

For your information, a valuable informant of our Boston Office recently secured a job in a factory in Massachusetts. As a result, this informant has been suggested for the position of vice president of the union at said factory and if so elected may be required to sign a non-Communist affidavit under the Labor Management Relations Act. This informant is a member of the Communist Party and

NOTE ON YELLOW:

See Executives Conference Memo 5/55, AB:tlc

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES
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MAY 13 1955
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- Gandy

EX-125

CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 16 1955

CONFIDENTIAL

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has been furnishing valuable information concerning the activities of the Party to this Bureau. Informant may have to sign a non-Communist affidavit in the near future. It will be necessary for him to deny Communist Party membership in signing this affidavit in order to maintain his position as a confidential informant of the FBI. *EW* ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

As you are aware, the non-Communist affidavit required under the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, pertains to current membership and activity within the Communist Party.

This informant has been instructed to avoid the situation wherein he will have to sign this affidavit if this is possible. However, there is a good chance that informant will not be able to avoid such a situation. You are requested to advise whether or not you are in accordance with permitting an active confidential informant to sign a non-Communist affidavit under these circumstances.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: Director, FBI

Date: May 16, 1955

FROM: *Handwritten initials* SAC, Detroit (134-0)b. SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS *General*
(SECURITY OF)

Handwritten 1
[redacted] a source closely associated with [redacted]
[redacted] and who has furnished reliable information in the
past, on March 28, 1955 stated that [redacted] had in his possession
five pages of undated, unsigned handwritten notes. These notes
concerned [redacted]
[redacted]

b7D

It will be recalled that all of these individuals are former Informants of the Detroit Division who testified in behalf of the Government in the Smith Act trials in Detroit in the latter part of 1953 and early 1954.

The notes were probably compiled either during the trial or shortly thereafter. The notes are primarily concerned with points or weaknesses of the Informants which should have made the Communist Party (CP) suspicious of the individuals.

An analysis of these notes indicates that the point stressed most was the fact that many of the above individuals were reportedly "politically ignorant" as far as the CP was concerned. Importance is also placed on the fact that although many of the above individuals had attended CP schools or classes, they had merely attended and apparently had taken no active part in discussions. Also, it was mentioned in some instances that dues were always paid on time; literature was purchased regularly; attendance at meetings was regular, etc. with the conclusion apparently being drawn that a person who is too steady in the above factors may be suspicious.

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DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 phume JC

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2 MAY 18 1955

EX-121

INT SEC

Letter to Director

Re: SECURITY INFORMANTS
(SECURITY OF)

The notes contain general conclusions which read in part as follows:

"1. Overrun with spies. Strategically placed. Well thought; long range. No important exposure since 1940. (Serious 1938, 1939). Many party org. problems in part flow from operat. in party. Must have a national plan fully unfolded by FBI in 41, 42.

"2. Spies: Not correct for top only.

"3. Wherever they brought out people, they left something behind! They must know whole party org.!! [] gave the whole struct. of party. (FBI however reported Michigan last year's registration 375, off by 25). One or two people in every region."

With reference to point 3 above, the [] referred to is probably [] With regard to the registration figures, it is noted that during 1953 the Detroit Division reported Michigan's registration as between 350 and 400, and in early 1954 this Division reported the registration as 350 members in Michigan. The general conclusions continued as follows:

"4. Two central questions in next six mos.--break-through (illegible word) or destroy party.

1) Every member without exception assigned to a mass org.--those who are not. First and foremost (one or two illegible words) people. Check up and control em. work, how they carry out party work and live.

2) Entire membership verification. Great Detail. Bold struggle in party." (At this point several sentences are illegible).

The notes hereafter are somewhat illegible but points which may be of interest are as follows:

Letter to the Director

Re: SECURITY INFORMANTS
(SECURITY OF)

"Form may present itself in struggle in mass org., evening work. They move very easily (or early) in party. Weak ideological level-why. Don't know and understand intimately our people. That is, not in homes, background, family, what they read. Native roots: If people not equipped, main assignment--train native people to take over what you leave behind you. No checkup and control. Greater attention to political growth of people. Let questions hang and don't demand political results of people."

This is furnished the Bureau for informational purposes since it is felt that this line of thinking or this type of analysis is probably being carried out generally in an effort to uncover Bureau Informants.

KC: manifest

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson *Viper*DATE: May 10, 1955 *10*FROM : L. B. Nichols *10/10*

SUBJECT:

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS EXPOSED

SECURITY INFORMANTS - GEUL.

Thirty-three confidential informants have been exposed in Smith Act cases. Twenty additional have been exposed in appearances before the Subversive Activities Control Board and other cases involving security matters, making a total of 53 confidential informants exposed.

These figures were obtained by Mr. Hennrich after a canvas of Bureau supervisors. These figures can be supported. There is a possibility there may be a few others. To determine this, however, would necessitate checking the files of all discontinued confidential informants which would be a rather extensive research project. Accordingly, this will not be done unless the Director and you feel we should get this data together.

cc: Mr. Boardman
Mr. BelmontLBN:MM
(4)ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 7/28/11 BY 2842 p/mcjc

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- Gandy _____

RECORDED-42

66-2542-3-951

MAY 20 1955

INT. SEC

MAY 25 1955

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *3/19/55*

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont *ABE*

SUBJECT: INFORMANTS MADE AVAILABLE TO THE DEPARTMENT
Security Informants - Genl.

DATE: May 16, 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 me/c

Tolson ☒
 Boardman ☒
 Nichols ☒
 Belmont ☒
 Harbo ☒
 Mohr ☒
 Parsons ☒
 Rosen ☒
 Tamm ☒
 Sizoo ☒
 Winterrowd ☒
 Tele. Room ☒
 Holloman ☒
 Gandy ☒

In accordance with the request of Mr. Nichols there is set out below the types of cases in which the Department has exposed 53 of our informants by using them as witnesses. As mentioned previously by Mr. Nichols this compilation is based upon a canvass of Bureau Supervisors. Mr. Nichols pointed out that there is a possibility that there may be a few others but to determine this would necessitate checking the files of all discontinued confidential informants which would be an extensive research project. It was not recommended that the latter be done.

Type of Case	Number of Informants
Smith Act Prosecutions	33
Hearings Before Subversive Activities Control Board in Following Cases	15
Labor Youth League	
Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade	
Civil Rights Congress	
Jefferson School of Social Science	
National Council American Soviet Friendship	
Labor Management Relations Act	3
Prosecution of Leaders and Members of	2
Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico	
Total	53

In addition to the above we are in the process of making available one additional informant to INS in connection with deportation proceedings relating to Chinese. With regard to INS cases it has been our policy to extend complete cooperation to that Agency and there may have been instances in the past when we have made available nonactive informants not previously exposed for use by that Agency. As a result of our poll it has not been possible to determine the names of any such informants, or of any active informants.

ACTION:

It is recommended that this be routed to Mr. Nichols for his information.

cc - Mr. Nichols
 Mr. Boardman
 Mr. Belmont
 Mr. Keay
 Mr. Hennrich
 Mr. Baumgardner
 Mr. Donohue

RECORDED-35
 INDEXED-35
 *See next page.

66-2542-3952

FHB
 67 MAY 26 1955

JDD:eje (8)

140-418105
 UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

* We have recently, in connection with consideration of Chinese, furnished INS the identities of twenty-five other people who were concealed by "T" symbols. These persons were not regular Bureau informants but persons who had requested their names be concealed or whose names were concealed by the Bureau for various reasons other than the fact they were regular informants.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

FROM : C. E. Hennrich

SUBJECT: INFORMANTS MADE AVAILABLE TO THE DEPARTMENT

DATE: May 13, 1955

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

At the request of Mr. Nichols earlier this week a compilation of informants, which the Bureau has made available to the Department in connection with prosecution of various types of cases, was made. Mr. Donohue on the informant desk determined that there were a total of 53 such informants which have been made available, 33 of which were in the Smith Act cases.

Mr. Nichols advised at 6:35 p.m. that the Director now wants a break-down on these informants as to the types of cases being prosecuted by the Department and the number of informants made available in each type of case. He also wants to be sure we include in this compilation the number of informants which have been made available to Immigration and Naturalization Service in connection with the deportation proceedings. He wants this information the first thing Monday morning.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY SP4 JPM/mc JC

CEH:blo (6)

cc - Mr. Belmont
 Mr. Hennrich
 Mr. Keay
 Mr. Baumgardner
 Mr. Donohue

URG

66-2582-3-152

OFFICE MEMORANDUM . UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM : SAC, PHILADELPHIA
SUBJECT: EUGENIA CIAY PA.
CS

DATE: 5-27-55

b7D

0 Security Informants - Genl

Re SAC Letter 55-35 (0).

This individual is not presently being contacted with sufficient regularity to warrant conversion to a source of information under the provisions of the SAC Letter. Accordingly he is being deleted as a confidential source.

WSS:emc

REGISTERED MAIL
(2 Bu 1 Ph)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 2/28/81 BY 2842 md me x

RECORDED - 103
INDEXED - 103

66-2542-3-953

6 MAY 31 1955

1-7
F 218
50 JUN 6 1955

M
EX-103

DATE OF MAIL 5-26-55

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR MR. LAWRENCE TO BE TEST PERMANENTLY IN HIS
OFFICE, ROOM 1736~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 pmw
mcjc

SUBJECT JUNE MAILREMOVED BY 87 JUN 6 1955FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-95-4

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

F-218

F-218

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM : SAC, PHILADELPHIA
SUBJECT: ANDREW A. O'NEILL
CS

DATE: 5-27-55

b7D

Security Divts. ^{Gen'l}

Re SAC Letter 55-35 (O).

This individual is not presently being contacted with sufficient regularity to warrant conversion to a source of information under the provisions of the SAC Letter. Accordingly he is being deleted as a confidential source.

WSt:emc

REGISTERED MAIL
(2 Bu 1 Ph)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 pmwmc
JC

RECORDED - 65

INDEXED - 65

001-X3

66-2542-3-955

8 MAY 31 1955

INT SEC

71 JUN 7 1955

236-55

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION.

Date April 21, 1955

To: Director, FBI

From: SA F. ANTHONY TANSEY

Field Office or Division New York Division

SUGGESTION: That an informant classification master list be compiled by the Bureau to encompass all past and present symbol number informants.

Security Informants - Gen'l

Its advantages are: To preclude continuing duplication of effort on the part of agent, stenographic, and clerical personnel; to avoid unnecessary delay in preparation of reports; and, to have a central control list readily available to the Bureau.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 pmw/mcjc

It should save at least \$ _____ annually. (Unable to estimate)

The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States.

ack 4/26/55 - Rec.
referred to Domestic Intelligence
and Investigative Services
for review 4/25/55 - Rec.
EX-100

(Signature of Suggestor)

Comments and recommendation of Supervisor, SAC, or Assistant Director:

I believe this suggestion has merit and recommend the Bureau give favorable consideration.

50 JUN 9 1955
FAT:JK

COPIES DESTROYED
9 08 JUL 19 1961

James J. Kelly
(Signature) JAMES J. KELLY
Special Agent in Charge
(Title)

APR 22 1955
66-251945-
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

I. SUGGESTED METHOD OF EFFECTUATING THE SYSTEM.

A. Require each of the 52 Field Offices to submit characterizations, in accordance with existing Bureau instructions, of all past and present informants.

The field could accomplish this by having each agent presently contacting an informant characterize him according to instructions. Assign all inactive informant files to agent personnel with top priority for the same purpose. This should not be construed to include a re-investigation of all previous information but should be sufficient to encompass all known facts logically available to the offices at this time. This information would be transmitted to the Bureau by a single correspondence from each SAC, identifying each informant by symbol number and classification only.

B. The Bureau could then compile a numerical-alphabetical master list of 3x5 cards, and notify all field offices as to the present characterization of all informants, by sending a copy to each office. Each office would, of course, be held strictly responsible for the accuracy of the list transmitted to the Bureau, and would be placed in the position of immediately notifying the Bureau of any changes or additions to the list with reasons therefor, in the future. At the time such a change is made, the Bureau, being in position to evaluate the ramifications of the change, could determine the method by which other offices would be notified, that is, by teletype, airtel, SAC letter, form letter or other means. The list could be corrected, deleted or supplemented in the same manner as is presently utilized by the Bureau concerning other administrative instructions, or thru periodic form letters such as are used in maintaining an up-to-date SI listing.

Regarding new daily additions to the list of symbol number informants, it would be assumed that an office using the symbol in a report or letter for the first time to another office, would therein administratively call this fact to the attention of offices receiving copies, until such time as each office has been routinely advised administratively as suggested in the preceding paragraph.

The master list could be compiled at the Bureau on 3x5 cards by clerical and typist personnel under the direction of Supervisory personnel. A possible procedure would be to mimeograph cards for distribution to the field.

II. ANALYSIS OF ADVANTAGES

A. It is believed that this type of control would preclude the necessity of each agent checking at the instant each report is written, with his own office files and other offices, to determine the evaluation to be given an informant. It would place the responsibility squarely on the office responsible for the informant to keep the Bureau and other offices advised at all times.

B. To clarify the advantages of such a program hypothetical cases are set forth to indicate the personnel hours expended before and after the adoption of a central control list:

1. Before

a. Office A wants to include 10 symbol number informants in a report. If each of the informants is from a different office this necessitates communicating with 10 other offices and a reply from each of the other ten offices. It involves agent time dictating, stenographic time preparing the letters, clerical time searching the indices, and time consumed by the agent at the office of origin reviewing the informant's file to make the classification. Then the time consumed by that agent to dictate, the stenographer to prepare the letter and the clerical handling. Assuming 10 minutes for dictation for each letter, 20 minutes in preparation, and 10 minutes clerical handling, including blockstamping, serializing, routing and filing, this would amount to 200 agent minutes, 400 stenographic minutes and 200 clerical minutes, each time the situation occurred. This would be in addition to time spent by the agent at office of origin reviewing the informant's file.

b. Five months later, office A wants to use the same 10 symbol number informants in a report. The procedure in 1.a above must be repeated to be current. This again would use 200 agent minutes, 400 stenographic minutes, and 200 clerical minutes.

c. Office B wants to include in a report 10 symbol number informants. Office B is origin in 6 of these cases. In the other 4 instances Office B must correspond with other offices and those offices must reply to Office B. Some of these might even be identical with the informants about whom Office A previously inquired. On basis of above figures this would entail an additional 80 agent minutes, 160 stenographic minutes, and 80 clerical minutes, in addition to a review of the file by the agent to whom assigned.

d. It is possible that larger offices such as New York, Los Angeles, Chicago and Washington Field, could conceivably send out more than one letter during any particular period, of say for example one week, from the different Divisions or Squads, to Office Z inquiring about the same informant. This would cause considerable duplication of agent, stenographic and clerical time.

In all of the above instances, communication costs and delay in submission of reports should be considered. These instances might be repeated day after day, month after month, and presumably some offices might not utilize a symbol number informant until a year or two have elapsed in which case the office of origin would still be setting out a letter to another of the 52 field offices saying the same thing it said on 51 occasions to each of the other offices.

2. After

a. In instance 1.a above, only the time spent by the agent at office of origin reviewing the informant file would be consumed.

b. Instance 1.b above would not occur.

c. Instance 1.c above would not occur.

d. Instance 1.d above would not occur.

e. It is believed that if the suggestion is adopted the agent assigned to the case would only once notify the Bureau, thru the list compiled by the SAC. This would change only at a future date when and if there is a change in the informant's classification. This would consume a great amount of time and space at first, but would certainly be a saving to the Bureau in the long run. It would save Agent, stenographic, and clerical time, and would avoid unnecessary delay in submission of reports.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. W. A. BRANIGAN *WAB*

DATE: MAY 25, 1955

FROM : MR. C. E. HENNRICH *CH*SUBJECT: HANDLING OF CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL
SOURCES
ESPIONAGE SECTION

cc Mr. Hennrich

Security Informants -
Genl.

In order that there may be uniformity in the application of the Bureau's rules regarding the handling of confidential sources and confidential informants and the designations of individuals in these categories, all Supervisors should be specifically instructed that any memoranda concerning these matters should be cleared through the Informant Desk in the Internal Security Section.

CEH:td
(2)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 2/28/81 BY 2842 p/m J C
RECORDED - 121

66-2542-3-957

17 JUN 8 1955

53 JUN 8 1955

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

*many all
response 24
6/3/55*

F 218

5D

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

TO : Director, FBI (66-2542-3)

DATE: June 19, 1955

FROM : SAC, Pittsburgh

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAM
IS-C

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Rebulet to Albany, 12/9/53, and mylet, 5/4/55.

The following is the May, 1955, report submitted in connection with captioned program:

	During Past 30 Days	Total to Date
1. Number of interviews conducted:	1	~50
2. Number of security informants developed under this program:	0	0
3. Number of confidential sources developed through this program:	0	0
	Part Time	Full Time
4. Number of agents engaged in interviews under this program:	0	3

During May, 1955, three SM-C interviews and no SIP reinterviews were conducted by agents assigned to the Security Informant Program.

REGISTERED MAIL
JRM/jep
(3)DECLASSIFIED BY 8068 JRM/jep
ON 4-21-99
83-1343DECLASSIFIED BY 8068 JRM/jep
ON 7-28-91APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S)

DATE 10/29/81

RECORDED-89

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISECLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 8068 JRM/jep
REASON FOR
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7-28-91

JUN 21 1955

CONFIDENTIAL

66 JUN 14 1955

CONSOLIDATION OF FORMS 5-29 AND 6-60

Rather than redesign the two forms (index cards), form 6-60 can be eliminated as 5-29 in its present form is suitable for use in the Criminal Informant Index.

CBT
J
E. J. W.
Rw

66-2542-3-959
ENCLOSURE

B-111992

the facts and circumstances outlined in your letter, this Office will not object to your certifying the invoice which is returned herewith, the decision herein to be noted on the payment voucher.

Sincerely yours,

Lindsay C. Warren
Comptroller General
of the United States

Enclosure

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Mason *M*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

DATE: 6/14/55

FROM : Fidelis Kunz *K*

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 PDU/mcJC

SUBJECT: SYMBOL CARDS FOR INFORMANTSDeletion of Form 6-60 in favor of Form 5-29.Security Informants - Gen

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

Forms 5-29 and 6-60 (Symbol Cards for Informants) are used in the Domestic Intelligence Division and Investigative Division respectively. They serve as an index reflecting the symbols assigned to Security and Criminal Informants and they are very similar in design. A copy of each form is attached.

It has been determined that Form 5-29 is suitable for use in its present form in connection with the Criminal Informant Index retained in the Investigative Division, thereby making possible the deletion of Form 6-60.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Form 6-60 be deleted in favor of Form 5-29.

EX-126 ENCL

Enclosure
(2 copies)

66 JUL 5 1955

RECORDED-32

INDEXED - 32

EX-126

2 JUN 24 1955

UNRECORDED

2-25

SYMBOL:
NAME:

FIELD DIVISION:

5-29

TYPE OF INFO:

Current form used in Division V.

SYMBOL:

DIVISION:

6-60

NAME:

Current form used in Division VI.

Criminal Informant Index

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 p.m.v.m.c.JC

61-7-959

ENCLOSURE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: JUNE 16, 1955

FROM : MR. F. J. BAUMGARDNER

SUBJECT: ~~FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AS INFORMANTS~~ (66-2542-3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

MIAMI SECURITY INFORMANT

PHILADELPHIA SECURITY INFORMANT (100-377137

10

_____ and has been so employed _____. By letter of January 26, 1953, Miami advised informant had been utilized for previous 18 months in several security cases and had potential as an informant. Authority granted to develop him and informant developed acquaintance with several subjects on his mail route and attended classes where Communism and Marxism were studied. In September, 1953, informant became member of _____ and is currently furnishing information concerning that group. _____

Informant presently being paid for his assistance up to [] per month, plus maximum of [] per month for necessary expenses. *AM*

Another informant, [] is employed

In [redacted] Informant has been operating for Bureau since 1942, first in Washington, D. C., and since 1949, in Philadelphia. Presently furnishes information [redacted]

Philadelphia. Presently furnishes information [redacted] He is paid at [redacted]
rate of [redacted] per month, plus expenses not to exceed [redacted] per month.

Question has been raised as to whether Bureau on firm ground in paying an informant who is also receiving salary from Federal Government.

3 ENCLOSURE
From a review of Bureau policy and material provided
by Administrative Division, it is believed dual compensation
Enclosures 2 INDEXED-87, RECORDED-83 66-2542-3
cc: Administrative Division

Mr. Belmont

Mr. Baumgardner

Mr. Donohue

JDD:DE (7)

63-10071-1A-29 1955

DECLASSIFIED AND UNCLASSIFIED BY: 7510 D

EXTENDED TO 20.9.2017
IN ACCORDANCE WITH

REASON FOR EXTENSION
ECM 11-1242

DATE OF REVIEW FOR

DECLASSIFICATION

64 JUN 30 1955

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BELMONT

provisions in Federal Government do not apply to Bureau informants. Basis for this conclusion is fact that informants are not Bureau employees and informants are told from inception of dealings with Bureau that relationship is strictly contractual. In view of contractual relationship, Bureau has no obligation to informants as employees, or their widows, for any claim against the Government based upon services performed by informant. Department has so ruled and for your information there is attached memorandum dated January 6, 1951, entitled: "Information Furnished by SAC Banister, Minneapolis, Re [redacted]"

b7D

Also attached is material furnished by Administrative Division, obtained from General Accounting Office, to the effect that an agreement or contract by an agency of the United States Government with an employee of another agency to perform a particular duty is not applicable under U. S. Dual Compensation Statutes. Where the service to be rendered under a contract with an employee is such as could have been required of him in his official capacity, payment of additional compensation to employee is forbidden.

Our informants perform activities for Bureau on their own time and not in conflict with their employment.

Information obtained by Administrative Division also indicates that whether there is contractual relationship or not a civilian employee may accept and receive fees for services in another agency (if the two services do not overlap in time) without limitation on either the individual or combined rate of salary.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Since Miami Informant [redacted] has been furnishing valuable information to the Bureau as an informant since 1952, and on behalf of Bureau joined a [redacted] organization, it is not felt we should risk losing the informant by advising the [redacted] of his relationship with the Bureau. If at a later date it becomes apparent such action is necessary, a separate memorandum will be prepared containing a suitable recommendation. *P. (u)*

b7D

2. Since [redacted] has been furnishing information to the Bureau since 1942 and is a current valuable informant in Philadelphia (u) on the [redacted] it is recommended that we do not advise [redacted] *(u)*

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BELMONT

[redacted] of his relationship with the Bureau as to do so would involve a risk of losing the informant. If at a later date it becomes apparent such action is necessary, a separate memorandum will be prepared containing a suitable recommendation. *(u)*

b7D

3. Based upon the previous opinion from the Department in the case of former [redacted] and material furnished by the Administrative Division, it is recommended that we continue to pay as informants Federal employees who are willing to voluntarily furnish assistance to the Bureau in accordance with Bureau policy that such assistance is rendered on a strictly contractual basis.

MAJOR EXISTING RESTRICTIONS ON DUAL EMPLOYMENT - DUAL COMPENSATION
IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES

Full-time Employees Cannot hold two positions if either job pays an annual salary of \$2,500 or more.

Cannot receive more than one of two salaries which exceed rate of \$2,000 per year when combined.

May hold a second job in the Government while on voluntary leave without pay only if the combined rate of pay for the two positions does not exceed \$2,000 per year.

May be employed in a temporary position while on involuntary furlough without pay without limitation on either the individual or combined rate of salary.

May accept and receive fees for services in another agency (if the two services do not overlap in time) without limitation on either the individual or combined rate of salary.

May hold a job in another agency and receive full payment for each, if each salary is less than \$2,500 per year, if the salary from one of the two positions is paid from some source other than appropriated funds.

The basic intent of the dual compensation and dual employment laws was not to prevent dual employment of civilian employees or the hiring of retired military personnel. Rather, the original purpose was to limit such employments to a reasonable extent. The present \$2,500 limit on dual civilian employment was established in 1894. The present \$3,000 limit on combined civilian salary and retired pay for commissioned officers was adopted in 1932; at that time this was only a little less than the annual rate for Grade 9 of the Classification Act. (Incidentally, this is the only restrictive provision of the 1932 Economy Act which has not been modified or repealed.)

File

62-17890-939

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 pmjmcjc

ENCLOSURE

66-2542-3-960

Per Mr. Farrar of the General Accounting Office.

An agreement or a contract by an agency of the U. S. Government with an employee of another agency to perform a particular duty is applicable under its Dual Compensation statutes.

Comptroller General's decision B 23077, dated 1/23/42; 21 CG 705 provides - Contracts between the Government and its employees are not prohibited generally by statute but only where an employee of the Government acts as agent both for the Government and the contractor in the transaction of business (see 18 U.S. Code 93; 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 482; 24 id. 557; 5 Comp. Gen. 93; 13 id. 281; 17 id. 123); or where the service to be rendered under a contract with an employee is such as could have been required of him in his official capacity, in which case the payment of additional compensation is inhibited by sections 1764 and 1765, Revised Statutes, 5 U.S. Code 69, 70. Cf. Woodwell v. United States, 214 U.S. 82.

However, aside from any statutory prohibition, contracts between the Government and its employees are open to criticism for possible favoritism and preferential treatment; and this office often has expressed the view that such contracts should not be made except for the most cogent reasons. 5 Comp. Gen. 93; 14 id. 403; Cf. 13 Comp. Gen. 281.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 p/mcjc

ENCLOSURE

66-2542-3-960



COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON 25

OCT 21 1952

8-111992

Claude A. Brown, Authorized Certifying Officer
United States Department of Agriculture
Forest Service, North Central Region
620 North Second Street
Milwaukee 3, Wisconsin

Dear Mr. Brown:

Reference is made to your letter dated September 18, 1952 (file A-Disbursement-Vouchers), transmitting an invoice—subsequently to be scheduled with other accounts on Voucher and Schedule Form 1166—of Gerald W. Pellishak, Watermanet, Michigan, in the amount of \$25, stated to be due for replacing two burned-out electric bulbs atop the 200 foot Government radio tower at Watermanet, Michigan, pursuant to informal contract entered into on July 11, 1952. You request a decision as to whether said invoice may be certified for payment.

It appears that the Regional Forest Service operating its own communication installation at the aforesaid site, including a beacon tower equipped with aircraft signal lights in conformity with applicable regulations, was required to make an emergency replacement on July 11, 1952, of two electric light bulbs. You state that such services previously were secured on a contract basis from Samuel Snapp, the only local individual commercially engaged in the specific work, and that while unable to perform the services in question due to concurrent illness he advised that his fee for the specific service was \$35.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/28/01 BY SP42 PNM/CJC

ENCLOSURE

66-2542-3-960

B-111992

exhausting bulbs. You state that Mr. Pelichuk, a full time regular employee of the Forest Service--the only other available individual qualified to complete the work--offered to make the required replacement for \$25. In view of the urgent need, together with the fact that the said services were not among the prescribed duties of the local agency employees or otherwise obtainable without unreasonable delay, the said offer was administratively accepted as being in the best interest of the Government. Further you state that the services were completed entirely outside the employee's assigned duty hours and that the Government furnished the safety equipment and bulbs used in connection therewith.

Contracts between the Government and its employees are not prohibited generally by statute but only where an employee of the Government acts as agent both for the Government and the contractor in the transaction of business; or where the service to be rendered under a contract with an employee is such as could have been required of him in his official capacity. However, aside from any statutory prohibition, contracts between the Government and its employees are open to criticism for possible favoritism and this Office often has expressed the view that such contracts should not be made except for the most cogent reasons. 21 Comp. Gen. 705, 707.

In view of the reported emergent situation and on the basis of

June 15, 1955

Security Informants - General

Mr. John C. Schaefer, Jr.
555 Broadway
Hastings-on-Hudson, New York

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 PNU
mcjc

Dear Mr. Schaefer:

It has been my pleasure to read your letter to the "New York Herald Tribune" dated June 8, 1955, and I want to thank you for your support of the use of informants.

It is, of course, important to use informants in effective law enforcement, but a confidential informant in a position to furnish key information of interest to the internal security of the United States is indispensable. After reading your encouraging letter, I could not let the opportunity pass without expressing my appreciation for your remarks. As you are aware, those who seek to destroy our Government are presently taking advantage of every opportunity to discredit the use of informants.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

NOTE: Bufiles reflect no record identifiable with Mr. Schaefer. Address per Yonkers Telephone Directory. Hastings on Hudson is a branch Post Office of Yonkers, New York.

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

GEM:nma
(3)

RECORDED-96

INDEXED-96

COMM - FBI

JUN 17 1955

MAILED 31

66-2542-3-967

JUN 28 1955

RECEIVED
JUN 15 7 27 PM '55
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

gum

Mr. Tolson ☒
 Mr. Boardman ☒
 Mr. Nichols ☒
 Mr. Belmont ☒
 Mr. Harbo ☒
 Mr. Mohr ☐
 Mr. Parsons ☐
 Mr. Rosen ☐
 Mr. Tamm ☐
 Mr. Sizoo ☐
 Mr. Winterrowd ☐
 Tele. Room ☐
 Mr. Holloman ☐
 Miss Gandy ☒ 4/29/50

Baumgardner
 Dr. [unclear]
 [unclear]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 pdr/mc
 JC

(and)
 det. no Schuyler
 6-#465
 S & M

66-2542-3-961

ENCLOSURE

Wash. Post and Times Herald ☐
 Wash. News ☐
 Wash. Star ☐
 N. Y. Herald Tribune ☒
 N. Y. Mirror ☐

Date: JUN 10 1955

~~Paid Informers~~

To the N. Y. Herald Tribune:

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, who is in a position to know, has defended the use of informants as an essential means of combating subversion. Dare we hope that, as a result of Mr. Hoover's forthright statement, we will be spared further crocodile tears and pious protests against "paid stool pigeons"? Let the Communists howl to their hearts' content—they are being hurt by the testimony of their former co-conspirators, who have had the courage to become Americans again. But why should any patriotic citizen try to place a stumbling block in the path of effective law enforcement?

JOHN C. SCHAEFER JR.

Hastings on Hudson, N. Y.
June 8, 1955.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *ABZ*

DATE: June 10, 1955

FROM : MR. F. J. BAUMGARDNER *JB*ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIEDSUBJECT: SUGGESTION NO. 461-55
FORM FD-209DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 JMD
mcj C

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Nichols	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

The attached suggestion deals with Form FD-209, which is used to report contacts with informants. It is being suggested that this form be amended to provide an evaluation of the reliability of the informant as:

1. Who has furnished reliable information in the past.
2. Who has furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past.
3. Contact with him has been insufficient to judge reliability.

It is recommended that this suggestion not be adopted for the following reasons:

1. Section 107 G of the Manual of Instructions provides that when specific information is received from an informant such information be made the subject of a separate memorandum to be placed in the informant's subfile and appropriately channelized. Thus, form FD-209 will not be used for positive information and any memorandum prepared should reflect the informant's reliability.
2. Informant checks should not be made with any informant in category No. 2 above (Who has furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past) and relatively few informant checks will be made with potential informants who would be characterized as in No. 3 (Contact with him has been insufficient to judge reliability). Most checks are made with regular paid symbol informants who fall into category No. 1 (Who has furnished reliable information in the past).

It is, therefore, believed that little purpose would be served by adding an evaluation of reliability blank to FD-209.

RECOMMENDATION

If you concur, this memorandum should be routed to the Training and Inspection Division.

Enclosure

cc: Training and Inspection Division

cc: Mr. Belmont *ABZ*

GFM:de (3) REC

161 JUN 24 1955

64 JUN 28 1955

ORIGINAL FILED IN

6-10-55

Suggestion 461-55 - That Form PD-209 (used in recording contacts with informants) be expanded to include 3 categories of reliability.

Investigative Division has no objection to this revision. Agent to whom informant assigned should provide the "reliability characterization" and by so doing on PD-209 some time will be saved as well as being more convenient for Agent preparing report in case on which informant contacted.

CSJ

7/1/55

AM

66-2542-3-✓

ENCLOSURE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

Mr. Tolson

DATE: 6/17/55

FROM :

R. T. Harbo

SUBJECT:

SUGGESTION NUMBER 461-55

Made By SA William R. Jenkins

Dallas Office

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____

SUGGESTION: That Form FD-209, copy enclosed, memo for recording contacts with Criminal and Security Informants (6-1-53), be amended to provide for Agents' evaluation of reliability of Informant by checking one of the three categories:

1. Furnished reliable information in the past;
2. Furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past;
3. Contact with him has been insufficient to judge reliability.

PRESENT PROCEDURE: Form FD-209, copy enclosed, is used to make a record of contacts made with informant. In many cases an Agent contacts his informant or potential informant on a case assigned to another Agent. The contacting Agent prepares Form FD-209 and gives a copy of it to the Agent to whom the case is assigned. When the latter Agent prepares a report he must evaluate the reliability of the informant. To do this he must either review the informant's file or contact the Agent to whom the informant is assigned.

ADVANTAGES STATED: If suggestion were adopted the Agent who prepares the report, but who did not contact the informant, would have an evaluation of the informant readily available and would not have to review the informant's file or check with the contacting Agent when writing a report.

DISADVANTAGES STATED: None.

Enclosure

DND:hcc

(2) #

NOT RECORDED
161 JUN 24 1955

11 JUN 1955

60 JUN 28 1955

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66

6/17/55

SAVINGS: Not estimated--would be small in any case.

OBSERVATIONS: SAC Murphy, Dallas, recommends adoption on the basis of advantages stated by SA Jenkins. Mr. Winterrowd, Investigative Division, has no objection to the adoption of the suggestion, stating that there would be great convenience and some time saved for the Agent preparing the report.

Inspector Hennrich, Domestic Intelligence Division, recommends unfavorably. Section 107G, Page 5, Manual of Instructions, provides that although Form FD-209 may be used to record contacts with security informants, a separate memorandum is to be placed in the informant's subfile and appropriately channelized whenever specific information is received from an informant. That memorandum should show the informant's reliability. Also, most contacts of the type covered here would be made with the regular paid symbol informants who are classified as having furnished reliable information in the past.

Training and Inspection Division recommends unfavorably. Experience shows that there can be a change in the reliability of an informant at any time. Agents writing reports should not be allowed to adopt any system which bypasses an up-to-the-minute check on the informant each time a report is written. Under the suggested procedure there could be a change in the reliability status of the informant between the time the reporting Agent receives the Form FD-209 and the time he writes the report. The report would then be inaccurate as to the status of the informant. There is less chance for such error if the Agent is required to check the informant's file for the latest information available on reliability each time he writes a report.

RECOMMENDATION: That the suggestion not be adopted.

OK

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: June 3, 1955

FROM : SAC, Dallas (56-1456)

Attention: Forms Management Desk, Training and
Inspection Division

SUBJECT: EMPLOYEES SUGGESTIONS
Addition to Form FD-209 to Provide
for Agents' Evaluation of Reliability
of Informants

461-55

Attached are the original and three copies of the suggestion of SA WILLIAM R. JENKINS, together with ten copies of FD-209, with suggested addition indicated.

The SAC concurs in the suggestion of SA WILLIAM R. JENKINS for the same reasons as shown in the suggestion.

24 Enclosures

ENCL.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/28/81 BY SP42 pmj
me JC

NOT RECORDED
JUN 24 1955

12 JUN 1955

ORIGINAL FILED IN

WAN:WMB
(3)

ack 6/9/55
Referred to Domestic Security Division 6/8/55
JUN 30 1955
12 enclosures attached by suggestion dated 6/16/55

SUGGESTED ADDITION TO FORM FD-209
TO PROVIDE FOR AGENTS' EVALUATION OF RELIABILITY OF INFORMANT

THE SUGGESTION:

That Form FD-209, memo for recording contacts with Criminal and Security Informants (6-1-53), be amended to provide for Agents' evaluation of reliability of Informant by checking one of the three categories:

1. Furnished reliable information in the past;
2. Furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past;
3. Contact with him has been insufficient to judge reliability;

PRESENT PROCEDURE:

Form FD-209 is used, when feasible, to report results of contacts with Criminal and Security Informants.

Agents Handbook, Part I, Page 35, Paragraph V, states: "All Confidential Informants shall be referred to by T symbols and the reliability indicated as either "who has furnished reliable information in the past", or "who has furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past" or "contact with him has been insufficient to judge the reliability of his information".

Very often an Agent contacts his Informant or Potential Informant on cases assigned to other Agents. As a result of this contact, the Agent prepares Form FD-209 and furnishes a copy of the form to the Agent to whom the substantive case is assigned. When this latter Agent prepares his report, he must evaluate the reliability of the Informant which, under present procedure, necessitates his either reviewing the Informant's file or contacting the Agent to whom the Informant is assigned to secure this information. Very often the Agents are assigned to different geographical areas, making the securing of this information rather difficult.

ADVANTAGES OF SUGGESTION:

If this suggestion is adopted, the Agent to whom the substantive case is assigned would have the evaluation of Informant readily available at the time of the preparation of his investigative report, and would obviate the necessity of the Agent to whom the case is assigned reviewing the Informant's file or contacting the Agent to whom the Informant is assigned to secure this information.

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/28/01 BY 2842 pmp/mcjc

Adm 6/9/55.
Rec

Referred to
Adm. Div.

66-2542-351

Handwritten initials and signatures, including "H. J. [unclear]" and "J. [unclear]".

DISADVANTAGES:

None..

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the Form FD-209 be amended as suggested above and as shown on the enclosed examples.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SAC

DATE:

FROM : SA

SUBJECT:

C.I. _____ P.C.I. _____ S.I. _____ P.S.I. _____

DATES OF CONTACT:

TITLES AND FILE #s ON WHICH CONTACTED:

PURPOSE AND RESULTS OF CONTACT:

Negative: _____ Positive: _____

PERSONAL DATA:

RATING _____

COVERAGE _____

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

EVALUATION OF RELIABILITY: (Check Appropriate Category)

1. Furnished reliable information in the past _____
2. Furnished both reliable and unreliable information in past _____
3. Contact with him has been insufficient to judge reliability _____

1- _____

1- _____

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 pjm/mcsc

46-2542-3 ✓

CONFIDENTIAL

APPROVED BY AGENCIES

Mr. A. H. Belmont

June 24, 1955

Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

class 10/20/81

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AS INFORMANTS (66-2542-3)

[redacted]

by 09/11/81 (unl)

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that [redacted] an active security informant, is a civilian employee [redacted] It is being recommended that we not advise [redacted] that this individual is cooperating with the Bureau on a confidential basis.

[redacted] was first contacted in March, 1953, in connection with an investigation of [redacted]

[redacted] Informant was cooperative and since that time has been furnishing information which he has been able to obtain on [redacted] activities in the [redacted]

[redacted] Informant is not a member of the [redacted] and he is not being paid by the Bureau for his assistance. He has been employed since 1944. [redacted]

RECOMMENDATION:

This unpaid informant, [redacted], has been furnishing valuable information to the Bureau since 1952, and on behalf of the Bureau has contacted members and sympathizers of the [redacted] It is not felt we should risk losing the informant by advising the [redacted] of his relationship with the Bureau. If at a later date it becomes apparent such action is necessary, a separate memorandum will be prepared containing a suitable recommendation.

cc - Mr. Belmont
Mr. Donohue

INDEXED - 98

66-2542-3-962
NOT RECORDED
47 JUN 30 1955

JDD:baw
(4)

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2803 [redacted] REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 FOR DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION 7-28-81

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CONFIDENTIAL

56 JUL 7 1955

Classified by 66-2542-3-962
Declassify on 7-28-81
66-2542-3-962

b7D

b7D

b7D

b7D

ORIGINAL COPY FILED 100-1-1-14

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: June 30, 1955

FROM : MR. F. J. BAUMGARDNER

SUBJECT: Security Informants
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AS INFORMANTS

CLASSIFIED AND

EXTENDED BY 128452

REASON FOR EXTENSION

FCIM II, 1-2.4.2

DATE OF REVIEW FOR

DECLASSIFICATION

(100-391709)

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Wick
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

b7D

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that [redacted] an active security informant (not paid for services, but Bureau does pay necessary expenses), is a civilian employee of the [redacted]. It is being recommended that we not advise the [redacted] that this individual is cooperating with the Bureau on a confidential basis.

SAINT LOUIS
b7D
b7E
CLASSIFIED
100-391709-1
1969-11-12

[redacted] was first contacted in May, 1952, during the course of an investigation regarding [redacted]

[redacted] member residing in [redacted]. The informant lived in the neighborhood and stated that he was closely acquainted with [redacted] for the previous six months on a social basis due to proximity of residence. The informant advised that the [redacted]

[redacted] and other functions believed to be in connection with the [redacted]

Since then informant on behalf of the Bureau became a member of the [redacted]

[redacted] and has furnished information concerning members of this organization, the majority of whom are Security Index subjects or subjects of security investigations. Informant is not a member of [redacted] and he is being paid at the present time up to [redacted] per month on a C.O.D. basis for expenses actually incurred in connection with his work for the Bureau. He has been employed since 1945 as a [redacted]

RECOMMENDATION

This active informant, [redacted] who does not receive remuneration for services, but whose expenses are paid by the Bureau has been furnishing valuable assistance and information to the [redacted]

cc: Mr. Belmont
Mr. DonohueEX-122
RECORDED-59ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED-59
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

16 JUL 7 1955

CONFIDENTIAL

64 JUL 12 1955

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-391709-1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BELMONT

Bureau since 1952 and on behalf of the Bureau has joined
the [redacted]
[redacted] He is not a member of
the [redacted] but does furnish information concerning
[redacted] It is not felt
we should risk losing the informant by advising the [redacted]
[redacted] of his relationship with the Bureau. If at a
later date it becomes apparent such action is necessary, a
separate memorandum will be prepared containing a suitable
recommendation. (u)

b7D

gms *9* *JK* *JK*

500

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE OF MAIL 6-30-55

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR NEW EVIDENCE TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS
OFFICE, ROOM 2736~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 pm vmc
JC

SUBJECT JUNE MAILREMOVED BY 59 JUL 15 1955FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-963X
66-2542-3-449

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (66-2542-3)

DATE: 7-5-55

FROM : SAC, RICHMOND

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
MONTHLY REPORT
JUNE, 1955

GENERAL

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED~~

DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 Pm

Re SAC Letter 54-68, Section J.

During Past
30 Days

Total to
Date

1. Number of interviews conducted
2. Number of Security Informants developed under this program
3. Number of Confidential Sources developed through this program

All subjects interviewed to date have been uncooperative.

No interviews presently pending.

No Agents being utilized full time.

Three Agents used part time.

RET:GTC
(3)

RECORDED-59

REGISTERED MAIL

JUL 7 1955

CLASSIFIED AND

EX-111111-71

$$f_{\text{max}} = f_{\text{min}} + \frac{f_{\text{max}} - f_{\text{min}}}{2}$$

FL130, 11/11/11

DATE OF
DECLASS

Ullrich, J.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

~~INT-SEC~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

81 JUL 12 1959

SAC, ALBANY

July 6, 1955

DIRECTOR, FBI

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES - SECURITY

59476

Security Informants - General

As a result of recent instructions many confidential sources on security matters have been changed to sources of information or discontinued entirely.

In view of the numerous changes in confidential sources, it will be necessary for each office to set out in a letter to the Bureau the name and/or symbol number, as the case may be, of each current confidential source being used on security matters.

The letter containing this information should be submitted by each office in order to reach the Bureau by July 25, 1955.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED


DATE 7/28/81 BY SP4 JRM/mc/jc

2 cc: ALL FIELD OFFICES

JDD:DE (4)

NOTE ON YELLOW: This information needed as an administrative control, measure to make certain we receive from the Field every 90 days a letter certifying the stability of each confidential source. Due to SAC Letter #55-35 which set up new standards for confidential sources many of them were changed to sources of information. When up-to-date list of all confidential sources is furnished by field, Seat of Government will follow each OS to make certain certification letter furnished by field every 90 days.

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

10211CE
RECEIVED

12 JUL 8 1955

60 JUL 13 1955

To : A. H. Belmont
 From : F. J. Baumgardner

July 7, 1955

Subject: FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AS INFORMANTS (66-2542-3)

POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANT

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that [redacted] Face, a potential security informant is a [redacted] It is being recommended that we not advise the [redacted] that [redacted] is cooperating with the Bureau on a confidential basis.

[redacted] was recommended by our Atlanta Division in a letter dated December 22, 1954, as a potential informant since [redacted] had volunteered information that he was an official of the [redacted] and due to his position would be in an excellent position to assist the Bureau. Atlanta advised that several offices had indicated an interest in Communist infiltration of the [redacted] and [redacted] could be of value. Authority was granted to develop [redacted] and he has developed a close personal friendship with a Security Index subject of Atlanta, [redacted] who has in the past admitted Communist Party membership. [redacted] has also become a subscriber to "Freedom, Incorporated," a newspaper published in New York City having subversive support.

Only one payment has been made to [redacted] namely, [redacted] on April 27, 1955. [redacted] has been employed since September 7, 1950, at the [redacted] as a [redacted]

RECOMMENDATION:

This potential security informant [redacted] [redacted] is presently under development by our Atlanta Division and on behalf of the Bureau is developing his acquaintances.

cc Mr. Belmont
 cc Mr. Baumgardner
 cc Mr. Donohue

JDD:d1j
 (4)

166-2542-3
 NOT RECORDED
 167 JUL 14 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 7/25/81 BY 2842 dmd
 mc JC

b7D

b7D

b7D

b7D

b7E

b7D

ORIGINAL FILED IN

INT

JUL 15 1955

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont

and associations in the subversive field in order to assist the Bureau. He is not a member of the Communist Party. It is not felt we should risk losing this potential informant by advising the [redacted] of his relationship with the Bureau. If at a later date it becomes apparent such action is necessary a separate memorandum will be prepared containing a suitable recommendation.

b7D

b6
b7c

Mr. Tolson ✓
Mr. Boardman ✓
Mr. Nichols ✓
Mr. Belmont ✓
Mr. Harbo ✓
Mr. Mohr ✓
Mr. Parsons ✓
Mr. Rosen ✓
Mr. Tamm ✓
Mr. Sizoo ✓
Mr. Winterrowd ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Mr. Holloman ✓
Miss Gandy ✓

Security Infts - Gen July 4, 1955

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
United States Dep't of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25 D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Thank you very much for your kind comments on my letter to the Herald Tribune regarding the use of informants.

On the chance that you may not have seen a similar letter of mine on the same general subject written earlier in the year, I am enclosing a copy.

Your appreciation of my remarks can constitute but a very small fraction of the appreciation that I, in common with all other real Americans, owe you for the day and night struggle which you have waged, all too often with meager support, for the very survival of these United States. God bless you.

JUL 6 1955

RECORDED - 71

INDEXED - 71

60 JUL 14 1955

601

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/28/81 BY 2842 pm D me JC

The Communist Program

To the **New York Times** Tribune:
The purpose of the internal security program is to protect our nation against the unending menace of subversion and espionage. Are there any loyal citizens so naive as to believe that these are not real and ever-present dangers? If so, they should heed the words of J. Edgar Hoover, who has done more than any one person in or out of government to expose the malev-

alent Communist conspiracy that endangers everything that is Christian and American. His warnings seemingly fall on deaf ears among our pseudo-intellectuals, who are more concerned over the "civil rights" of Fifth Amendment "Reds" and other traitors than for the preservation of our country.

If the internal security program produces unfair results in isolated cases, that is no indictment of the program as a whole. The important thing is that no one whose loyalty is subject to the slightest question shall be allowed to fill any government

JOHN C. SCHAEFER JR.
Hastings-on-Hudson, N. Y.
Jan. 13, 1955.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842pm
mcjc

66-2542-3-966

ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 7/13/55

FROM : SAC, Phoenix (134-00A)

SUBJECT: CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES - SECURITY INFORMATION - GENERAL

ReBulet to SAC, Albany, 7/6/55.

At the present time there are no confidential sources in the Phoenix Division which are being utilized on security matters. (u)

CWS:dec

(3)

REGISTERED

CLASSIFIED AND
EXEMPTED FROM
DECLASSIFICATION
DATE 7-28-81 BY 2842 pmc JC

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/7/81 BY 2842 pmc JC

DECLASSIFIED BY 8642 pmc JC
ON 4-21-81

83-1343

RECORDED - 19

66-2542-2-967

20 JUL 18 1955

34 JUL 26 1955

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson *V. 88*

FROM : R. T. Harbo *RTH*

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NUMBER 13-56
Made By SA Harry D. Berglund
Minneapolis, Minnesota

DATE: 7/13/55

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo *PH* _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Holloman _____
Mr. Gandy _____

SUGGESTION: That Form FD-209, copy enclosed, memo for recording contacts with Criminal and Security Informants (6-1-53), have a space included for evaluation of reliability of Informant.

ADVANTAGES STATED: Would insure best possible appraisal of the informant, thereby eliminating Agents' time in reviewing the informant's file for the purpose of determining reliability, consequently saving considerable Agent time.

DISADVANTAGES STATED: None.

OBSERVATIONS: SAC Howard, Minneapolis Office, believes Form FD-209 should contain a space for evaluation of informant in light of recent Bureau requirements that each informant be specifically evaluated in one of three ways.

This same suggestion was submitted previously by SA William R. Jenkins, Dallas Office, (Suggestion #461-55) and rejected by memorandum R. T. Harbo to Mr. Tolson dated 6/17/55. The original of this memorandum is enclosed.

RECOMMENDATION: That the suggestion not be adopted.

Enclosures (2)

hcd
(2)

27 JUL 21 1955

Security Info - Gen.

de

66-2842-3-

NOT RECORDED
167 JUL 22 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 Pm/mcjc

65 JUL 26 1955

66-2482-2580
ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-2482-2580

filed in
orig

RECORDED - 81

✓ 1 - Original plastiplat
1 - Yellow file copy
1 - J.D. Donohue
1 - Section tickler

TO: SAC, Albany
FROM: Director, FBI (66-2542-3)

DATE: July 14, 1955

59477

EX-108

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

There is enclosed a copy of page 1 of the June 30, 1955, issue of The Evening Star, Washington, D. C. daily newspaper.

In connection with the captioned program, your attention is directed to the article which describes how a group of Soviet officials moved from their residences when the apartment house in which they were living began accepting Negro tenants.

It is felt that this glaring example of racial discrimination on the part of official Soviet representatives could serve as effective discussion material in attempting to develop additional security informants.

Additional copies of this article, if required, should be reproduced in your office.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842-200

Enclosure - 1

cc Baltimore (With Enclosure - 1)
Boston (With Enclosure - 1)
Buffalo (With Enclosure - 1)
Chicago (With Enclosure - 1)
Cincinnati (With Enclosure - 1)
Cleveland (With Enclosure - 1)
Denver (With Enclosure - 1)
Detroit (With Enclosure - 1)
Indianapolis (With Enclosure - 1)
Los Angeles (With Enclosure - 1)
Milwaukee (With Enclosure - 1)
Minneapolis (With Enclosure - 1)

cc Newark (With Enclosure - 1)
New Haven (With Enclosure - 1)
New York (With Enclosure - 1)
Pittsburgh (With Enclosure - 1)
Philadelphia (With Enclosure - 1)
Portland (With Enclosure - 1)
St. Louis (With Enclosure - 1)
San Francisco (With Enclosure - 1)
Seattle (With Enclosure - 1)
Springfield (With Enclosure - 1)
Washington Field (With Enclosure - 1)

JFC:nar
(4)

22 1955

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: July 7, 1955

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
Bufile 66-2542-3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

REF ID: A66487

DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 em

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

Central Research Section regularly brings to the attention of the field material suitable for use in connection with captioned program. The June 30, 1955 issue of The Evening Star, on page one, carried an article which reported that a number of Soviet officials who were living in the same apartment house in Washington, D. C. moved to other residences when this apartment house began accepting Negro tenants. This glaring example of racial discrimination on the part of Soviet official representatives in the United States appears to be effective discussion material in connection with attempts to develop additional security informants.

Sufficient copies of the June 30, 1955 issue of The Evening Star have been purchased so that each office receiving the enclosed letter will receive the actual page one which includes instant article. This has been done to (a) give an authentic appearance to the article and (b) give the field an original for any reproduction deemed necessary. Article not reproduced at Bureau as each office is in better position to estimate any additional copies required and in view of additional mailing costs.

Plastiplat for enclosed letter being retained in Central Research Section. A copy of the pertinent article in The Evening Star has been mounted and is enclosed for your information.

RÉCOMMENDATION:

RECORDED - 81

INDEXED 81

66-2542-3-968

It is recommended that the enclosed letter to the field be approved. Upon approval it should be returned to the Central Research Section where it will be dated and arrangements completed for transmitting this material to the field.

Enclosure


RWS:nar

(4)

- 1 - Mr. A. H. Belmont
1 - J. D. Donohue
1 - Section tickler

11

Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. Boardman _____
 Mr. Nichols _____
 Mr. Belmont _____
 Mr. Harbo _____
 Mr. Mohr _____
 Mr. Parsons _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Tamm _____
 Mr. Sizoo _____
 Mr. Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Mr. Holloman _____
 Miss Gandy _____



THIS SIGN STARTED IT ALL—Since the sign (right) appeared on the lawn in front of the apartment building at 3519 Thirteenth street N.W., most of the Russian tenants have moved out. The sign says: "Colored—For Rent."

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/87 BY 22424 PMJ/mc JC

66-25423-968

ENCLOSURE

Wash. Post and Times Herald _____
 Wash. News _____
 Wash. Star ☒ _____
 N. Y. Herald Tribune _____
 N. Y. Mirror _____

Date: June 30, 1956

'Colored—For Rent' Sign Goes Up, Russians Move

A Northwest apartment house that has been a favorite residence for Soviet Embassy employees for more than 10 years has suddenly lost their favor.

(Negro families are moving in the Russians are moving out.

The building is a neat 18-unit structure at 3519 Thirteenth street N.W. Its owner, Russian-born Charles Baron, has rented apartments in it to Russian Embassy families since 1943 or 1944.

Until a month ago, 13 of the 18 units were occupied by Russians. The other five apartments held white American families.

Then, a month ago, Mr. Baron put up a sign on the front lawn reading, "Colored—For Rent." The rest of the neighborhood was already largely occupied by colored residents.

Russians Give Notice

As soon as the sign went up, the Russians began giving notice.

Eleven Russian families have left already and the last two are expected to leave in a few days. Two colored families moved in two weeks ago and seven more are due tomorrow. The five white families are still in the building.

Mr. Baron said he didn't want to draw any conclusions about why the Russians are moving, but he added:

"They are always talking about Americans. Their propaganda is that the American people are oppressing the colored people. But after the colored people began to move in."

Mr. Baron said none of the Russian tenants stayed with him for very long. He said that there

was a constant rotation with each family moving away—presumably because of new assignments—after approximately three years.

Unworried by Russians

One of the apartments already rented to colored people is occupied by Mr. and Mrs. Norman Fitz. He is a disc jockey at a radio station. They have an attractive apartment. Mrs. Fitz, who was home yesterday, said she wasn't troubled about living in the same building with Russians.

At the Soviet Embassy, the press attaché said he did not know about the families of the Thirteenth street apartment. He gave another telephone number to be called, also at the Embassy, where a reporter might reach Yuri A. Astafey, listed in the telephone book as living at the Thirteenth street address.

Mr. Astafey said he did not move immediately after the sign went up in front of the apartment. He said he did not move because of the colored people, but "I sent my family to the country and changed my apartment." He said others at the Thirteenth street address were not available at the time.

Born in Pinsk

Mr. Baron was doing various jobs in the apartment house yesterday afternoon and his brother was painting. To the question of where he was born, Mr. Baron replied, "Russia." He joined in the laughter at what seemed to be a joke on the Russian tenants. Actually, he said, he was born in Pinsk. He said Pinsk is



CHARLES BARON
Owner of the Building

—Star Staff Photo

fundamentally a Polish city, although it is in Russia now.

He came to this country in 1923 and settled in New York where he had a brother. He learned to be a plumber and saved \$2,000. In 1932 the Barons came to Washington. "With President Roosevelt," he said. They bought a grocery, saved and in 1940 bought the apartment building.

Live in Chevy Chase

The Barons live in Chevy Chase, Md. One son is an Army veteran who served overseas. He enlisted at 17 after Pearl Harbor. A second son is at the University of Maryland. The Barons' daughter was just graduated from high school and goes to college next year.

"Those people who think so much of Russia ought to go there," Mr. Baron said. "They'd come back and want to kiss every tree and every stump here. This is a holy land. A man is free. The only way you could get me out of America is dead."

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Boardman _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Parsons _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tamm _____
Mr. Sizoo _____
Mr. Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/84 BY 2842 phone JC

66-25423-968

ENCLOSURE

Wash. Post and Times Herald _____
Wash. News _____
Wash. Star ☒ _____
N. Y. Herald Tribune _____
N. Y. Mirror _____

Date: June 30, 1955

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION

Date: July 1, 1955
To: Director, FBI
From: HARRY D. BERGLUND, Special Agent Division: Minneapolis
SUGGESTION:

Include space for evaluation of confidential informant on FD-209.

ADVANTAGES OF SUGGESTION: See attached memo.

DISADVANTAGES OF SUGGESTION:

Security Info Gen.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/28/81 BY SP4/200 J
mcjc

The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States.

(Signature of Suggester)

RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS OF DIVISION HEAD:

FD-209 should contain a space for evaluation of informants in light of recent Bureau requirements that each informant be specifically evaluated in one of three ways. To add the 3 possible evaluations to the form, however, would further clutter an already cluttered form, and little space would be left for reporting of information. As an alternative, I suggest a space be added "EVALUATION - ". The agent in preparing the form would then give the one of three types of evaluation.

HDB:RSK
(5)
66-2501

166-2542-3 ✓
NOT RECORDED
167 JUL 22 1955

(Signature)
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE
(Title)

68 JUL 26 1955

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-3481-2-1

ADVANTAGES OF SUGGESTION:

I-35 of the Special Agents' Handbook reflects the following:

"All confidential informants shall be referred to by T symbols and the reliability indicated as either 'who has furnished reliable information in the past', or 'who has furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past', or 'contact with him has been insufficient to judge the reliability of his information'.

"If the latter condition exists, describe informant sufficiently to permit outside agencies to judge reliability. Avoid the use of 'unknown reliability'."

Frequently, an agent of the FBI will contact an informant on perhaps 6 or 7 separate matters, thereafter setting copies of FD-209 to the individual agents to whom each case is assigned. He thereafter will report this information in report form reflecting the information furnished by the informant. However, he is not in a position to actually furnish a true evaluation of the informant as set out in the above instructions unless he would review the informant's file in great detail.

In the interests of reporting all information accurately, including the evaluation of the informant, which responsibility should actually rest with agent to whom this particular informant is assigned, it is suggested that Form FD-209, which is ordinarily utilized in reporting results of contacts with informants, include the following:

"Who has furnished reliable information in the past"

"Who has furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past"

"Contact with him has been insufficient to judge the reliability of his information."

It is suggested a small block follow each description of the informant, and the agent to whom the informant is assigned would have the responsibility of indicating the reliability of the informant.

By utilizing this method, it would insure the best possible appraisal of the informant, thereby eliminating agents' time in reviewing the informant's file for the purpose of determining the above, consequently saving considerable agent time.

It is suggested that the Forms FD-209, which are presently in the various Field offices, could be easily amended by utilizing a mimeograph or a multilith for the purpose of inserting this descriptive data of informant at a minimum of expense to the government.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 7/22/55

FROM : SAC, BUTTE


b7D

SUBJECT: CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES - SECURITY

59478

Re Bureau letter to Albany, July 6, 1955.

There is set out below the name and/or symbol number of current Confidential Sources of the Butte Office being used on security matters. It is noted that all of these sources are on the Panel of Confidential Sources of the Butte Office.



CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 2822 dmf/mc/tp
EXACTLY 11 EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7-28-91
7-28-81

b6
b7C
b7DTHZ:pjh
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

REGISTERED
AM

RECORDED - 19

66-2542-3-969
JUL 25 1955

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S)
DATE 11/20/81

EX-108

DECLASSIFIED BY SP6 JML/SP5 BJS
ON 4-21-84
83-1343

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


60 AUG 2 1955

July 22, 1955

RECORDED - 40

INDEXED - 40

EX-121




Dear 

Your letter of July 18, 1955, was received during Mr. Hoover's absence from the city, and I am taking the liberty of acknowledging it. I know Mr. Hoover will be pleased to learn of your interest and support of the FBI.

Sincerely yours,

Helen W. Gandy
Secretary

RECEIVED MAIL ROOM
JUL 22 3 28 PM '55
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE



NOTE: No references in Bufiles identifiable with  In-absence reply considered advisable in view of his criticism of the present administration's handling of the Lattimore case and security matters in general.

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

RGE:bs
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 mtc

66 JUL 29 1955

July 18, 1955

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.

59473

Dear Mr. Hoover,

Confidential Informant

I have just received a copy of your printed release addressed TO ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS and dated June 1, 1955.

I am in complete agreement with all you say in that release, and I am very glad you have taken such a firm stand on the protection of informants who assist in the exposure of subversion. Thank you for sending me this release.

It has been a shocking revelation of the present administration's policy toward those who have aided and abetted communists and communism to have Owen Lattimore turned loose when we know that there is irrefutable evidence of his anti-American activities. It is quite obvious that there is too much lip-service to the fight against subversion and not enough actual prosecution of even the most flagrant offenders.

Knowing your dedication to the security of our country, I can well imagine how frustrated you must sometimes feel upon seeing subversives evade prosecution when you have so faithfully pursued the evidence which identifies them as enemies of our country and its form of government.

Please be assured that you have the appreciation of all loyal Americans who realize what a vicious and determined enemy you are up against, and how cunningly they have infiltrated even the highest branches of our government.

The best we can do is send you an occasional word of encouragement and our grateful prayers.

Sincerely yours,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842pm/mc JC

RECORDED 40

EX-121

JUL 27 1955

2542-3-970

M. J. Jones
CHIEF

b6
b7C

JUL 20 1955

b6
b7C

none
ack
7/27/55
ref
201

OFFICE MEMORANDUM - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: Director, FBI

DATE: 7-15-55

FROM: SAC, St. Louis

SUBJECT: LOUIS J. GUALDONI
SOURCE OF INFORMATION

REGISTERED MAIL

Reference SAC Letter 55-35 dated 5-17-55.

As per instructions contained in referenced
SAC Letter, the above Confidential Source is being converted
to Source of Information.

Security Informants - Gen'l

CSS: mbs
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/28/81 BY 2942 pnd
mc JC

JUL 22 1955

RECORDED - 47

INDEXED - 47

JUL 26 1955

EX - 113

64 AUG 2 1955

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: 7/20/55

FROM : J. P. Mohr

SUBJECT: The Congressional Record

Security *Informants*
general

Page A5288

Congressman Walter, (D) Pennsylvania, extended his remarks to include an article from the Washington Post and Times Herald entitled, "Hoover Cites Aid - Informants Praised By FBI Chief." This was set forth in a memorandum written earlier this date.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 PMD
mcjc

Original filed in: 66-2542-1138

INDEXED - 1

EX-121

NOT RECORDED
76 JUL 29 1955

66-2542-3-972

In the original of a memorandum captioned and dated as above, the Congressional Record for Tues 7/19/55 was reviewed and pertinent items were marked for the Director's attention. This form has been prepared in order that portions of a copy of the original memorandum may be clipped, mounted, and placed in appropriate Bureau case or subject matter files.

50 AUG 9 1955

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: July 15, 1955

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: PROPOSED RESEARCH STUDY ON
SECURITY INFORMANTS OF THE FBI
CENTRAL RESEARCH MATTERALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/28/81 BY 2122Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

The identification and development of security informants is one of the most difficult and important phases of the work of the Domestic Intelligence Division. Both quantity and quality are needed with a strong accent being put on the latter. Obviously, no knowledge should be ignored which could aid us in developing even more effective security informants.

It is believed that a very thorough and exacting research analysis and evaluation of all presently active security informants of the Bureau would unearth the most relevant knowledge which could assist our field office Agents materially in furthering this complex and difficult aspect of our work. For example, what percentage of our informants are Negroes and what percentage are white? Among the white informants, what races predominate? What is the percentage of women informants and men informants? What age level predominates? What occupations and professions are found to be most commonly reported among our informants? In short, every possible aspect pertinent to the development of the informants we now have should be explored. This would include such phases as economics, political, sociological, psychological, geographical, industrial, etc. This exacting research analysis of our currently active informants would definitely show certain patterns of value. On learning what these patterns are, we would better know how to proceed with the development of informants in the future.

This research study and analysis should reveal among our presently active informants five important behavior patterns: (1) a pattern showing what type of person was most easily approached and developed as a security informant; (2) a pattern showing the opposite; (3) a pattern showing what type of person makes the most reliable, controllable and effective type of informant; (4) a pattern showing the opposite; and (5) a pattern showing what the most important factors are which today make loyal and binds our presently active informants to the FBI.

WCS:nar
(4)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. J. D. Donohue
- 1 - Section tickler

RECORDED - 54
INDEXED - 54

EX-101

973
KCH

Memorandum to MR. A. H. BELMONT from W. C. Sullivan

The purpose of this study is the lifting to ever higher levels our informant development, handling and controlling work. A knowledge of these behavior patterns of our presently active informants would be of inestimable value relative to this purpose.

The occasion for referring to this study now is the completion by the Central Research Section (in rough draft stage) of an eight section study of security informant development work which points to the need for an additional analysis as is proposed here.

The Informant Desk of the Internal Security Section was consulted and believes this research study should be made.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this study be approved.

*no - not sufficient evidence coming
2/13 - still involved*

*John SP
2/13*

CH

66-2542-3-974

CHANGED TO

66-2542-3-13-394

AUG 29 1955

H. M. J.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/28/81 BY 8842 PSM
mc J C

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: August 2, 1955

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION RE USE OF
PERSONNEL FOR DEVELOPING
SECURITY INFORMANTS

DATE 7/28/81 BY 2042 PM

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
DeLoach _____
Malone _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
Wick _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

In the memorandum from Mr. G. A. Nease to Mr. Tolson, dated July 26, 1955, containing an interview with Special Agent James A. Marley, Jr., assigned to the Newark Division, it was pointed out that Marley suggested all offices should put more men on the developing of informants. SA Marley believes that men assigned to this work should carry moderate case loads so they will be familiar with the problems, but not loaded down to such an extent that they do not have time to develop informants.

We are continually stressing to the field through conferences with the SACs and Agents handling security work the absolute necessity to develop informants who can furnish coverage in the subversive field. On several occasions Agents during conferences have pointed out such specialized work requires concentrated effort which on some occasions is not possible due to the diversified workload which an Agent must carry. This is a problem which the Bureau has to face in all of its work and Agents who bring up this question are advised that the SAC must carefully and continuously divide the workload for which he is responsible and he is under instructions that whenever consistent with such workload he should consider utilizing Agents full or part time in the development of informants. It is also pointed out that we have inaugurated special programs whereby Agents have been placed full time on the developing of informants and as a result we have trained Agents who can handle this type of work, consistent with the demands upon their services required by the field office workload.

ACTION

None. We will continue to stress to SACs the necessity to utilize personnel to the fullest extent and, if necessary, on special assignments, particularly to obtain the necessary security informants to provide coverage where needed.

cc: Mr. Harbo
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Donohue

RECORDED - 17
INDEXED - 17

66-2542-3-975

JDD:DB (5)

AUG 5 1955

SEE ADDENDUM PAGE TWO

58 AUG 16 1955

ADDENDUM

August 6, 1955

It is not believed that an SAC Letter would correct the criticism implied in Special Agent James A. Marley, Jr.'s suggestion that Special Agents assigned to the development of confidential informants are carrying such a heavy case load they do not have time to develop informants. We follow carefully the security informant situation in each office and when an office reflects a decline in informant coverage, a letter is directed to that office instructing that greater efforts be made to develop more informant coverage. In the future we will include in such letters instructions to the SACs to go over the case load of Agents assigned to the development of informants to insure that they are not overloaded with other assignments to a point where they cannot spend adequate time on the development of security informants.

I feel this will have a better effect on the offices than an SAC Letter and if you agree, we will put this practice into effect.

FJB:dae

I agree -

This agent wasn't criticizing however, he was emphasizing the importance of informants & the fact that he didn't necessarily feel a man should devote full time to informants alone, but should have someone assigned to be fully familiar with the problems involved.

DATE OF MAIL 8-2-55~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR MR. CATHART TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS
OFFICE, ROOM 1736~~HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/22/81 BY 2842 pm
mcjcSUBJECT JUNE MAILREMOVED BY 59 AUG 15 1955FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-976

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

SAC, Los Angeles (134-00)

August 8, 1955

RECORDED - 19

66-2542-3-977

EX-121 Director, FBI (66-2542)

59480

SECURITY INFORMANTS

a

Reurlet dated July 22, 1955, regarding Bureau instructions contained in the Manual of Instructions, Section 107G, page 5, paragraph 6, wherein it states that in connection with receiving material and pamphlets from informants such material should not be mailed.

As you are aware, this rule was formulated to insure that a legal chain of evidence is established in the handling of such material should its introduction as evidence be necessary.

It is noted that your office in connection with the Daylet Program has found it most expedient when an informant attends a meeting late at night to have him deposit pamphlets and literature in the mail in order that it might be received the following morning.


In connection with the material submitted by informants of your office of interest to the Daylet Program the Bureau has no objection to the continuation of having the informant deposit in the mail material of interest so that it may be received by your office on the following morning. However, this should be the exception rather than the rule.

BFR:wc
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/22/81 BY SP42pm/mjc

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____



66 AUG 12 1955

FBI/LOS
AK

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 7/22/55

FROM : *WJM*
SAC, LOS ANGELES (134-00)SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS - *C. G. ...*

The Bureau's advice is being sought in the handling of material emanating from security informants.

The Manual of Instructions, Section 107 G, page 5 paragraph 6, indicates that in connection with receiving material and pamphlets from informant this material should not be mailed. This office feels that the Bureau does not intend this to be an arbitrary rule in that such material can never be received by mail under any circumstances. *))*

In connection with the Daylet Program, it has been found most expedient in the past, when an informant who has attended a meeting calls late at night, to instruct him to drop the material into the mail in order that it might be received at the post office box the following morning. The Bureau is then advised under the Daylet Program and the material is photostated and forwarded immediately. To have the informant hold this material until a personal contact can be arranged would seem to be an unnecessary delay in keeping the Bureau advised of new developments.

This matter is being brought to the attention of the Bureau not to establish a practice contrary to the instructions but to have authority in this office to have a certain flexibility in receiving informant pamphlets through the mail when good judgment dictates.

Your advice in this matter is solicited.

WJM:DRU
Registered

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY *SP5 JFC*
RECORDED - 19

EX-121

8/8/55

INT 9/2/55

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *ABK*

DATE: July 28, 1955

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *FJB*SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NUMBER 78-55
SECURITY INFORMANTS - FORM FD-209ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 pmj

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Nichols	_____
Belmont	_____
Harbo	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Sizoo	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

The attached suggestion from Special Agent J. Wayne Parrish, Chicago, recommends that Form FD-209 be amended to omit the caption: "Titles and File Numbers on Which Contacted" and merely state: "File Numbers on Which Contacted."

Form FD-209 is a record maintained in the administrative file on an informant of each contact with an informant. By means of this form there is maintained in a convenient manner the identities of the cases concerning which a specific informant is in a position to offer positive testimony.

The form requires that the titles and file numbers of each case on which the informant is contacted must be set out. It is believed that the title is necessary as the file number does not readily identify the case and merely indicates the classification number. If the file numbers only are set forth, it would be necessary to pull those files to determine the titles, and cause more work than is now required to set out the title and the file number.

ACTION:

It is recommended that the attached suggestion and this memorandum be routed to the Training and Inspection Division and that this suggestion not be adopted.

Enclosure *1 EN 71*

cc - Training and Inspection Division
Boardman
Belmont
Baumgardner
Hallerberg

RECORDED - 71

INDEXED - 71

AUG 11 1955

RHH:mjw

(6) *mjw*

E-109

78 55 A 28 11 22

78 55

Handwritten: 66-2542-3-978
JFH
E-109
Memo
Hallerberg
8/6/55 - hca

AUG 18 1955

Handwritten: 2-100
CHH

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SAC

DATE:

FROM : SA

SUBJECT:

C.I. _____ P.C.I. _____ S.I. _____ P.S.I. _____

DATES OF CONTACT:

TITLES AND FILE #s ON WHICH CONTACTED:

PURPOSE AND RESULTS OF CONTACT:

Negative: _____ Positive: _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/25/81 BY 2842 DMJ
mctc

PERSONAL DATA:

RATING _____

COVERAGE _____

1- _____

1- _____

FD-209
66-2542-3-978

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION

78-585

2 Date: July 25, 1955

To: Director, FBI

From: SAC, Chicago

Division of assignment: Chicago

SUGGESTION: Form FD-209, used for setting out contacts with informants and potential informants, requires the listing of the titles and file numbers on which contacted. Generally, an informant or potential informant will be contacted concerning several cases. Where such is the case, the listing of the case titles entails at least 50% of the effort involved in preparing Form FD-209.

It is suggested that the listing of titles of cases on which contact was made be discontinued and that the cases be listed by file number only.

Security Informants
Current practice or rule (include manual citation as ~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED~~ ~~HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED~~ ~~DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 gmc~~ ~~mcjd~~)

Advantages of suggestion:

The saving of agents' time (50% or more) which is taken up by listing the complete title of the case on which the informant or potential informant is contacted rather than the file number only which is sufficient to identify the case. Where the contacts are dictated to a stenographer there would be a saving of both stenographer and agent time by discontinuing the listing of the title and listing only the file number on which contact was made.

None

RECORDED - 71

INDEXED - 71

66-2542-3-979

The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States

16 AUG 11 1955

Recommendations and comments of Division Head

I recommend that the Bureau favorably consider this suggestion.

ack 7/26/55 - her
Ref to Donato Subcom
6 AUG 10 1955
7/27/55 - her

Signature of suggestor

Signature & Title

EXP. PROC.
JUL 26 1955

Suggestion 78-55 - That file numbers only be listed on form FD-209 to identify cases on which informant contacted rather than both file number and title.

- - - - -

Investigative Division opposed. This suggestion previously considered and not approved because of possibility of error in file number which would result in routing to wrong file. Title does not have to be complete - only enough to identify with case file. Therefore, no substantial time or typing would be saved by adoption of suggestion and possibility of filing error would be increased.

cfy
[Signature]
[Signature]
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/28/81 BY 284221
Qmdmc *[Signature]*

2-115

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

Mr. Tolson

DATE: 8/5/55

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Nichols	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Sizoo	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

FROM :

R. T. Harbo

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT:

SUGGESTION NUMBER 76-56

Made By SA J. Wayne Parrish
Chicago OfficeDATE 7/28/81 BY 2842
pmm/sj

BACKGROUND: Form FD-209, copy enclosed, is a record maintained in the administrative file on an informant of each contact with an informant. By means of this form there is maintained in a convenient manner the identities of the cases concerning which a specific informant has been contacted.

SUGGESTION: That Form FD-209 be amended to omit the caption: "Titles and File Numbers on Which Contacted" and merely state: "File Numbers on Which Contacted."

ADVANTAGES STATED: A saving of stenographic and Agent time.

DISADVANTAGES STATED: None.

OBSERVATIONS: ASAC Joseph L. Schmit, Chicago, recommends that the Bureau favorably consider this suggestion.

Mr. Keay, Domestic Intelligence Division, recommends unfavorably. It is believed that the title is necessary as the file number does not readily identify the case and merely indicates the classification number. If the file numbers only are set forth, it would be necessary to pull those files to determine the titles, and cause more work than is now required to set out the title and the file number.

Assistant Director Rosen recommends unfavorably, stating title does not have to be complete - only enough to identify with case file. No substantial time or typing would be saved by adoption of suggestion and possibility of filing error would be increased.

RECOMMENDATION: That the suggestion not be adopted.

Enclosure

hcc
(2)RECORDED - 71
INDEXED - 71

16 AUG 11 1955

65 AUG 18 1955

2-105

RECORDED - 84 SAC, Boston

September 1, 1955^{b7D}61-542-2-981
Director, FBI (66-2542-3)X-107
SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
BOSTON DIVISION

Reurlet dated August 25, 1955.

Authority is granted to utilize Special Agent Joseph E. Condon on captioned program. Be certain that Special Agent Condon is afforded the opportunity to review material furnished to your office in connection with this program prior to conducting any actual interviews.

YELLOW ONLY: SA Condon's personnel file has been reviewed and it appears that there is no reason why he should not be so utilized.

GFMc:ejp:lj
(4)ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY SP4 JMD/mc

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

SEP 15 1955

COMM - FBI
SEP 1 1955
MAILED 19

copy sent
to Mr. (100)

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (66-2542-3)
 ATT: Security Informant Section

DATE: August 25, 1955

FROM : SAC, Boston

CONFIDENTIAL

b7D

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
 Boston Division

Bureau authority is requested to utilize SA JOSEPH E. CONDON on captioned program. Agent CONDON entered on duty with the Bureau June 30, 1941. He has had several years of experience in the security field. Agent CONDON, in addition, has a persuasive personality which recommends him strongly to this type of work. This agent is intended to replace former Special Agent BILLY R. OTTE on this program. SA OTTE resigned from the Bureau in August, 1955.

In the event the Bureau approves Agent CONDON for this program, it is requested that his name be substituted for Agent OTTE's in Boslet 7/8/55 entitled "Training of Bureau Personnel in the Development and Handling of Informants" (Bufile 1-6617). This letter was submitted at the Bureau's request in connection with a special training session on informants which the Bureau was contemplating.

Agent CONDON, upon approval of the Bureau, will receive instruction regarding this program from the agents of the Boston Office presently approved for this work by the Bureau.

FMC:MIW

1 cc - Bufile 1-6617

DECLASSIFIED BY 2542 DMJ/mcr
 ON 7-28-87

Registered Mail

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES

ADVISE

BY

DATE

BY

DATE

CLASS
 10/20/81 AMT

9-1-55
 69712
 RECORDED - 84

66-2542-981

10
 1955
 PERM. FILES

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: July 30, 1955

FROM : J. P. Mohr

SUBJECT: The Congressional Record

Page A5622 Congressman Hoffman, (R) Michigan, extended his remarks to include an article from the Saturday Evening Post of July 30, 1955, entitled "Loyalty Boards Can Err, But We Still Need Them." In regard to confidential informants it is stated, "Unless we reconcile ourselves to the end of the the FBI as an effective investigating body, we must continue to protect the anonymity of FBI agents in security cases."

17 SECURITY INFORMANTS - GENERAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY SP4 JRM/mcj

Original filed in: 66-1731-1149

66-2542-3-✓

NOT RECORDED
126 AUG 17 355

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

In the original of a memorandum captioned and dated as above, the Congressional Record for ~~FRIDAY~~ 7-29-55 was reviewed and pertinent items were marked for the Director's attention. This form has been prepared in order that portions of a copy of the original memorandum may be clipped, mounted, and placed in appropriate Bureau, case or subject matter files.

60 AUG 24 1955

2183

DATE OF MAIL 8-30-55

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR MR. [REDACTED] TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS
OFFICE, [REDACTED]~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 [signature]
mjc

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Security Informants Genl.

REMOVED BY

69 SEP 12 1955

FILE NUMBER

66-2542-3-982

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION

Date: August 18, 1955

To: Director, FBI

From: Jimmie K. Tinsley

Division of assignment: Oklahoma City Field Office

SUGGESTION:

That a FD Form be approved for Special Agents to use in submitting sources of information. That this form be printed on a 3 x 5 card with spaces provided for all the information necessary as set out in Manual of Rules and Regulations Section 6, Page 6, Paragraph K. (A sample of the proposed form is attached.)

Current practice or rule (include manual citation as well as facts):
The present rule is, that the information required be typed on a plain index card.

Advantages of suggestion:

1. Savings in Agent time.
 2. This form could be filled in in ink by the Agent at the time of contact or immediately thereafter.
 3. More complete information would be submitted on each source of information, and the form would require more uniformity of information.
 4. It is believed that more sources of information would be developed with the use of this form.
 5. This form could be filed by the CCO and would not have to be retyped. This
- Disadvantages of suggestion: would result in a savings of clerical time.

None

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 emc

RECORDED - 86

INDEXED - 86

EX-107

66-2542-398

29 AUG 29 1955

The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States.

ack 8/24/55 - lca

☒ Mr.
☐ Mrs.
☐ Miss

(Signature of Suggester)

Recommendations and comments of Division Head:

In my opinion this suggestion has merit, and I see no disadvantages that would be incurred through its adoption. Recommend adoption.

(Signature & Title)

Special Agent in Charge

62 SEP 20 1955

EXP. PROC. FILED IN
AUG-22-1955
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

S A M P L E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/25/81 BY 2842 DMM/ETC

CITY _____ SOURCE OF INFORMATION _____ (FD-00)
TYPE OF INFO _____
NAME _____
EMPLOYED _____
EMPLOYMENT ADDRESS _____
EMPLOYMENT PHONE NO. _____
RESIDENCE ADDRESS _____
RESIDENCE PHONE NO. _____
REMARKS: _____

DATES OF CONTACT: _____ : _____ : _____
INDEXED BY CCO: _____ SPECIAL AGENT _____

S A M P L E

ENCLOSURE

2-11

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson *W. J. [initials]*

FROM : R. T. Harbo *RT* *Conf Infile - [illegible]*

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NUMBER 142-56
Made By Jimmie K. Tinsley
Oklahoma City Office

DATE: 8/26/55

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo *426*
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

SUGGESTION: That a FD Form, be approved for Special Agents to use in submitting sources of information. This form could be printed on a 3 x 5 card with spaces provided for all the information necessary. Sample of proposed form enclosed.

ADVANTAGES STATED: Savings in Agent time. Form could be filled out in ink by the Agent at the time of contact or immediately thereafter. More complete information would be submitted on each source of information and the form would require more uniformity of information. More sources of information would be developed with the use of this form. Form could be filed by the Chief Clerk's Office and would not have to be retyped. This would result in a savings of clerical time.

DISADVANTAGES STATED: None.

OBSERVATIONS: SAC Johnson recommends favorably, stating this suggestion has merit. SAC Johnson sees no disadvantages that would be incurred through its adoption.

Training and Inspection Division recommends unfavorably for security reasons. If an Agent took a bunch of these cards and put them in a briefcase or in his pocket, as seems likely to occur, and any of them were lost, either in a blank condition or after being filled out by the Agent after the contact had been made, the finding of the card by someone outside the Bureau could be embarrassing.

RECOMMENDATION: That the suggestion not be adopted.

Enclosure

DJD:hcc
(2)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/01 BY 2842 [illegible]

INDEXED - 85

EX-107

SEP 8 1955

SEP 16 1955

I- [illegible]

DATE OF MAIL 9-26-55

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR MR. [REDACTED] TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS~~
~~OFFICE, ROOM [REDACTED]~~ ~~HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED~~
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/22/81 BY 2842PMC
mcjc

SUBJECT

JUNE MAIL

Security Informants - Genl.

REMOVED BY

59 OCT 11 1955

FILE NUMBER

66-2542-3-986

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

9/13/55

SAC LETTER NO. 55-58.

GENL
(K) SECURITY INFORMANTS AND SOURCES - SYMBOLS -- Effective immediately, active informants and sources entering another division on temporary basis for Bureau business or for personal reasons should be referred to in initial letter to interested office by true name and symbol number if it is necessary for the other division to know the identity of the informant. Unless it is absolutely essential that the office whose territory the informant is entering know the identity of the informant, this information should not be provided inasmuch as it reduces the security of the informant. Office receiving such letter should make appropriate index cards and place same in "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" index. Subsequent letters between interested offices may then identify individual by symbol number only.

Individuals who leave the division where they have been furnishing information and do not plan to return should be immediately discontinued, their symbol number, if any, should be cancelled and their true name should be used in all administrative correspondence. Of course, if an informant is transferred to another office and remains active, his identity must still be protected.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/28/81 BY 28142/ndh
mejc

166-2542-3- ✓
NOT RECORDED
44 SEP 27 1955

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-04-2049

50 SEP 27 1955

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. ROSEN

DATE: July 25, 1955

FROM : C. H. STANLEY

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: EDNA BRAY
TREASURY
SGE

Security Informants

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

Denver letter 5/26/55, requested Chicago to supply information re 3 former Denver informants now residing in Chicago territory. Informants identified by symbol numbers only and Chicago, being unable to identify informants from symbol numbers, requested additional information from Denver. Since informants subject of previous correspondence wherein their symbol numbers were used, Chicago was asked why additional correspondence with Denver necessary.

Chicago has advised symbol numbers on previous correspondence not indexed and names of individuals not reflected in current Denver letter. Chicago noted Section 107, Manual of Instructions, states permanent symbol numbers of informants shall not be included in general office indices. Chicago advised it maintains a subsection in its informant symbol number index cards designated "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" (Section 107-K), but includes in this only symbol numbers of informants in other divisions who can furnish information concerning activities in the Chicago area. Chicago states the former Denver informants were never assigned symbol numbers in Chicago Office; that they had been carried as potential security informants, but the files are now closed following determination they have no security informant potential in Chicago area. Therefore, they are indexed by name only.

Section 107-J, Manual of Instructions, provides informants' permanent symbol numbers shall not be indexed in general office indices. Section 107-K provides all offices shall maintain an alphabetical name index on potential and active security informants, and a symbol number index card on each individual to whom a symbol number has been assigned. Paragraph 3, Section 107-K provides for a separate section in symbol number index designated "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" and a card is to be prepared for this section on each informant and source which has been furnished. Section 107-I of Manual provides that after the Bureau is advised of the permanent symbol number for an informant, in subsequent communications, it is not necessary to set forth the names of informants in the heading, but merely the symbol numbers. The same procedure is to be followed in communications between field offices.

Enclosure
100-8534
CWS:MEW
(4)

100-8534
SEP 1955
CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFIED BY SP-6 GAY/BJA
ON 11-25-94
99-1343

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/20/01 BY 2843 amj/mcjc

58 SEP 15 1955

166-2542-3-
NOT RECORDED

140 SEP

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 877 mfa/ae

REASON FOR EXTENSION

FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2

DATE OF REVIEW FOR

DECLASSIFICATION 9-12-91

9-17-81

me
CONFIDENTIAL

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN
140-8534-24
140-4358-041

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES

ADVISED BY ROUTING

SLIP(S) OF

DATE

class
10/20/81 omj

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM TO MR.. ROSEN

OBSERVATIONS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

It will be noted instructions in Section 107 of Manual relate to active and potential informants and make no mention of former discontinued informants. Chicago, therefore, did not index the symbol numbers of these discontinued informants but indexed their names only. Denver on the other hand apparently applied Section 107-I of the Manual in preparing its letter to Chicago and set out symbol numbers only (previous correspondence had identified informants by name and symbol). (u)

RECOMMENDATION:

SAC, Chicago, is of opinion the agent took proper action in requesting additional information from Denver, noting Section 107-J provides informant symbol numbers are not to be included in general office indices; and, further, the symbol numbers were not placed in the symbol number index as provided in Section 107-K as this section applies to active informants only. Chicago notes instant informants had been discontinued by Denver Office, could furnish no information of interest to Chicago, and, therefore, were indexed by names only. (u)

Section 107-I notes that once the Bureau or a field office is notified of an informant's permanent symbol number, it is not necessary to set out informant's name in subsequent correspondence, but merely the symbol number. Even though the Manual doesn't state whether instructions in 107-I do or do not apply to former discontinued informants, it appears Denver construed these instructions as applying in instant case and, therefore, set out only symbol numbers in its letter to Chicago. (u)

Since there appears to be room for misinterpretation of instructions in Section 107 with regard to discontinued informants as opposed to active informants, it is suggested this memorandum and attached Chicago letter be routed to Domestic Intelligence Division for consideration by Informant Section as to whether Manual clarification or instructions to field are warranted to cover similar situations in the future.

26 R JRM
LH

C.S.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

25 SEP 1955

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, BOSTON

(134-0)

CU

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

DATE: September 23, 1955

FEDERAL AGENCIES

AND FIELD OFFICES

ADVISED BY ROUTING

SLIP (S) OF *Classification*

DATE

5-11-79 *leg*b6
b7C

INFORMATION CONCERNING

Security Info. - Sent

This is to advise that on August 11, 1955 the above

[REDACTED] who resides at [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] who resides at [REDACTED] came to the Liaison Desk in this office to volunteer their services as informants in Security investigations. They indicated that they wanted assistance and direction from this office so that they could obtain information of value concerning individuals and organizations of a subversive nature. Both of these young ladies, incidentally, advised that they were

[REDACTED] the [REDACTED] girl [REDACTED] and the [REDACTED] girl [REDACTED]

At the time of the initial contact both of the above captioned young girls were advised that the Bureau could not utilize their services as offered.

Subsequently these young women again contacted the Liaison Agent in the office on September 18, 1955 at which time they advised that following research conducted at the Boston Public Library they obtained the name of a Communist, one [REDACTED] Bufile 100-208756, of [REDACTED]. They stated that they thereafter personally contacted [REDACTED] at his residence [REDACTED] and indicated to him that they were interested in the Communist movement. At the time of this contact with [REDACTED] the latter furnished the girls with Communist literature and advised them that he would recontact them. According to the [REDACTED] girl, [REDACTED] shortly thereafter, introduced the girls to [REDACTED] Bufile 100-14645, at [REDACTED] residence [REDACTED]. The girls at this latter meeting reiterated their desire to become acquainted with the Communist movement and [REDACTED] indicated that he would recontact them early in October.

JEC:gi

cc Bufile 100-208756

100-14645

Reg. Mail

(8)

RECORDED-37

66-2542-3-987

14 SEP 26 1955

DECLASSIFIED BY 6383 ORT LSP

ON 2/12/81

appeal # 9-21966-2542

68 OCT 10 1955

CLASSIFIED BY 2338/ST/14
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 2
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE
3-5-86/89

100-208756-
100-14645-

b6
b7C

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

b6
b7C

BS 134-0
JEC:gi

next, and make arrangements for them to attend a Communist Party Study Group.

Both [redacted] were again advised on September 18, 1955 that this Bureau did not condone the activity which they had undertaken and both were instructed to notify their parents concerning the contacts they had with this office in this matter.

It will be noted that [redacted] of recent date, furnished this office a written report concerning a Communist Party cell meeting attended by the informant on September 12, 1955 at the residence of [redacted]. According to the informant, [redacted]

[redacted] advised those present at the meeting that she was recently contacted by two young girls, one of whom she identified as the [redacted] girl, and she stated since they had indicated an interest in the affairs of the Communist Party, it was her intention at a later date to direct these girls into a Communist Party Youth group.

It will be noted that these young women made contact with known Communists with apparent ease and the possibility, therefore, existed that they might be a "plant," so it was deemed advisable to contact their parents in order to insure that the Bureau would not be embarrassed at a future date. Accordingly, on September 20, 1955 agents of this office made contact with the parents, identified as [redacted]

[redacted] and [redacted]
[redacted] Both parents were separately interviewed in the presence of their daughter and the parents were furnished all information concerning the activities of the daughters as set forth, except that furnished by [redacted]. They were also informed that since the girls were under legal age it was understood that their activities were primarily the responsibility of their parents and that the purpose of this contact was to inform them that the Bureau did not, under any circumstances, condone the activities reported and disclaimed any responsibility for their activities. Each parent indicated complete surprise and stated that they had no prior knowledge concerning their daughter's activities in this regard and they expressed sincere gratitude for the manner in which the Bureau was handling this incident. Messrs. [redacted] and [redacted] described the activities of their daughters as being in the nature of an escapade and they stated that they would take steps to insure against any recurrence of such activity.

The indices of the Boston Office contain no references concern-

BS 134-0 [redacted]

ing the above-captioned young women or their parents. It was ascertained, however, that both of these young women come from reputable homes. [redacted] is the [redacted] of a well-established [redacted] business located at [redacted]

[redacted]
is a [redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C

It is not anticipated that these young women will make any further effort to contact Communists in this area in view of the action taken by this office.

4-22 (6-15-55)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Section

28 SEP 1955, 1955

☐ Name Check Unit - Room 6523
☐ Attention _____
☐ Service Unit - Room 6524
☒ Forward to File Review
☐ Return to _____ Ext. _____

Supervisor _____
Room _____

SEP 30 1955
☒ All References
☐ Subversive References
☐ Main _____ References Only
☐ Restrict to Locality of _____
☒ Breakdown ☐ Buildup ☐ Variations
☐ Exact Name Only
☐ Exact Spelling
☐ Check for Alphabetical Loyalty Form

SUBJECT
Address

[Redacted Box]

b6
b7C

Localities _____
Birthdate & Place _____

R# 508 Date 9-27 Searcher Initial 8-25
FILE NUMBER SERIAL

NR [Redacted Box] NR
NR 105-24567-10, 1, 6, 2 NR
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 pmc
mc JC
[Handwritten Signature]

4-22 (6-15-55)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Section

1955

☐ Name Check Unit - Room 6523
☐ Attention _____
☐ Service Unit - Room 6524
☐ Forward to File Review
☐ Return to _____ Ext. _____
Supervisor
Room _____

☒ All References
☐ Subversive References
☐ Main _____ References Only
☐ Restrict to Locality of _____
☐ Breakdown ☐ Buildup ☐ Variations
☐ Exact Name Only
☐ Exact Spelling
☐ Check for Alphabetical Loyalty Form

SUBJECT
Address

b6
b7C

Localities _____
Birthdate & Place _____

R#

Date

Searcher

Initial

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/28/81 BY 28422nd
mcjc

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman **CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 22-120-10000 DATE: September 29, 1955**
 REASON FOR EXTENSION
 FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont **CONFIDENTIAL**
 SECURITY **DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 5-20-81**
 SUBJECT: **FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AS INFORMANTS** 7-28-81
 (66-2542-3)

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

SOURCE OF INFORMATION
 Bufile 100-375862

PURPOSE:

To advise that [] is employed by []

[] He has furnished valuable information to Bureau since September, 1943. [] is not an active member of any subversive organization but is associating with Communists for purpose of providing information to Bureau. Being recommended we not advise [] regarding his activities and confidential relationship with the Bureau. Also being recommended that Chicago be authorized to continue C.O.D. payments to [] for additional period of three months effective October 4, 1955. **ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE**

SYNOPSIS:

[] operated by Chicago Office as security informant from September 15, 1943, to September 22, 1954, when redesignated as confidential source as he was not an active member and did not attend affairs or meetings of any organization. On May 31, 1955, he was redesignated a source of information per instructions in SAC Letter 55-35, as he continues to furnish valuable information in connection with investigation of Czech, Slovak and Yugoslav cases; regarding Communist Party literature printed at Praga Press, Chicago, Illinois, and regarding activities at the Modern Book Store, the principal Communist propaganda outlet in Chicago.

[] is employed as []

Chicago letter dated September 19, 1955, recommends authority be granted to continue C.O.D. payments to [] at the reduced rate of up to [] per week for services rendered plus actual expenses incurred up to [] per week for a period of three months effective October 4, 1955. Previous authorization which expires October 4, 1955, was up to [] per week for services plus actual expenses up to [] per week.

64 OCT 17 1955

HHH:102 Feb (6)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100 - 375862 - 3

Memorandum to Mr. Boardman:

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Since [] is not a member of the Communist Party, but is able to furnish valuable information due to his wide acquaintance with persons active in Communist affairs in Chicago, it is not felt that we should risk losing his services by advising the [] of his activities at this time. If at a later date it becomes apparent such action is necessary, a separate memorandum will be prepared containing a suitable recommendation. *W*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b7D

W

2. Subject to your approval, it is recommended that the copy of Chicago letter dated September 19, 1955, which has been stamped "Approved," be approved and returned to Chicago Office authorizing continued C.O.D. payments at the reduced rate recommended.

W

SB

SH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Jol
red

DATE OF MAIL 10-24-55

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR MR. LAMPERT TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS
OFFICE, ROOM 2257~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/28/81 BY 2242 pon

mcjc

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Security Informants - Genl.REMOVED BY 59 NOV 7 1955FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-989

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGOUT

October 10, 1955

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

66-2447-3 ✓
New York 17, New York

DECLASSIFIED BY 5-242-200-1013
ON 7-28-81

Dear [redacted]

In line with our conversation Thursday evening, I am enclosing a copy of the Director's address before the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and I would like for you to read very carefully the last paragraph on page 4 and the first paragraph on page 5 and I think you will see the Director made the point just about as thoroughly as it is humanly possible for a person in the space allotted.

His own feeling on the need to protect innocence and the need to give truthful testimony, I think, in and of itself seems to be a pretty effective answer to some of the editorial comment which has berated the fact that the Director did not denounce Matusow in the same speech. Frankly, I think it would have been an insult to the intelligence of the IACP to have engaged in a discussion on the reprehensibility of an informant who testifies falsely. This has been a problem which law enforcement has dealt with over the years and any law enforcement agency worth its salt checks and double checks on its informants constantly. The mere fact that we have a Matusow now and then should not becloud the issue although a very studied attempt has been made to do so. The blunt truth is, for your strictly personal and confidential information, our informants have been under tremendous pressure for a long time and we see them react every time there is extended publicity denouncing informants. After all, many informants are leading double lives. The fact that it is for the good of humanity and being humans they cannot help but wonder if it is worth the gaff.

RECEIVED DIRECTOR

10/10/55

(3)

(Cover memo Mr. Nichols to Mr. Tolson 10-8-55)

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

ORIGINAL FILED IN 34 44-3886

[REDACTED]

October 10, 1955

b6
b7C

The situation has gotten to the point where it was necessary for the Director to publicly defend the honest informant seeking to do a job. There is not a single one of our informants who have not had pressure brought to bear on them by the Bureau over the years through cross checks. Even though the Director had set forth his feelings on the Matusow incident, I doubt that this would have in the slightest forestalled some of the criticism which has developed.

We have been very much surprised at the tremendous reaction from little people all over the country in writing in since the speech was made.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

L. B. Nichols

Enclosure

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson *Went*

DATE: October 8, 1955

FROM : L. B. Nichols

SUBJECT:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/30/81 BY SP4 JRM/mc3

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Mr. Gandy

[redacted] tried to get ahold of me on Wednesday and Thursday while I was in the U. S. Attorneys' Conference. I called him at home late Thursday night. He wanted to tell me about some information on the Fund for the Republic which is reported in a separate memorandum.

In the course of the conversation he stated that he did not like the trend of some of the news comments on the Director's address and that while he had not seen the complete text of the address he thought that had some reference been made reflecting indignation against those furnishing false testimony that this would completely have blocked some of the editorial comments.

I told [redacted] that it had to be read in the first place; that this was a professional talk directly to Chiefs of Police; that the matter of the difficulties encountered on reluctance of witnesses to testify and the matter of informants was developed after the Director had talked about high principles in law enforcement and after the Director had made the point that every time a police officer's testimony is disproven or questioned that all law enforcement takes a black eye; that any reasonable minded person reading the speech would, of course, realize quite clearly that the Director was quite indignant over inaccuracies in testimony and that this applied whether it came from police officers, confidential informants or reformed Communists. I further told Morris that there were certain other factors that entered into this and that for his information the protection which we had up to now had been seriously threatened by the concentrated attack and that unless something was done to reverse the field, then our security would suffer immeasurably and this was exactly what some people were trying to bring about.

[redacted] is a great deal exercised over the letdown following the Geneva Conference and he pointed out that it is his feeling that Communism is a greater threat today than ever before. I told [redacted] that he ought to get out on the stump and shout this to the house of representatives. I further told [redacted] that I would send him the full text of the Director's remarks, which I am doing with the attached letter.

cc - Mr. Boardman
cc - Mr. Belmont
Enclosure

LBN:ptm

(4)

NOT RECORDED
157 OCT 14 1955

13 OCT 13 1955

ORIGINAL FILED IN 94-4-5

b6
b7C

Security Index - 10-15-55

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

TO : SAC, Los Angeles

FROM : *JS* Director, FBISUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS - General
LOS ANGELES OFFICEALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

PERSONAL ATTENTION

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
ADVISED BY
AIR MAIL
DATE 10/22/81
CLASS 10/22/81
CONFIDENTIAL

A review of your informant coverage discloses your office is operating 25 husband-and-wife teams as security informants. The value of these combinations is recognized, particularly when developed to the point where they function effectively as a unit. There are apparent advantages in such an arrangement -- more complete and accurate information is obtained, one member need not conceal his informant activities from his spouse precluding the creation of an element of distrust, each informant may furnish information which the other could not obtain, one can usually attend meetings and functions in the absence of the other and suspicion on the part of Communist Party (CP) officials is alleviated inasmuch as membership of spouses is solicited by the Party. (S)(u)

In order to achieve the best possible informant coverage, the activities of husband-and-wife teams should be afforded proper guidance by your office. In the initial stages of their development and in order to introduce the spouse to the subversive movement, their membership in the same organizations and local groups is necessary and desirable. However, upon the completion of their indoctrination as informants and their successful penetration and establishment in the subversive movement, it is the opinion of the Bureau that efforts should be made to effect an arrangement whereby one informant is in a position to report on activities of certain groups and individuals while the spouse reports on activities of other groups and other individuals. By so doing, not only would your informant coverage be amplified but the possibility of payments for duplication of effort and information would be eliminated. There is no objection to discussing this goal with your husband-and-wife teams in order that they will understand fully the Bureau's wishes and be alert to capitalize upon any possibilities or avail themselves of opportunities presented to them for expanding their coverage. (S)(u)

The Bureau has no reluctance in making payments to informants commensurate with value received. However, in determining payments to husband-and-wife teams, certain factors should be considered in addition to those ordinarily utilized in establishing the value of an informant. As an illustration, in deciding the value of an informant who is a member of a local CP group, consideration would be afforded the (S)(u)

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 282-
EXEMPTED FROM
FOIA
DATE 7-28-81
DECLASSIFICATION

8 OCT 19 1955

NOT RECORDED
164 OCT 13 1955

CONFIDENTIAL

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-2542-3-26-3351

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to SAC, Los Angeles

following factors -- (1) the number of members in the group (2) how many of these members are Security Index subjects or key figures in your territory? (3) are any of the members active in subversive affairs on a full-time basis? (4) do the activities of the group faithfully follow high-level policy and instructions? (5) what contribution does this particular group make in forming your over-all coverage of the organization's activities in your territory? (6) what is the informant's potential for advancement? (7) what other informant coverage, live or otherwise, is available to report on activities of this group? In establishing the value of husband-and-wife teams, additional factors should be considered, such as, whether the group is adamant in the matter of introducing spouses of members into the movement, whether equal opportunity for advancement would be afforded to both, whether advancement is possible in more than one field, and whether personality traits or other motivations are present on the part of one member which would interfere with the progress of the other. For example, to effect or perpetuate a harmonious informant relationship, equal payments may be made to each, although one is more aggressive and successful in acquiring information -- the important consideration being that total payments made to BOTH are justified on an over-all basis depending upon total data received from both. *ELU*

The factors listed above are by no means all-inclusive and will vary according to the group in question and the circumstances and abilities of the informants. Therefore, payments made to husband-and-wife teams should be the subject of constant study and evaluation by your office, not only for the purpose of assuring full value received for expenditures but also to obtain as extensive and effective informant coverage as possible. *ELU*

In view of the observations cited above, you are requested to review your files on each husband-and-wife team to make certain no opportunity is being overlooked in order to expand informant coverage. Details are desired of each informant's current status in the subversive movement and that of the spouse, together with any action taken or contemplated by your office to guide one member into subversive groups other than those with which the spouse is affiliated, if feasible to do so. At the same time the payments made to each team should be analyzed and re-evaluated to insure the expenditure to both is warranted on the basis of the coverage they provide individually and collectively, in line with the comments above. This information should be incorporated in your next letter of justification requesting continuation of payments and should be repeated in subsequent *ELU*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to SAC, Los Angeles

justification letters. Your requests for payment to each team should be based on the data submitted and you should have no hesitancy in recommending decreased payments should circumstances dictate such action. To facilitate handling, it is suggested that justification for both husband and wife be forwarded in one communication. (u)

These comments apply to the following husband-and-wife teams, all of whom are paid informants, and sufficient copies of this letter are being forwarded for inclusion in each of their files --- (u)

b7D

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SAC, San Francisco

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE October 7, 1955 BY [illegible]

FROM : Director, FBI

EXC 1
DATE [illegible]

SUBJECT:

SECURITY INFORMANTS - GENERAL
SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE

PERSONAL ATTENTION

A review of your informant coverage discloses your office is operating 11 husband-and-wife teams as security informants. The value of these combinations is recognized, particularly when developed to the point where they function effectively as a unit. There are apparent advantages in such an arrangement -- more complete and accurate information is obtained, one member need not conceal his informant activities from his spouse precluding the creation of an element of distrust, each informant may furnish information which the other could not obtain, one can usually attend meetings and functions in the absence of the other and suspicion on the part of Communist Party (CP) officials is alleviated inasmuch as membership of spouses is solicited by the Party. (S)

In order to achieve the best possible informant coverage, the activities of husband-and-wife teams should be afforded proper guidance by your office. In the initial stages of their development and in order to introduce the spouse to the subversive movement, their membership in the same organizations and local groups is necessary and desirable. However, upon the completion of their indoctrination as informants and their successful penetration and establishment in the subversive movement, it is the opinion of the Bureau that efforts should be made to effect an arrangement whereby one informant is in a position to report on activities of certain groups and individuals while the spouse reports on activities of other groups and other individuals. By so doing, not only would your informant coverage be amplified but the possibility of payments for duplication of effort and information would be eliminated. There is no objection to discussing this goal with your husband-and-wife informant teams in order that they will understand fully the Bureau's wishes and be alert to capitalize upon any possibilities or avail themselves of opportunities presented to them for expanding their coverage. (S)

The Bureau has no reluctance in making payments to informants commensurate with value received. However, in determining payments to husband-and-wife teams, certain factors should be considered in addition to those ordinarily utilized in establishing the value of an informant. As an illustration, in deciding the value of an informant who is a member of a local CP group, consideration would be afforded the (S)

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY [illegible]
REASON [illegible]
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE [illegible] FOR [illegible]
DECLASSIFICATION [illegible]

NOT RECORDED

OCT 13 1955

68 OCT 18 1955

unable to find original

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-2542-2-47-3215

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to SAC, San Francisco

following factors -- (1) the number of members in the group (2) how many of these members are Security Index subjects or key figures in your territory? (3) are any of the members active in subversive affairs on a full-time basis? (4) do the activities of the group faithfully follow high-level policy and instructions? (5) what contribution does this particular group make in forming your over-all coverage of the organization's activities in your territory? (6) what is the informant's potential for advancement? (7) what other informant coverage, live or otherwise, is available to report on activities of this group? In establishing the value of husband-and-wife teams, additional factors should be considered, such as whether the group is adamant in the matter of introducing spouses of members into the movement, whether equal opportunity for advancement would be afforded to both, whether advancement is possible in more than one field, and whether personality traits or other motivations are present on the part of one member which would interfere with the progress of the other. For example, to effect or perpetuate a harmonious informant relationship, equal payments may be made to each, although one is more aggressive and successful in acquiring information -- the important consideration being that total payments made to BOTH are justified on an over-all basis depending upon total data received from both. (S)

The factors listed above are by no means all-inclusive and will vary according to the group in question and the circumstances and abilities of the informants. Therefore, payments made to husband-and-wife teams should be the subject of constant study and evaluation by your office, not only for the purpose of assuring full value received for expenditures, but also to obtain as extensive and effective informant coverage as possible. (S)

In view of the observations cited above, you are requested to review your files on each husband-and-wife team to make certain no opportunity is overlooked in order to expand informant coverage. Details are desired of each informant's current status in the subversive movement and that of the spouse, together with any action taken or contemplated by your office to guide one member into subversive groups other than those with which the spouse is affiliated, if feasible to do so. At the same time the payments made to each team should be analyzed and re-evaluated to insure the expenditure to both is warranted on the basis of the coverage they provide individually and collectively, in line with the comments above. This information should be incorporated in your next letter of justification requesting continuation of payments and should be repeated in subsequent justification letters. Your requests for payment to each team should be based on the data submitted and you should have no hesitation in (S)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to SAC, San Francisco

recommending decreased payments should circumstances dictate such action. To facilitate handling, it is suggested that justification for both husband and wife be forwarded in one communication. (X)(u)

These comments apply to the following husband-and-wife teams, all of whom are paid informants, and sufficient copies of this letter are being forwarded for inclusion in each of their files -- (X)(u)

b7D

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *10-24-55*

DATE: October 24, 1955

FROM : W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

SUBJECT:

SECURITY INFORMATION PROGRAM
Bufile 66-2542-3ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY 2044/AM

Tolson	
Boardman	
Nichols	
Belmont	
Harbo	
Mohr	
Parsons	
Rosen	
Tamm	
Strom	
Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Holloman	
Gandy	

The Central Research Section has been furnishing the field public source material suitable for use in connection with the captioned program as such material becomes available. In order to determine the effectiveness of this material, the offices in which the bulk of Communist activity is concentrated were asked to advise the Bureau of the various ways in which this material was being used. The replies from the field indicate the following uses for this material:

1. It is mailed anonymously to potential informants before they are interviewed.
2. It is furnished to potential informants during interviews as a basis for suggesting further discussion at subsequent interviews.
3. It is mailed to potential informants after they have been interviewed.
4. It is used as a basis for discussions at security squad conferences.
5. It is studied by Agents prior to interviews with potential informants as possible material for discussion during the actual interviews.

Since the material being furnished the field by the Central Research Section is of assistance in furthering the captioned program and saves considerable Agent time in the field, additional material will be furnished the field as it becomes available.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information.

JFC:nar *nar*

EX. - 122

(4)

1 - Mr. A. H. Belmont

1 - Mr. J. D. Donohue

1 - Section: tickler

RECORDED-91

24 NOV 1 1955

60 NOV 29 1956

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: November 17, 1955

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Thornton
Mr. Reddy
Mr. Bibler
Mr. DonohueSUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS - *Went*Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

In connection with Smith Act and other security trials and hearings, it is necessary under our present procedure to furnish memoranda to the Department containing information concerning current informants being considered as potential witnesses. This information is prepared by the appropriate field offices and contains data on the informant's background, value, type of information furnished, long-range potential and factors affecting his credibility. Some offices have been transmitting this information to the Bureau under the character of the case involved and the field office copies of such letters are, therefore, being filed in the field substantive case files. These communications do not mention the informant by name but use his symbol. However, they are so detailed that it would not be difficult for someone with knowledge of subversive activity in a locality to determine the name of the informant involved. Such detailed information should only be maintained in the informant's file under close supervision of the SAC, ASAC or Security Supervisor. Such information should not be set out in substantive case files maintained in the open file section of the office.

For security reasons, it is felt that instructions should be issued to the field to send such identifying data to the Bureau in memorandum form under the informant's symbol. The memorandum should be submitted by a cover letter having the case caption. The field should be told to file its copy of the cover letter in the substantive case file and the field copy of the memorandum in the informant's field file. Since present procedure has been in effect since June, 1955, the field should also be told to check back and transfer such data from any substantive case files to informant's file.

Manual and Handbook changes not necessary.

RECOMMENDATION:

EX-122

RECORDED - 82

In line with the above, there is attached an appropriate letter to all SACs. NOV 28 1955

Enclosure

JDD:ojk

(7)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/20/81 BY 2042/mc
mc j.c.

DEC 5 1955

66-16263-1
UNRECORDED (2-2-55)

SAC, Los Angeles (66-4331)

10/21/55

Director, FBI

RECORDED

FD-209'S

EX-118 Reurlet 10/3/55, same caption.

The Bureau approves your suggestion that FD-209 be amended to remind Special Agents that security informants should certify that they have furnished all information obtained by them since last contact. There will also be a place for checking compliance with this requirement. The revised form will be adopted when current supply is exhausted. In the meantime you need not require that this information be placed on the form currently in use.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 pld

Based on memo E. D. Mason to Mr. Tolson
10/17/55 re Form FD-209 DJD:hcc.

21

MAILED 6

OCT 21 1955

COMM-FBI

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

DJD:hcc
(5)

HMP

DEC 5 1955

W. J. [Signature]

Rw

66-2542-12
66-34521
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN
FBI
940105 Tests made

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson *W. J. [unclear]*

DATE: 10/21/55

FROM : E. D. Mason *✓*SUBJECT: FORM FD-209 0Security Infts. Genl.

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

During the August, 1955, inspection of the Los Angeles Office Inspector Van Pelt reminded Los Angeles personnel that Section 107-G, paragraph 3, Manual of Instructions, requires that at the time of each contact with an informant the activities of the informant since last previous contact must be carefully reviewed and a statement elicited from him that he has reported all information and data obtained since previous contact. Inspector Van Pelt recommended that the fact that this action was taken be noted on each FD-209 (copy enclosed) submitted by a contacting agent so that the supervisor can be certain this important administrative procedure is being followed. Los Angeles now suggests that FD-209 be amended to remind the contacting agent of the above requirement and to show a place where he can check compliance with this requirement. SA Donahue of the Security Informant Desk, Domestic Intelligence Division, advises that he has no objection to this proposed revision. Investigative Division advises that it is not concerned with this suggestion--Bureau rules do not require that criminal informants certify to having all information in their possession. A sample of the new form as revised by the Forms Management Desk is enclosed.

RECOMMENDATION: 1. That the enclosed amended FD-209 be approved for printing and use when present supply is exhausted. (About 3 months' supply on hand)

2. That the enclosed letter be sent to Los Angeles to advise that office that the suggested revision of the form has been approved.

Enclosures

DJD:hdc
(2)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 7/28/81 BY 28042 PDM/MEJ
 JC

66-2542-3992
NOV 29 1955

66-2541-1
 66-3482-1
 UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN
 2 AUTO-STATS MADE IN

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SAC,

DATE:

FROM : SA

SUBJECT:

C.I. _____ P.C.I. _____ S.I. _____ P.S.I. _____

DATES OF CONTACT:

TITLES AND FILE #s ON WHICH CONTACTED:

PURPOSE AND RESULTS OF CONTACT:

Negative: _____ Positive: _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 pm
mcjcINFORMANT HAS CERTIFIED THAT HE HAS FURNISHED ALL
INFORMATION IN HIS POSSESSION SINCE LAST CONTACT

PERSONAL DATA:

RATING _____

COVERAGE _____

COPIES DESTROYED

9 08 JUL 19 1961

1- _____

1- _____

PRESENT FORM, WITH
PROPOSED ADDITION
ENCLOSURE

66-2542-3-992

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SAC,

DATE:

FROM : SA

SUBJECT:

☐ CI

☐ PCI

☐ SI

☐ PSI

Dates of Contact

Titles and File #s on which contacted

Purpose and results of contact

☐ Negative

☐ Positive

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842
pmjmc
JC

☒ Security Informant certified that he has furnished all information obtained by him since last contact.

Personal data

Rating

Coverage

ENCLOSURE

66-2542-3-992

PROPOSED FORM, DESIGNED BY FORMS MANAGEMENT DESK

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, LOS ANGELES (66-4331)

SUBJECT: FD-209'S

DATE: 10/3/55

Page 184, Item 17, of the August 1955 Inspection Report covering this office made reference to FD-209's used to reflect contacts by agents with informants.

Security

The Inspector commented that notation should be made on this form by the agent to the effect that the informant has certified that he has furnished all information in his possession to the agent since last contact with the agent was made.

If the Bureau feels that this is necessary on a monthly basis, it is suggested that FD-209 be amended to contain the statement together with a place for checking by the agent in order that it will be perfectly clear that this matter has been discussed with the informant by the agent.

Copies of the suggested amended form are attached hereto.

Should the Bureau disagree with this suggestion, UACB no comment will be made on the FD-209 specifically covering this point although agents will be alerted to cover this matter with the informants.

HEW:DRU
Enc. 2, ENCL.
(3)

Noted by Longue Beach

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY SP-5 JN

PMD/mjc

RECORDED 13

EX-118

66-2542-3 993

10-27

OCT 7 1955

Handwritten signatures and initials

DEC 5 1955

1470570T made
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-3482-11 66-2542-1

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman **ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7/28/81 BY 2840** November 22, 1955

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY ATTEMPTS TO ASCERTAIN IDENTITIES OF BUREAU INFORMANTS AND POTENTIAL GOVERNMENT WITNESSES Mr. Reddy

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

Reference is made to my attached memorandum dated November 1955, wherein it was recommended and approved that we discuss with Department its previous ruling that current informants, made available as witnesses at Smith Act or other security trials and hearings, refuse to orally admit or to sign a statement that they never heard defendants advocate overthrow of Government by force and violence, even though refusal resulted in disclosure of informants and/or expulsion from the Communist Party.

This matter was discussed with Departmental representatives William E. Foley and Thomas K. Hall on 11-15-55 by Messrs. Sizoo and Baumgardner of the Bureau. It was pointed out to Foley and Hall that when current informants are classified as essential witnesses by the Department, they are, pursuant to previous instructions issued by the Department, told not to orally admit or sign a statement that they had never heard the defendants advocate overthrow of Government by force and violence. It was further pointed out that the trial or hearing may not take place for some time and that meanwhile, should the informants be contacted by defendants or defense counsel and refuse to make the oral admission or to sign the statement, they will in all probability be expelled from the Communist Party and/or exposed as informants and their services lost to the Bureau months before the trial or hearing actually begins. In addition the Department would lose the benefit of a surprise witness and the defense would have time to thoroughly explore the informant's background for cross-examination purposes.

Foley and Hall stated that in view of these considerations, current informants scheduled to testify at security trials or hearings should, if contacted, make such an oral admission or sign such a statement up to the date the trial actually starts. Each such informant should, on the same day if at all possible, submit a report stating that the oral admission was made or the statement signed not because it was true but solely to protect the informant's status. Once the trial or hearing has started, however, any current informant scheduled to testify should refuse to make such an oral admission or to sign such a statement even though exposure and/or expulsion from the Communist Party results. Mr. Hall specifically requested that the current informants scheduled to testify at the Cleveland, New Haven, and Buffalo Smith Act cases not be included under this new procedure since the two former trials are in progress and the Buffalo case is scheduled to begin in the immediate future.

RECORDED-66
INDEXED-66
NOV 23 1955
ID DEC 5 1955
66-2542-3-994

Enclosures 2 (5)
FJR:lfb:nds

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the attached SAC Letter be approved, modifying the instructions set out in previous SAC Letters pursuant to the Department's current opinion.

2. That the attached memorandum be transmitted to the Department confirming the conference of November 15, 1955.

✓
OK
M
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK

OK
OK

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: November 9, 1955

FROM :

Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT:

COMMUNIST PARTY ATTEMPTS TO ASCERTAIN
IDENTITIES OF BUREAU INFORMANTS AND
POTENTIAL GOVERNMENT WITNESSES

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 PWD/mcjc

SYNOPSIS:

SAC Whelan, San Francisco, suggests Bureau reconsider and perhaps request Department to reconsider instructions set out in SAC Letters 55-57 and 55-68 that current informants, already made available as witnesses at Smith Act or other security trials and hearings, if requested by defendants or defense counsel to orally admit or to sign a statement that they never heard the defendants advocate overthrow of Government by force, refuse to so orally admit or to sign such a statement if not completely true even though refusal results in disclosure as informants or expulsion from Communist Party.

SAC Whelan points out that this rule would appear to promote premature disclosure of identities of Government witnesses many months prior to trial, resulting in Bureau losing services of informants before absolutely necessary and giving defense time to plan attack on these witnesses. SAC Whelan suggests that these informants should follow same procedure which other informants, not made available to testify, have been instructed to follow, namely to make the oral admission or sign the statement and immediately thereafter submit detailed report to field office concerning the incident pointing out that admissions made or statement signed not because it was true but solely to prevent disclosure as informants. The Director requested that SAC Whelan's comments and suggestions be given prompt attention.

OBSERVATIONS:

SAC Letters 55-57 and 55-68 were transmitted following incident during Denver Smith Act trial wherein current informant scheduled to testify was unexpectedly contacted by a defendant and defense counsel and signed such a statement. The question as to whether informants scheduled to testify should or should not sign such a statement was presented to Department by memorandum 3-22-55 and by memorandum 3-25-55 Department instructed that current informants scheduled to testify at security trials should be instructed not to sign such a statement if not completely true, even though refusal to do so resulted in disclosure as informants and subjected them to considerable harrassment before they testified.

Enclosure 11-10-55

cc: Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Baumgardner
Mr. Reddy

EBR:nbs

(5)

11/24/55
SAC Letter 11-22-55
RECORDED-66
11-23-55
EBR: nbs

10 DEC 5 1955

EX-101

V EBR

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

At Denver trial, fact that informant signed such a statement was brought out by defense during direct examination of this informant and the statement was turned over to Government counsel and presented to and identified by the informant. Informant then testified that statement was not true but the court sustained a defense objection to the Government's question to the informant as to why he had signed the statement. Subsequently at Denver trial, another current informant scheduled to testify was requested to sign such a statement and upon his refusal was notified by registered letter that he had been expelled from the Communist Party. This fact was brought up during the direct examination of the informant and he was able to testify that he had been expelled from the Communist Party because he refused to sign a statement, which was not true, to the effect that he had never heard the defendants advocate overthrow of Government by force and violence. Government attorneys admitted that the latter situation made a much stronger impression on the jury than did the former.

CONCLUSION:

Once a current informant is made available to testify, the Bureau is committed to ultimately losing his services. Even though the procedure suggested by SAC Whelan might enable the office involved to utilize an informant a little longer, the proven fact is that the Government's case is much stronger if an informant refuses to sign such a statement because it is not true than if he signs it solely to temporarily retain his informant status but is not allowed when testifying to explain why he did, in fact, sign the statement.

RECOMMENDATION:

It appears that we should continue the procedure outlined in the SAC Letters in question, but in view of the question raised by SAC Whelan, we will, if you approve, again discuss this problem with the Department. A letter to SAC Whelan is attached explaining the factors which prompted these SAC Letters and advising that this matter is again being taken up with the Department.

9 agree
11/10 ✓
OK.
d.
- 2 -
JMS
EER

DATE OF MAIL 11-30-55~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM FILE TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN THE
OFFICE, ROOM~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 JMD
mcjc

SUBJECT

JUNE MAIL

Security Informants - Genl.

REMOVED BY

273
59 DEC 15 1955

FILE NUMBER

66-2542-3-995

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: 12/14/55

FROM : E. D. Mason

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #319-56
Made by SA William John Nolan
Los Angeles Office

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/29/81 BY SP2 JMC

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

SUGGESTION: That all memoranda from security informants be placed in a Sub A file for each investigative file, and that each memorandum be prepared on a perforated sheet with necessary five-point documentation for administrative pages of the report on the lower portion and information from the informant on the upper portion (sample enclosed). At the time of preparing the report, all channelizing memoranda will be physically removed from the Sub A section and when the agent has placed it in the proper form for documentation, he will tear along the perforated line; thus having completed administrative page for report. When the report is dictated, the channelizing memoranda will be destroyed in view of the fact that the location of the original sources will now be on the administrative pages of the report.

PRESENT PROCEDURE: All channelizing memoranda from security informants are placed in the subject file. At time of preparing a report, the agent takes detailed notes and necessary data from the memoranda to make up the administrative pages. At time of dictation, channelizing memoranda are left in subject file.

ADVANTAGES STATED: (1) At least 50% reduction of agent time in preparing report by not having to take notes nor dictate the administrative pages; increase production of reports by at least 50%. (2) Saving of space by destroying channelizing memoranda after it has been incorporated in report. (3) File reviews will be much easier and more accurate as main subject file will contain all necessary data to further the investigation. (4) Untrained clerks can be utilized to file material in the Sub A files as there is no necessity for segregating such material since it will be eventually destroyed.

DISADVANTAGES STATED: Necessity for maintaining a main file and sub file on each subject. No other disadvantages apparent.

OBSERVATIONS: SAC Malone, Los Angeles, believes the suggestion has merit and recommends Bureau considerations.

A similar suggestion, #272-53, made on June 16, 1953 by SA Leo K. Cook. He suggested that when an investigative report has been submitted in a security case and all the contents of the channelizing memorandum that were pertinent to that case have been reported, that the

Enclosure

ceh
(2)

60 JAN 3 1956

FILES

UNRECORDED - 66-2542-3-996

Memo E. D. Mason to Mr. Tolson
Re Suggestion #319-56

12/14/55

channelizing memorandum then be removed from its file and destroyed. The Executive Conference, on 7/6/53, was unanimously opposed to this suggestion. Domestic Intelligence Division recommended unfavorably, as it would involve considerable additional work on the part of agents and clerks in removing the channelizing memorandum from the file, destroying it, and maintaining an accurate record of destruction. These memos, usually one page in length, do not pose a problem of considerable bulk which would justify this additional work. It was also believed, advantageous that this channelizing memorandum remain in file for purposes of future reference.

RECOMMENDATION: On the basis of the unfavorable action given previously to a similar suggestion, it is recommended that the suggestion made by SA Nolan not be adopted. SA Nolan has been thanked for his suggestion and it appears that no further action is necessary.

JFM
BUB
M
C
V

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CHANNELIZING MEMORANDUM

TO: SAC, LOS ANGELES
FROM: SA RICHARD J. ROE
SUBJECT: LOS ANGELES COUNTY COMMUNIST PARTY
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

T Symbol _____:

[redacted] on November 15, 1955, advised that the County Committee of the Los Angeles County Communist Party met on November 14, 1955, at 124 West 6th Street, Los Angeles, California, Room 524. *(C)*

Persons present were:

[redacted]

The agenda consisted of the following:

A. - - - -
B. - - - -
C. - - - -

b6
b7C
b7D

DECLASSIFIED BY *SP-6 JRS*
ON *4-21-94*

RJR/pms

cc: 100-1763 (LACCP)
100-4486
100-4567
100-2345
100-etc.

[redacted]

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY *2812 pm Dms*
EXEMPTION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION *7-28-91*
7-28-87

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE *7/28/87* BY *2812 pm Dms*
me jc

(Perforations)

Source	Date of Activity or Description	Date Received	Agent	Location
<i>T</i> [redacted]	Co. Committee Meeting LACCP 11/14/55	11/15/55	RICHARD J. ROE	[redacted]

This part of page can be much lower or could even be at the top of the page. For more than one page memorandum it would be more convenient if it were located at bottom so that memorandum need not be separated when tearing this portion off.

66-2542-3-996 ENCLOSURE

BLOCK STAMP
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- sample -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - CC

Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Redy
Mr. Rose

The Attorney General

December 15, 1955

Director, FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMMUNIST PARTY ATTEMPTS TO
ASCERTAIN IDENTITIES OF FBI
INFORMANTS AND POTENTIAL
GOVERNMENT WITNESSES
FBI File 100-3-84

DECLASSIFIED BY 2242 DMG mcr
ON 11-2-88

Information has been developed that the Communist Party is very concerned over security, especially since the appearance of [redacted] as a Government witness in the recent Cleveland Smith Act trial. A Communist Party leader has stated the Party is going to take more stringent measures for the detection of informants in the Party. A measure was considered whereby two out-of-town people would get in the informant's car some night after the informant first testifies and beat him senseless. This would frighten other informants against testifying and identifying Party members. Another Communist Party leader to whom this idea was presented was not in favor of this suggestion. (u)

Some Communist Party leaders feel that if something is not done soon, the Party will become heavily infiltrated by "stool pigeons." The Party is especially concerned that [redacted] could name many people in Pennsylvania as Communists who have never been publicly identified as Party members should he testify before Congressional Committee. (u)

The above is submitted for your information and you will be advised of any new developments in this matter.

2cc - Mr. William P. Rogers
Deputy Attorney General

2cc - Assistant Attorney General
William F. Tompkins

cc - Bufile 66-2542

BFR:lfr:ojk
(12) 9 DEC 22 1955

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT RECORDED
CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 955207 mcr
REASON FOR EXTENSION
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 9-17-81

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

DECLASSIFIED BY 2242 DMG mcr
ON 11-2-88

YELLOW
DUPLICATE
JUN 16 1955
MAILED

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION # 117-16

Date: November 23, 1955 O

To: Director, FBI

Security INFOS - 6-111

From: SA WILLIAM JOHN NOLAN Division of assignment: Los Angeles

SUGGESTION: In connection with channelized memoranda from security informants, it is suggested that all memoranda from these informants be placed in a Sub A file for each investigative file. This suggestion is made with the view that each memorandum will be prepared on a perforated sheet with the necessary five point documentation for administrative pages of the report on the upper portion and information from the informant on the lower portion. At the time of preparing a report, all channelizing memoranda will be physically removed from the Sub A section and when the agent has placed it in the proper form for documentation, he will tear along the perforated (see attached page) Current practice or rule (include manual citation as well as facts):

The current practice is to place all channelizing from security informants into the subject file and at the time of preparing a report it is necessary for the agent to take detailed notes from the Advantages of suggestion: memorandum as well as the necessary data to make up the administrative pages. Such operation is quite time consuming. Also at the time of dictation the channelizing memorandum is left in the subject file.

(See attached page)

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DATE 7/28/81 BY SP4 BMD/mcs C

Disadvantages of suggestion: Necessity for maintaining a main and sub file on each subject. There are no other disadvantages apparent.

66-2542-3-997

RECORDED-75

66-2542-3-516

The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States.

☒ Mr.
☐ Mrs.
☐ Miss

(Signature of Suggester)

Recommendations and comments of Division Head: This suggestion appears to have merit, and Bureau consideration is recommended.

62 JAN 12 1956

John F. Malone
(Signature & Title)

EXP. 117-16

NOV 28 1955

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-2435-1

Suggestion (Continued): line thus having completed administrative page for report. When the report is dictated the channelizing will be destroyed in view of the fact that the location of the original sources will now be on the administrative pages of the report.

Advantages of Suggestion: Will decrease by at least 50 per cent the time necessary an agent must spend in preparing a report in security work; thus it will increase production of reports by at least the same amount. The agent will not have to take any notes from the memorandum nor will he have to dictate the administrative pages. The complete five point documentation can be handed to a stenographer.

(2) Appreciable saving of space. In the Los Angeles Office there is over 10,000 individual memorandum per month going to various files. In a course of a year this takes up a considerable amount of space. To destroy the memorandum after it has been incorporated in the report will gain valuable space.

(3) From the supervisory standpoint, file reviews will be much easier and more accurate as the main subject file will only contain the necessary data to further the investigation, such as reports and letters, in connection with leads and other administrative data and the supervisor will not have to be looking for pertinent material buried in innumerable items of channelizing.

(4) From a clerical viewpoint, untrained clerks can be utilized to file the material in the Sub A files in view of the fact that there is no necessity for serializing such material as it will be eventually destroyed. The saving here is in the clerical time necessary for the present serializers and necessity for training clerks in that field.

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

CLASSIFIED AND

EXTENDED BY 2892

DATE 12/10/56

FCIM, II, 1-2.2

DATE OF REVIEW FOR

DECLASSIFICATION 29-9

DATE: December 27, 1955

FROM : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

SUBJECT: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND
SIMILAR TYPES OF COVERAGE

SECURITY INFORMANTS - 29-8

GENL.

SYNOPSIS:

This is a monthly memorandum setting forth the total number of the Bureau's confidential informants and trash and mail covers as set forth in the attached pages.

OBSERVATIONS:

Technical surveillances are only utilized when necessary and are discontinued when they are no longer productive. Their number varies and as of this date we are operating 86 technical surveillances. All are being used on security investigations. Twenty-one microphone surveillances are presently in use and all are concerned with security investigations.

Security informants have decreased from 916 to 910. Potential security informants have increased from 547 to 566.

During November, 54 new criminal informants were added, while 31 former informants were deleted. This net increase of 23 informants raised the total number of criminal informants to 1576. Also during November, 1955, a net increase of 265 potential criminal informants reflected a new total in that category of 5039.

Trash covers have increased from 96 to 97. The field lists a total of 140 mail covers. Of this number, 41 are maintained in criminal fugitive cases and 6 in criminal cases other than fugitives. There are 93 mail covers in security cases.

ACTION:

This is for your information.

Enclosure

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Baumgardner
Mr. C. L. Green
Mr. A. B. Eddy
Mr. J. D. Donohue

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP
DATE 10/10/56

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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

JDD:ojk
(8)

DECLASSIFIED BY 2892
ON 11-21-84

66-2542-3-2998
JAN 10 1956

60 JAN 12 1956

2 ENCL

27

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY *SP-6 J. J. [illegible]*
ON *4-27-88*
83-7348

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY *28-81- [illegible]*
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW
DECLASSIFICATION

FIELD OFFICES	TS	MS	ISM	FMC	OMC	TC	SI	PSI	CI	PCI
Albany	0	0	1	0	0	4	11	55	24	74
Albuquerque	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	7	29	45
Anchorage	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	7	12
Atlanta	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	4	33	35
Baltimore	0	2	0	4	0	15	27	17	48	119
Birmingham	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	3	33	32
Boston	0	1	1	0	2	0	19	6	40	145
Buffalo	3	6	0	0	0	1	15	9	20	64
Butte	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	11	30	69
Charlotte	0	0	2	0	0	0	3	7	31	115
Chicago	8	0	6	1	1	5	52	27	43	313
Cincinnati	0	0	0	1	0	6	23	5	37	66
Cleveland	0	0	1	0	0	0	23	6	26	46
Dallas	0	0	1	0	0	0	9	1	33	61
Denver	1	0	0	0	0	3	4	3	29	84
Detroit	3	0	1	2	0	0	25	6	39	243
El Paso	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	22	13	41
Honolulu	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	3	20
Houston	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	3	24	50
Indianapolis	0	0	0	0	0	0	19	11	34	120
Kansas City	0	0	5	0	0	0	2	1	28	100
Knoxville	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	5	36	97
Little Rock	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	27	52

TS - Technical Surveillances
MS - Microphone Surveillances
ISM - Internal Security Mail Covers
FMC - Fugitive Mail Covers
OMC - Other Mail Covers

Legend

TC - Trash Covers
SI - Security Informants
PSI - Potential Security Informants
CI - Criminal Informants
PCI - Potential Criminal Informants

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FIELD OFFICES	TS	MS	ISM	FMC	OMC	TC	SI	PSI	CI	PCI
Los Angeles	4	0	4	4	1	2	127	37	56	140
Louisville	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	43	93
Memphis	0	0	0	1	0	0	7	4	24	57
Miami	0	0	0	1	0	0	15	2	75	101
Milwaukee	1	0	3	4	1	0	8	7	19	62
Minneapolis	0	0	1	0	0	1	26	7	49	96
Mobile	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	31	81
Newark	4	0	6	3	0	1	27	29	35	168
New Haven	0	0	0	2	0	0	20	3	17	50
New Orleans	0	0	0	0	0	1	6	2	36	73
New York	36	5	41	10	0	9	60	20	63	625
Norfolk	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	18	55
Oklahoma City	0	0	0	1	0	0	12	3	30	87
Omaha	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	1	11	42
Philadelphia	1	1	1	0	1	14	48	7	44	138
Phoenix	0	0	1	0	0	0	13	27	24	84
Pittsburgh	0	0	0	0	0	2	14	4	41	92
Portland	0	0	0	1	0	0	12	22	28	54
Richmond	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	28	32
St. Louis	0	0	1	1	0	0	17	2	27	164
Salt Lake City	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	14	32	80
San Antonio	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	18	19	53
San Diego	0	0	1	0	0	0	21	30	25	36
San Francisco	7	4	3	3	0	3	100	64	38	206
San Juan	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	16	8	41
Savannah	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	21	79
Seattle	0	1	4	0	0	1	25	17	30	130
Springfield	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	4	21	65
Washington Field	18	1	5	1	0	29	17	13	16	52
TOTALS	86	21	93	41	6	97	910	566	1576	5000

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: December 27, 1955

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

SUBJECT: [WAR PLANS - VITAL RECORDS TO QUANTICO]

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

Reference is made to the Executives Conference memorandum dated September 14, 1954, concerning the preparation of duplicate records for retention in Quantico for use in the event of an emergency.

Photostats of alphabetical 3x5 active security informant index cards have been made and are maintained in Quantico.

There are attached thirty-two Photostats of additions which should be placed in the index at Quantico alphabetically and by field division as follows:

b7D

- Baltimore
- Chicago
- Chicago
- Cincinnati
- El Paso
- Los Angeles
- Los Angeles
- Los Angeles
- Memphis
- Milwaukee
- Newark
- New Haven
- New York
- Philadelphia
- Philadelphia
- Philadelphia

Phoenix
Phoenix
Phoenix
Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh
Portland
San Diego
- San Francisco
- San Francisco
Seattle
Seattle
Seattle
Seattle
Seattle
Washington Field

The following Photostats now in Quantico should be destroyed as the informants named are no longer active.

Enclosures (32)

cc - Mr. Belmont
cc - Mr. Baumgardner
cc - Mr. Donahue

66-2542-3-1
NOT RECORDED
145 JAN 3 1956

DEC 30 1955

JDD:sad
(5)

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2822 JDD/mc
EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION
FOR EXTENSION OF ORIGINAL
AUTHORITY
7-22-81

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-6 JAB/SLP
ON 11-17-81

INSTRUCTIONS AS
TO DISSEMINATION
SEE FILE 66-17381-12-18-52

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF CLASS
DATE 10/24/81 JDD

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-17381-12

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont

CONFIDENTIAL

b7D

[redacted] - Boston
[redacted] - Buffalo
[redacted] - Chicago
[redacted] - Detroit
[redacted] Indianapolis
[redacted] Indianapolis
[redacted] - Los Angeles
[redacted] - Los Angeles
[redacted] - Los Angeles
[redacted] - Los Angeles
[redacted] - Miami
[redacted] Miami
[redacted] - Newark
[redacted] - Newark
[redacted] - Newark
[redacted] - New Haven
[redacted] - New Orleans
[redacted] - New York
[redacted] - Philadelphia
[redacted] Philadelphia
[redacted] - Philadelphia
[redacted] Pittsburgh
[redacted] San Diego
[redacted] - San Diego
[redacted] - San Francisco
[redacted] Washington Field

ACTION:

It is recommended that this memorandum and attachments be sent to Quantico in order that the necessary action may be taken. When Quantico has taken action, this memorandum should be returned to the Security Informant Desk for filing.

*Handled
at Quantico 7/23/55
wm.*

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE OF MAIL

1-11-56

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR MR. [REDACTED] TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS
OFFICE, ROOM 1496~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCL. FILED

DATE 7/28/81 BY 2842 pmd

SUBJECT

JUNE MAIL

Security Informants Genl.

²³
59 JAN 31 1956

REMOVED BY

FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-999

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman
FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont
SUBJECT : PROGRESS IN SECURITY INFORMANT
COVERAGE SINCE AUGUST, 1955
Bufile 66-2542

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENSION
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DECLASSIFICATION DATE 7-28-81

DATE: January 18, 1956

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Baumgardner
Mr. Donohue
Mr. Rose

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Ladd
Nichols
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise you of the Bureau's progress in developing security informants and placing informants in the Communist Party (CP) since August, 1955. (u)

Since August, 1955, despite the stringent security measures instituted by the Party and the tightening of informant standards and requirements in furtherance of the Bureau's informant screening program, a total of 39 informants have been placed in the CP. The Bureau was alert to capitalize on the recruiting program instituted by the CP during September, 1955, by directing established informants and potential security informants into strategic positions resulting in their recruitment by the Party. (u)

The following is the tabulation of these accomplishments: (u)

Current security informants developing and furnishing information regarding subversive matters on a continuing basis

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OTHERWISE

Individuals developed as security informants since August, 1955

Informants placed in the CP since August, 1955
Of the above 39 informants, 16 were developed as security informants since August, 1955, and 23 were under development as security informants prior to August, 1955, but have since been successful in gaining membership in the CP.

Informants developed since August, 1955, who have gained membership in front groups

Informants developed since August, 1955, who have gained membership in the Ku Klux Klan

Informants developed since August, 1955, who have gained membership in the Muslim Cult of Islam

Informants developed since August, 1955, who have gained membership in the Labor Youth League

It is to be noted one of these informants holds an official position in this group.

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY SLIP(S)
DATE 10/20/82

CONFIDENTIAL

JAN 25 1956

CONFIDENTIAL

INT. SEC.

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (ORC)
DATE 6-8-84

Classified by 6021 EAM/WS
Declassify on: OADR

64-628-28 1956

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

It is to be further noted that of the 80 individuals developed as security informants since August, 1955, 47 are in a position to furnish information regarding the CP and 66 are in a position to furnish information regarding front groups. (u)

The continued success of the Bureau in placing informants in the CP and its related front groups can be attributed to the enthusiasm and ingenuity of Agents in the field in successfully carrying out the programs instituted by the Bureau to broaden our security informant coverage.

In addition to the foregoing increase in our security coverage it should be noted that previously established informants have continued to advance in their positions of trust and importance within the CP. NY 694-S continues to make trips to Canada as a courier between the CP, USA, and leaders of the Canadian CP. He has also continued to develop a channel of communication with John Williamson, deported CP, USA, functionary now in England, who is maintaining close touch with Moscow. Informant advised that during July, 1955, Williamson discussed current CP, USA, program with Central Committee of the Communist Party, which program was criticized by this committee. This data was disseminated to the White House and interested United States Government agencies. CG 5824-S attended national conferences of the CP during August and December, 1955, and continues to furnish current information regarding the CP on the highest level. [redacted] is presently

current information regarding Party plans to [redacted] [redacted] It is to be noted the Attorney General has requested that [redacted] be made available for use as a witness in the hearing before the Subversive Activities Control Board regarding the Communist infiltration of the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (no date has been set for this hearing). [redacted] is being favorably considered as a [redacted] for the Party in its [redacted]

[redacted] recently submitted an extremely valuable review and analysis of trends in the CP since 1948. Information furnished by [redacted] in this regard was disseminated to the White House and other Governmental agencies for information purposes. (S)

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: January 24, 1956

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (66-4468A)

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #444-56
Security Informant Files

general

There is transmitted herewith an original and two copies of a suggestion submitted on January 18, 1956, by SA JAMES J. MIDDLETON of the Chicago Division. This suggestion has been examined and analyzed and the following comments are offered:

- 1.) It is believed that a considerable amount of agent hours as well as unnecessary duplication of work in reviewing informant files to extract necessary informant background information could be ~~had~~ ^{SAVED} through the adoption of this suggestion.
- 2.) Adoption would effect a standardization of background information including information regarding reliability and stability for each informant to be utilized as prosecutive reports are prepared.
- 3.) The needed information could be easily located and it would be the responsibility of the agent to whom the informant file is assigned to keep this page current.

It is recommended that the suggestion submitted be adopted by the Bureau.

cnf/jen
(4)

- (2) - Bureau (Encls. 3)
- (2) - Chicago

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/28/81 BY 2842 DMJ
mc JC

EXP. PROC. JAN-31-1956 39 (11)

RECORDED-39 66-2542-3-1000X
JAN 31 1956

Memo E.D. Mason
to Mr. Tolson 1/15/56 - lch
FBI

Mark TWO

Scopie. deleted by sugg. clk. EH

1 copy sent 3-25-56 (4)

89

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION # *144-36*
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE *7/28/81* BY *2842 pmc*
mc jc

Date: January 18, 1956

To: Director, FBI

From: SA JAMES J. MIDDLETON

Division of assignment: CHICAGO

13
SUGGESTION: RE 134 files in Field Offices:
Periodically the Bureau requests background information, reliability, availability, residence, employment, and phone number of witnesses utilized in prosecutive reports involving subjects of security investigations. It is suggested a second floating serial such as the FD-238 or a page 2 be made for FD-238 setting forth the necessary information re background, etc. The SA to whom the 134 file is assigned would have the responsibility for maintaining this summary of information in a current status.

Current practice or rule (include manual citation as well as facts):
Each SA preparing a prosecutive report has to review the 134 files on the witnesses utilized and extract necessary info. from several and sometimes numerous serials in each individual 134 file. Each SA then Advantages of suggestion: summarizes this info. in his own words.

If the info. was prepared in advance and thereafter maintained in a current status, the review of 134 files by SAs unfamiliar with the informant could be eliminated. In addition, the wording of the information submitted to the Bureau on each informant would be standardized. Any change to be made on the floating serial could be made in ink or if completely changed it would not have to be reserialized.

ENCLOSURE *66-2542-3-1000X*

Disadvantages of suggestion: "CORDED-89" *66-2542-3-9-2620*

Placing this suggestion in effect would involve some time, however, when completed on all pending 134 files the resultant saving in time would be justified.

15 FEB 8 1956

The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States.

☒ Mr.
☐ Mrs.
☐ Miss

ack 2/1/56 - cch
Referred to Domestic Intelligence Division, New York and Philadelphia for review 2/15/56 - cch
Recommendations and comments of Division Head:
1 copy sent 2/15/56
James J. Middleton
(Signature of Suggester)

I recommend that the Bureau favorably consider this suggestion.

Themo & Drayton & Mr. Tolson
2/15/56 - cch
J. S. Holtz
(Signature & Title)
ENCLOSURE

DATE OF MAIL 1-25-56

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR MR. [REDACTED] TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS
OFFICE, ROOM [REDACTED]~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 2/28/81 BY 2842 psh
mcs

SUBJECT

JUNE MAIL

Security Informants Genl.

REMOVED BY

4440

FEB 7 1956

FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-1001

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

DATE OF MAIL 1-16-56

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR MR. JAMES TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS
OFFICE, ROOM 2554-7530~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/22/91 BY 2842 pmc
mcjc

SUBJECT

JUNE MAIL

Security Informants General

REMOVED BY

57 JAN 23 1956

FILE NUMBER

66-2542-3-✓

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT